The Congregational Quarterly

EDITORIAL.

ONE cannot help noticing, whether one travels by rail or road, or watches the newspapers, the effectiveness of the advertisements of the brewery trade. We have been making a collection of these, and only refrain from quoting them lest our readers should begin to wonder whether this is not another ingenious method of advertising! Whether the propaganda be verbal or pictorial, it certainly "gets there", as the continued prosperity of the drink trade even in these days of depression abundantly proves.

The problem of the relationship of the churches to advertising is by no means an easy one; certainly the methods sometimes adopted on the other side of the Atlantic are deplorable. But one thing is clear: if advertising is worth while at all, it is worth while advertising well. When the cleverness of the brewers' advertising is compared with the "dud" methods of the churches—their colourless and tepid announcements, their platitudinous wayside pulpits—one gets a nasty jar. The devil has the good tunes once more! Here is another opportunity for the unused talent—and what an amount of it there is—in the churches. Brains forward, please!

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OF course, the best advertisement for organized religion ought to be the people who worship in the churches, the "professing Christians". Indeed, if these rightly showed forth Christ to the world, no other advertisement would be needed. But do they? Are they not sometimes just as ineffective as the other notices the churches display? At the present moment American Congregationalists have a Commission in session on Church Attendance. Its Chairman, Mr. Roger W. Babson, a statistician whose name is known all over the United States, has just expressed his opinion thus:

> A minister who sees his congregation dwindling may be quite sure it is due to one or more of these three reasons: (*a*) To sermons which are uninteresting, unintelligent and non-helpful to the *average* man and woman. (*b*) To the fact that the people who attend his church are no more honest, kinder or better employers or employees than those who do not attend. (*c*) To the lack of spiritual influence in the home and school, and the bad example as to "church going" set by a few key people in this community.

It is when there is a marked and manifest difference between Christians and other people that the Church is advertising effectively; when that takes place the empty pews and chairs will begin to fill.

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WRITING on the eve of the meeting of Parliament, and without the Government's proposals before us, it is difficult to comment on the political situation. With most readers of this journal, we imagine, we feel that at present international affairs and Indian policy are safer in the hands of the Labour Party than of any other, and for that reason regret the fall of the Labour Government. It is impossible, however, not to feel that Labour deserves its fate for its dilatoriness in tackling the economic situation. If, even three months ago, Labour had shown any willingness to press drastic retrenchment, and had proposed to make unemployment benefit fluctuate with the cost of living, the other Parties would have been obliged to back them, and a Conservative Protectionist Government would have been staved off. Now, when it is too late, members of the late Government are explaining in the *Daily Herald* what might have been done in the way of economy. But why wasn't it? Because of this slackness—for which Mr. Snowden must take a large part of the blame, for his Budget was simply a Micawber plan of waiting for something to turn up—people of progressive sympathies are reluctantly supporting a Government which is predominantly Conservative, and deploring the fact that the country seems to be drifting into a state of class war.

In view of the demand made for sacrifices all round, is it not interesting to behold the joyous alacrity with which different sections of the community are making their response? Civil servants, police, teachers—how eager they all seem to accept their share of the burden!

It is to be hoped that, despite the change of Government, there will be no panic in regard to India. The political murders now common, and the laudation of the murderers as martyrs by Hindu nationalists, has so roused English residents in India that a deplorable cry for reprisals has arisen. The meeting of the Round Table Conference is none too soon. May its results avert the outbreak so many fear.

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THE vast changes in modern life produced by such inventions as the radio, the cinema, the motor car, and electricity are nowhere having greater repercussions than in the work of Christian missions, and those responsible for missionary policy at the present time are confronted with an extremely complex and difficult situation. Indeed, so critical are the problems facing them that it is no exaggeration to say that the future of Christian Missions in India and China is in the balance, and the best brains the Churches possess should be at the service of the Missionary Societies, already sufficiently harassed by financial stringency. The rise of nationalism and the contemporary emergence of rationalism were enough in themselves to challenge the Christian missionary, and to them have now been added the various complications caused by the rapid civilizing influence of the new inventions.

A book like Dr. Chao-Kwang Wu's *The International Aspect of the Missionary Movement in China* (Milford, 11s. 6d.) gives an intelligent and thought-provoking analysis of one side of the situation. Dr. Wu, who is Professor of Political Science in Shanghai, shows how Christian missions have been entangled with political and economic questions such as the property and legal rights of missions, and the protection of missionaries by their own Governments. He believes that the future of the missionary movement is inextricably linked

> with the settlement of such outstanding problems as the abolition of extra-territoriality, the establishment of complete tariff autonomy, and the retrocession of foreign settlements and concessions. All signs point to the fact that the missionary movement has entered a new era. Never before has the movement faced such a complex situation. Now, probably for the first time, the "heathen" East in general, and China in particular, vigorously challenges the supremacy of Christendom. In this connexion one must not forget the fact that it was Christendom that sought the East, and that, therefore, if the bridge, which is beginning to span the civilizations of East and West, now falls into a new and wider chasm, it will be because Christendom refuses to change its ways or its thinking.

At the same time comes the demand that "Christian education should give up religious propaganda". Prof. Hu Shih is said to speak for the bulk of Chinese educators in asking that:

1. There should be no required worship.
2. There should be no religious teaching in the curriculum.
3. Inducements should not be held out to children and their parents to become Christians.
4. The school should not be used as an agent for propaganda.
5. Scholarship alone should be the standard in the appointment of teachers. Teachers should not be required to be Christians.
6. Christian and non-Christian children should receive exactly the same treatment.
7. There should be freedom of thought, speech, and belief.

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THE election of our American correspondent, Dr. Carl S. Patton, to the Moderatorship of the National Council of Congregational Churches in the United States, is peculiarly gratifying to us. Dr. Patton, after a period on the staff of the Chicago Theological Seminary, has recently returned to the First Congregational Church, Los Angeles, where he had a remarkable pastorate, and the honour that has come to him deservedly crowns his life's work. Dr. Patton has himself written for us an account of the meetings of the National Council. American Congregationalists always feel it something of a risk to hold their Council on the Pacific Coast, but the gatherings at Seattle have been both representative and inspiring, though there have been some criticisms on the ground that social and political questions have had an undue place in the programme to the detriment of the purely spiritual concerns of the churches.

Two features of the Council call for comment. The first is the "merger" between the Congregational and the Christian Churches, an amalgamation which causes a problem in nomenclature, for to call the churches Christian Congregational Churches or Congregational Christian Churches is obviously unsatisfactory. The proposals for union apparently went through without much opposition. It looks, however, as if no attempt were made to consult the individual churches, and in view of possible—though far from imminent—proposals for similar "mergers" in this country, it is well that we should learn from the experience of other Congregationalists. How it appears to one American Congregational minister may be gathered from a personal letter before us:

> Your Congregational soul would have been strangely disturbed to see the way in which we do things. A merger with a small denomination (the Christians) was put through by steam roller methods. The merger has not been matter for discussion in any church meeting that I know anything about, and here in the U.S.A. I expect we shall have to let the Presbyterians conserve the Congregational ideal of the individual congregation. With them the General Assembly would have had no power to do anything until the individual congregations and presbyteries had acted upon it. . . . I think the individual congregations would have favored the merger, but they were not asked whether they did or not. . . .
>
> Come over again soon and lecture, preferably to the Secretaries of our Extension Boards, Superintendents, and other officials on "Congregationalism, What it is, and How it Ought to Work".

In the union of the Methodist denominations, now almost completed, there has been ample opportunity for the local units, circuits, if not churches, to express their views. It would be strange indeed were it to be found that Methodists and Presbyterians proved themselves more willing than Baptists or Congregationalists to consult the individual churches.

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THE other feature of the National Council was the adoption of the Seminar Method. The Assembly was divided into six Seminars (for the subjects see Dr. Patton's article) which presented their findings to the full Council. From all sides we gather that this experiment was a marked success. The Council decided that the reports of the Seminars should be printed and sent to the churches for discussion—a course which will no doubt be approved by the writer of the letter above—with an intimation that the reports represented the Seminars only, and had not been adopted by the whole Council. This course seems to have been taken owing to divergence of opinion on some of the subjects discussed, and especially on Birth Control. The whole Council, however, took a far more advanced position on this subject than has been reached—or, at any rate, expressed—by the Congregational Churches in this country, a fact which is all the more

remarkable when we remember that legislation against contraceptives is still in force in the United States. The Council, while recommending the dissemination of the Federal Council's recent report on Birth Control, added this finding of the Seminar :

> Recognizing the moral and spiritual values inherent in and arising from the relation of marriage and the institution of the home, we believe the church has an important and inescapable responsibility for the creation and support of intelligent, high minded and Christian standards for these fundamental human values.
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> We believe in the ideal of marriage as the complete union of one man and one woman, who, forsaking all others, give themselves wholly unto each other. This ideal, we are convinced, cannot be realized without mutuality and freedom resulting from physical and spiritual oneness. We believe in the right of children to be wanted and the right of husband and wives to assume parenthood. Therefore, we favor the principle of voluntary child bearing, believing that it sacramentalizes physical union and safeguards the well being of the family and society.

The Seminar itself went still further, declaring :

> A majority of the committee holds that the careful and restrained use of contraceptives by married people is valid and moral. They take this position because they believe that it is important to provide for the proper spacing of children, the control of the size of the family, and the protection of mothers and children ; and because intercourse between the mates, when an expression of their spiritual union and affection, is right in itself. They are of the opinion that abstinence within marriage, except for the few, cannot be relied upon to meet these problems, and under ordinary conditions is not desirable in itself.
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> But they cannot leave this statement without further comment. They feel obliged to point out that present knowledge of birth control is incomplete, and that an element of uncertainty, although it is small, still remains. More serious is the fact that all methods are as yet more or less subject to personal factors for their effectiveness. Married couples should keep these facts in mind, and welcome children, should they come.
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> The public should be warned also against advertised nostrums, which are beginning to appear in thinly disguised forms in reputable periodicals, and so-called "bootlegged" devices at drug stores, for which there is no guarantee of safety against injury or of suitableness for individual cases. It is essential to consult the family physician or to go to established clinics or health centers for information or assistance.
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> That serious evils, such as extra-marital sex relations, may be increased by a general knowledge of contraceptives must be recognized. Such knowledge, however, is already widely disseminated, often in unfortunate ways, and will soon be universally known. Guided by the past experience of the race as to the effects of scientific discovery upon human welfare, we should expect that so revolutionary a discovery as control of conception would carry dangers as well as benefits. Society faces a new problem of control with each fresh advance of knowledge. If men generally cannot properly use the knowledge they acquire, there is no safety and no guarantee of the future. These members of the committee believe that the undesirable use of contraceptives will not

> be indulged in by most people, and that if the influence of religion and education is properly developed the progress of knowledge will not outrun the capacity of mankind for self-control. But if the sex impulse and the use of contraceptives are to be kept under moral control, the church and society, including parents, must give greater attention to the education and character building of youth and to the continued education of adult opinion.

In view of these findings, and those of the Lambeth Conference, is it not time that the Free Churches in this country, and the Congregational Churches in particular, gave some reasoned guidance to pastors and people, many of whom are greatly perplexed and troubled in spirit?

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THE reference in Sir Alexander Glegg's article, printed within, to the need of rationalization in Congregational Theological Colleges once more reminds us of our sister churches across the Atlantic. Commenting on, and approving, the use of the Seminar Method at the National Council, President Irving Maurer, of Beloit, urges the formation of a Seminar on "The Congregational Colleges and Religious Education", and goes on:

> Such a Seminar could discuss topics such as these: (1) Do we have too many Congregational colleges? (2) Are Congregational colleges having difficulty in securing teaching personnel which is Christian in philosophy and spirit? (3) What do we mean by Christian education? (4) What should be the programme in our colleges for nurturing intelligent loyalty to the Church? (5) What are we doing in our colleges with regard to courses in Biblical literature? (6) Are colleges giving adequate courses in Christian theism? (7) Are our colleges preparing students for life in a modern world?

Our own Ministerial Training Committee might do worse than take this as a basis for its activity.

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A REFERENCE in these notes to the attitude to organized religion of boys who have attended Nonconformist Public Schools has brought some interesting and encouraging facts from the Rev. A. W. Anderson, Congregational minister at Caterham, where Caterham boys worship during term. Mr. Anderson's last five Communicants' Classes have been attended by 21, 27, 28, 15, and 25 Caterham boys, not counting day boys whose families attend the church. In all, 97 boys have attended, some of them having attended two consecutive classes. Of these 97, ten, possibly eleven, hope to become ministers or missionaries.

Our correspondent goes on to give many illustrations of the excellent tone among boys and old boys of the School. One of these may be quoted:

> One old boy, under twenty, went to the Far East two years ago. He joined the Church, helped in the Choir, played Rugby for the Colony, and stood out as a manly young Christian. I had a long

letter from him in which he spoke of the rotten moral conditions of the place. He died of fever this spring. After his death I heard from his young brother that his colleagues in the East had a bet among themselves that, within a year, he would be as bad as the rest of them. The brother's significant comment was : "They have lost their bet".

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Verify your references.

MEN in every age and every Church need to remember this advice and never ignore it. The Archbishop of York, in making a broadcast appeal for funds for a new Anglican Church in New Delhi, no doubt speaking from a brief, said that the Christians there were "without expression of their faith apart from the enterprise which I am now asking you to complete", and that "among all the splendid buildings of the city there is no Christian Church". Three years ago the Baptists and Wesleyans combined to build a Free Church in New Delhi, an Anglican clergyman taking part in the Dedication Service. The Archbishop, of course, at once expressed regret when the inaccuracy of the statement was brought to his notice, and has no doubt had something to say to those who supplied his information.

In its turn the Anglican Church suffers from lack of accuracy. The *Osservatore Romano,* the official Vatican organ, recently said of England :

> The influence of the Anglican Church in the life of the country is always going steadily down. . . Churches are everywhere empty. . . . There are at present 30,000 vacant posts, and no hope of seeing them occupied. . . Family life suffers a terrible assault and is near unto ruin.

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WE are pleased to be able to print in this number the full text of the papers read at the Cambridge Theological Conference, without adding to the charge made for the issue. With this number, too, we include title-page and index for those readers who desire to bind the four numbers in one volume. Binding cases can be obtained from the publishers, price 2s. 6d.

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WE take this opportunity of thanking our readers for the support they have given the journal during the past nine years. We should like to celebrate the tenth year of our existence by doubling our circulation, a task in which we invite the co-operation of every subscriber. Can you not persuade some thoughtful young people to become regular readers? Can you not help some minister, to whom every ten shillings is a consideration, to see *The Congregational Quarterly*?

FROM FACT TO FAITH.

" RELIGION will not regain its old power until it can face change in the same spirit as does science ", says Whitehead, and Modernists eagerly assent. Indeed the enthusiasm for a theology which both in spirit and method shall be genuinely scientific sometimes outruns that caution which is no less essential to the scientific temper. For the scientific method is never completely applicable to the subject matter of theology, and there are limits beyond which it is not available at all. There is furthermore what Whitehead calls " the fact of the religious vision . . . our one ground for optimism " which may more than compensate for the inadequacy of theological hypotheses and demonstrations. The present paper is a study both of the scientific limitations of theology and of those compensations which are enjoyed, if not by theology, yet most certainly by that religious experience which it proposes to explain. For Christian faith, indeed, the Gospel is an invincible certainty. For our present purpose, however, we must regard it rather as analogous to a scientific hypothesis suggested by experience, whose truth is established only by its success in dominating and interpreting ever widening ranges of fact.

How far is the scientific method applicable in theology? Can thought in that region really move inductively—" from fact to faith "?

What do we mean by " fact "? We seem to need the term to indicate the irreducible datum in experience, stripped bare of every interpretative element—the raw material which in perception and thought we work up into the everyday objects of knowledge. It is impossible not to suppose that such ultimate data exist—*something* must be given in experience—but it is equally impossible, without interpreting it, to say what that something may be. For every definition is an interpretation. And further, although there must be pure facts, the psychologist says we cannot get at them. Even the simplest form of experience is already an interpretation of the given. Pure awareness of pure facts is a limit never actually reached. Finally, even if we could experience pure facts, we should be compelled to enjoy them in the strictest privacy. For no communication of our experience to another is possible without the use of symbols such as words which form a system of conventional meanings and generally received interpretations. But " ultimate datum " is only the ideal definition of the term " fact ". Ordinarily we apply the term, not to the raw material of experience which, like a sense datum or a toothache, is strictly private to each one of us, but to those objects and events which constitute our common world. In this looser sense of the term a 'table' is a fact, although in strictness

it is nothing of the sort, but a theory or interpretation whereby we correlate our private experience—the nearest approach we make to pure fact—and refund them into an external world common to us all. As long as we understand that commonsense " facts " are really theories we all take for granted as true for the practical purposes of living, there is no reason why we should not continue to use the term in this looser but more convenient way. By " facts ", therefore, we shall mean those commonsense interpretations which constitute our common world. At the same time, however, we shall have to recognize a residue in our experience which will be factual in the stricter sense—something which cannot be " put into words ", as we say, which cannot be framed into a theory or embalmed in a concept. This will be private to each one of us, incommunicable, and, if you like, purely subjective. But it is just here that pure subjectivity passes into pure objectivity, for this irreducible surd in our experience is nothing other than that indefinable sense of the actual, the matrix alike of self-consciousness and of consciousness of an external world, and the citadel of our inexpugnable realism.

Scientific method, we are often told, is only our ordinary commonsense reasoning refined and made more precise. This is true, however hard to believe by those who have tried to follow contemporary scientific discussions. But science, although keeping vital contact with commonsense facts at the beginning and at the end of its long chain of reasoning, has little or no concern with them in between. And before they can become subject matter for scientific treatment, commonsense facts must be whittled down by abstraction. John Smith is a commonsense fact, yet science has no use for him except as an organism, or a ponderable mass, or a system of space-time events. John Smith must be dissipated into general concepts before he can become raw material for science. Thus a new set of objects arises to represent concrete facts like John Smith, and these objects differ from John Smith in two ways: in the first place they are all exactly alike in certain assignable respects and repeatable, while he is unique, being only himself and occurring only once; and, secondly, they are comparable with one another in terms of pointer readings on a scale, while John Smith, being unique, is not comparable with anything else in ways which admit of measurement. Science, therefore, first turns commonsense facts into concepts and then expresses these in terms of their mutual relationships, or, in mathematical language, treats them as functions of one another. And the treatment can be truly mathematical in so far as the concepts, being not facts but abstractions from facts, can be precisely defined and have invariable meanings assigned to them. The world of pure physics is not the commonsense world but a system of mathematical relations symbolic of certain aspects of that world. An electron, for example, is not a fact, but only a

symbolical description of certain modes of behaviour which actually do belong to commonsense facts. This solid, motionless table is a commonsense fact and therefore a theory. The scientist, for his own special purposes, replaces this theory by another—that of a thin cloud of electrons moving at incredible speeds. Is the scientist's theory truer than that of commonsense? This question does not seem to interest the scientist. He will cheerfully admit that he has no idea what an electron *is*, or whether indeed there is actually any such thing. But he will insist that he knows what an electron *does*; and if you ask him how the non-existent can do anything, he replies that "electron" is for the present a good enough peg upon which to hang a theory of what Nature is doing. *Something*, at any rate, behaves in these ways, and it is characteristic of the scientist to be interested in the behaviour rather than in the something—which is the proper interest of the metaphysician. The electron, therefore, is only a theory which, curiously enough, may be quite fruitful for knowledge even though it be false. Not only so, but by choosing new postulates the scientist will frame a second hypothesis to fit the same observed facts and will then work with each in turn according to convenience—using one, as Sir William Bragg puts it, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and the other on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. Nothing could be more astounding than the apparent light-hearted indifference to Truth in a quarter where we supposed she had the pre-eminence. But the scientist has not apostasized. All the while he believes that his results have a cumulative significance as pointers towards the truth, and sometimes he can devise an experiment in which an observed fact will be found to be compatible with one hypothesis and incompatible with another which, until the experiment was made, had an equal truth claim.

It is often laid to the charge of theologians that they are less ready than the scientists to modify or abandon their hypotheses. This is true. One reason seems to be that the hypotheses of theology never move so far away from concrete experience as those of science, and so retain more of the solidity and inflexibility of commonsense fact. Hence, also, the mental attitude of disinterested postulation and supposition cannot work so freely. All of which is only another way of saying that a theological hypothesis is of the philosophical rather than of the scientific type. A scientific hypothesis like that of relativity deals with abstractions like velocities, world-lines, and four-dimensional events. But a theological hypothesis deals not with those abstract aspects of facts which can be pinned down in concepts and represented by algebra, but with facts in their full concreteness, facts as they are experienced by you and me. Like philosophy, theology attempts to set forth a world view, and therefore may dismiss no single fact as utterly irrelevant. Science, on the other hand, does not pretend to study the universe as a whole but only

selected, measurable characteristics of it in isolation from the rest. It is because it " divides " that science is able to " rule ". But since theology and philosophy cannot thus " divide " and select their data, they are at a disadvantage compared with science. Their subject matter is complex and unwieldly, and for this reason, and also because concrete facts are unique and therefore incommensurable, proof of their hypotheses can never reach that standard of cogency which science can secure for its demonstrations. We must therefore expect the inductive method to be less fruitful in theology than in science.

Then why employ it at all? If it be so unpromising would it not be better to discard it in favour of that other method which for centuries was regarded as alone valid, whether in theology or philosophy, the method of deduction? Doubtless it would be very convenient if reality were deducible in detail from a few first principles. But we have no reason to suppose that this is the case, and modern philosophy for the most part recognizes with Plato that we must begin with " appearances ", with the actual facts of experience, and that our hypotheses must "save the appearances", that is to say, they must account for those facts. And however it may stand with other philosophical hypotheses, the Christian world-view is by its very nature committed to the inductive method. For the Christian philosophy is unique among philosophies by reason of that very feature which determines that its method shall be inductive—proceeding from fact to faith. Let us illustrate.

If we ask, " Is Platonism true? ", we ask a perfectly unambiguous question. It can only mean, " Is that world-view known as Platonism valid as an interpretation of reality? " And it is obvious that recent controversies as to whether certain characteristics of Platonism are due to Plato himself, or to Socrates, or to the Pythagoreans, are entirely irrelevant to a discussion of the question, " Is Platonism true? " Even if it could be proved that Plato had never existed that discussion would still be unaffected. Theories of the non-historicity of Plato—even if well supported by evidence—would not give Dean Inge a single night's sleeplessness. That doughty Platonist would maintain with perfect truth that, whoever may have been its creator or mouthpiece, Platonism is a permanent possession of our civilization which can be discredited, not by proving that Plato never lived, but only by convicting the philosophy of inadequacy or error. Could the same thing be said of our Christian philosophy? Supposing it could be established that Jesus had never lived, would that be irrelevant to the question, " Is Christianity true? " There have been some hardy spirits who have maintained that Christianity is on all fours with Platonism even here. " Christianity "—they would say—" is our permanent heritage. Even though the Synoptic Jesus were an entirely mythical figure, He

would still be able to bring men into communion with God by reason of the Christ-idea whose symbol He is. The spiritual values which like any other great artistic creation He would still enshrine are timelessly real and not at the mercy of any historical enquiry ". If this be so then the question, " Is Christianity true? ", is quite unambiguous, and exactly equivalent to " Is the Christian philosophy a valid interpretation of the world? " It must be admitted that if the non-historicity of Jesus could be proved, that question could still be asked. There would still be *a* Christian philosophy, but it would no longer be the same philosophy which we know as historic Christianity. It would no longer be unique, for its uniqueness lies in this—that it takes its departure from certain alleged historical facts. The Christian religion vindicates its truth-claims by pointing to a historical figure—Jesus of Nazareth. It is to the spiritual power supposed to have been historically manifested in Him that Christianity in its dogmas describes a cosmic significance. The major premiss of its philosophical argument is not an *a priori* principle but a historic personality. And it is impossible to cut Christianity loose from its historical moorings without robbing its world-view of all philosophical uniqueness and its gospel of its burning heart—" the Word became flesh ".

Whatever starting-point other philosophies may choose, therefore, Christianity is committed to historical fact and to that method of enquiry and verification which begins with facts. There is a place for deduction in theology just as there is in science. Having formulated the hypothesis the facts suggest, you proceed to test it by " deducing " further facts from it. This method is especially prominent in science as prediction of events. But although the expression is convenient, it is not strictly accurate to speak of " deducing " facts. Facts just happen; and whatever you deduce from your hypothesis will not be a fact unless observation confirms its actual existence in the commonsense world. Under a hypothesis the planet Neptune was " deduced ", but the hypothesis was proved true only because telescopic observation confirmed the deduction. And as every hypothesis must be tested by facts, so, unless it is to be a mere random guess, it will arise from them. The Christian idea of God is a case in point. We do not receive this idea as a self-evident truth or as a miraculous revelation *ab extra*. We reach it from our experience of certain facts, central among which is the historical Jesus. It is surely obvious that the verification of Christianity—which is apologetic as distinct from dogmatic theology —must proceed by way of enquiring whether this idea of God is really implied in the facts and necessitated by them, and whether it offers an adequate interpretation of experience as a whole.

" Is Christianity true? " is therefore a two-fold question. It asks, first, whether those alleged historical facts upon which

Christianity rests are indeed facts; and, secondly, whether the meaning which on the evidence of those facts Christianity assigns to the world really explains our experience of it. And until the historical question has been answered we cannot be sure that the Christian philosophy is true, since the specific character of the philosophy depends upon that answer.

We begin therefore with the alleged facts of history. The historian's task is made more difficult by the circumstance that, as Loisy says, he knows Jesus only in the tradition, through the tradition, and across the tradition of the Church. Now the logical situation may be graphically outlined by supposing that the historian sets out to doubt everything in the tradition which can possibly be doubted. He knows that later on he will have to reinstate some of the material he now discards; but it is safer for him to be ruthless at first, since analogous cases show that tradition commonly idealizes historical personalities. Are there any facts recorded in the tradition which could not have been invented? Are there any facts so repugnant to the idealizing motive that they would have been explained away and jettisoned had that been possible? There is at least one such fact—the Crucifixion. But all that this one fact can do is to establish the bare historicity of Jesus. The historian, however, possesses at least one more fact, solid and undeniable—the belief of certain Jews that this crucified Jesus was the promised Messiah and that he had been raised from the dead. And behold, these two facts seem utterly irreconcilable! The historian must then interpret the historical Jesus and the whole situation by means of a hypothesis which will harmonize these two polar certainties. And although the historian may be right in detecting idealizations in the Synoptic interpretation of Jesus, yet in the end all that the historian can set over against it is a hypothesis of his own. And both of them and every other alternative must explain how a crucified Jew could be regarded by his disciples as the Messiah of God. It need hardly be added that those theories which deny that Jesus claimed to be the Messiah or that He was acknowledged as such prior to the Crucifixion only aggravate the difficulties they must overcome. How are we to decide among the competing interpretations? There is no final criterion; we are left with probabilities, greater or less. The crucial question in each case is whether the Jesus of this particular interpretation could have been regarded as risen Messiah in spite of the Cross. Such a representation of Jesus as that of Kirsopp Lake, for instance, seems to fail this test. Unquestionably Lake succeeds in reproducing a contemporary estimate of Jesus, who really did look like that to Simon the Pharisee. Only on purely historical grounds there seems no reason for preferring the estimate of Simon the Pharisee to that of Simon Peter, and very cogent reasons for believing that, whoever Jesus was, He was at least a far greater figure than the

rather commonplace prophet whom Lake portrays. No theory can account for the ascription of Messiahship to the crucified Jesus which does not concede to Him the historical uniqueness of a Buddha or a Mahommed. Further than this, perhaps, historical criticism cannot be expected to go, but unless it reaches this point it declares itself bankrupt.

But the Christian philosophy, although taking its rise in the historical region, cannot refrain from applying the hypothesis won there to ever-widening contexts of fact within the universe. What the belief in the " divinity " of Jesus really signifies is the sense that Jesus is greater than the actual historical events can reveal—that He is significant for reality as a whole. In the New Testament the historical Jesus becomes the Christ of the apostolic experience, and this Christ in turn is transformed into the Logos " in whom all things cohere ". Christian dogma, beginning as historical assertion and ethical commandment, runs out into a metaphysic. The " good news " about Jesus becomes a philosophy of the universe. We are not now concerned with the validity of this transformation. The point is that it was inevitable. The development of Christian doctrine is neither a rigorous deduction from a few pregnant truths, nor a biological evolution, but the natural logic of Christian experience which, like that of commonsense, is inductive and experimental—the " trying-out " of hypotheses in ever-widening circles of fact.

In general, the facts to be brought under the hypothesis are of two types—facts of public history like the Cross, and facts of intimate, personal history like the apostolic faith in Christ. If Jesus is historically significant, this truth will not be fully grasped until we see Him in the context of world-history. For revelation cannot be historical unless all history is revelation. There will be hints and fore-shadowings in Greece and Israel and in the great religions which, if our Christian hypothesis be true, will receive their complete expression in Jesus Christ. There will be blurred outlines of the Divine nature which are focused and made sharp and clear in Him. On the side of inner experience we seek first the facts of religious life in general and then the distinguishing marks of that type we call Christian. How is Christian experience related to religious experience as a whole? What is the connexion between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith? How far is Christ the clue to the facts of man's ethical life, individual and social? Finally, does Christianity provide a world-view, and how does it confront the facts of pain and sin?

Such is the programme of a theology truly inductive. Why cannot it be carried out in its fullness? Why cannot the Christian hypothesis be verified as completely and convincingly as that of relativity? One reason has already been given—Christianity is a philosophical hypothesis concerned with concrete facts of infinite

complexity. There is another reason, not unconnected with this one, to which we now turn.

We must suppose that truth does not depend upon anybody's actual knowledge of it—the facts are what they are and mean something, whether that meaning be known to us or not. But the *demonstration* of truth is obviously made for somebody's benefit, and must therefore be adapted to the conditions and existing content of that somebody's knowing. Now it is characteristic of scientific proof to present evidence which means the same thing for all observers. We have seen that the commonsense facts from which science sets out and to which it returns for the verification of its hypotheses are, strictly, commonly received interpretations of the given. Similarly, the " normal observer " to whom the scientific proof appeals is the common denominator of all knowing minds. The normal observer is not the concrete John Smith, but everybody in general and nobody in particular. There is no scientific hypothesis which can be verified without an ultimate appeal to a commonsense fact—to a perception like the position of a pointer reading on a dial, or to a self-evident truth which is perhaps a perception of another kind. And it is of the essence of the proof that anybody of normal mentality shall be convinced by it. If science is only the refinement of commonsense reasoning this is precisely what we should expect. But where is the " normal observer " to whom the Christian hypothesis can appeal? He does not exist. And for this reason many regard religion as belonging to that realm of taste and feeling within which there is proverbially no common ground for argument. If you prefer jazz to Beethoven, your preference is, of course, a fact, but so is your neighbour's, who prefers Beethoven to jazz; and nothing can be inferred from these facts which bears upon relative objective values in music. And if your neighbour says that you *ought* to prefer Beethoven, he thereby commits himself to finding objective grounds for musical preferences in order to justify that " ought "—a difficult task to perform. This absence of any common ground in religious experience comparable to the pointer readings of science has led some to the rash assertion that religion is purely subjective. But to call religion subjective is to say nothing useful and merely to darken counsel.

Why cannot religion find its " normal observer "? Not because it appeals only to private taste while science appeals to what is common to all men, but because it appeals to the whole man and not merely to the cognitive side of him. Blackguard and saint are agreed about a pointer-reading; they are not agreed as to the cogency of such proofs as Christianity can offer, for in the realm of religion the truth you see will ultimately depend upon the kind of man you want to be—upon your moral attitude to reality. *Ultimately*—for we must not shrink from " trying-out " our religious

hypotheses—and indeed faith cannot shrink from all the rigour of the argument without ceasing to be itself. But between one hypothesis and another, both of which seem to fit the facts, what is to decide?

We have now reached the limit of scientific method in theology and are forced, with modern science itself in the persons of its most farseeing representatives, to a confession that there are fundamental elements in experience which can never be caught in any logical net of human making. Some things must be taken on trust. It is a mystery—something to be accepted by " natural piety "—that anything at all should be given in experience. Philosophy has outgrown its ambition to indicate the precise reasons why there should be a world, and why, out of all conceivable alternatives, this world should have come to be. That skeleton in the scientific cupboard—the principle of uniformity—is now understood to be resolvable into two assumptions about the world which are entirely lacking in finite probability. They may be true for all that, but in the absence of any knowledge whatever one way or the other, we simply accept them —the scientist accepts them—by faith.

But does not this lead to universal agnosticism? The fact that experience cannot be completely rationalized need not invalidate any fragment of our knowledge—unless the scientific method be the only way of knowing. If even the scientist's world is reasonable only as faith makes it so, is it not worth consideration whether faith may not be a way of knowing more fundamental that science or philosophy? It is not a question of finding room for faith in the gaps science leaves, for the gaps may be closed as science advances. It is a question of the very foundations of truth and the meaning of the world as a whole—high matters for which the scientific method by reason of its own intrinsic limitations must be for ever inadequate. Is there anything self-contradictory in the thought that faith and science are both indispensable to a living knowledge of reality? If faith needs the discipline of science, so in turn does science need the inspiration of faith. And while the Christian hypothesis must prove itself reasonable under the scrutiny of the scientific temper, yet it is faith to which its final appeal is made. For faith is the activity of the whole man—of full concrete moral personality—in self-surrender to the constraint of the real world and of the real world's God. From nothing less can Christianity win a verdict.

" That's all very well ", says someone; " what you have done is merely to say ' Here is our Christian hypothesis. If our arguments convince you, well and good; if not, so much the worse for you '. And now you want to invent a new way of knowing to camouflage the ugly fact that your theology is mere guess-work ". Now in reply we would suggest that what are called "values" are evidently known and that the scientific way of knowing is clearly not the way

in which we know them. Are values facts? However different from pointer-readings, they are certainly characterizations of reality. If they are " merely subjective ", are pointer-readings in any better case? And in any case, even if all values are read into the universe by minds, are not minds themselves significant for philosophy? Whether we place values on the subjective or on the objective side of the account, that account must be made to balance somehow—metaphysics must still confront a fact about the real, namely, that we, being members of the universe, interpret it and qualify it as good, beautiful, and rational. Not only valuings but values, therefore, are facts which qualify reality. And values are wholes, harmonies, known by an impression or intuition, and not by an analytical perception as parts in relation are known. They constrain the whole man, demanding not only to be perceived but to be valued, and until rightly valued they are not truly known.

Like the moral imperative and the æsthetic vision, faith has its own intrinsic authority. It is at once absolute and relative. The latter aspect need not detain us. When St. Teresa declares that she saw how one God could be in three Persons, and in what manner the Virgin Mary was assumed into heaven, we distinguish between what she saw and her interpretation of it. Her experience was real and authoritative, but the interpretations she assigns to it are those to be expected in a Catholic believer. A Buddhist mystic will have an experience which, so far as psychological analysis takes us, seems almost indistinguishable from St. Teresa's, but which he will interpret quite differently. The issue between Christian and Buddhist interpretations of religious experience cannot be decided except by appraising their respective merits and defects as explanations of the world and their practical issues in individuals and societies. In so far as this is a philosophical question, the answer cannot confer upon either more than a degree of probability. The philosopher continues to regard Christian theism as a somewhat faulty, though reasonable, hypothesis. This need not surprise us, since no fragment of actuality can be completely rationalized. If Christian faith were belief in the adequacy of its hypothesis it would merit the charge of jumping to conclusions upon insufficient evidence. But the finality, the absoluteness, of faith does not lie here. The disciplined and instructed believer is as anxious as the philosopher to declare his hypothesis inadequate; but while the philosopher condemns it because it asserts too much, the believer is dissatisfied with it because it expresses too little. There was in the original experience a wealth which is but meagrely represented in any theoretical scheme, and a finality which remains untouched by the inevitable relativity and imperfection of all theologies. We have an analogy in the categorical imperative of conscience where finality is recognized as belonging to the *form* as distinct from the *content* of the moral judgment. In the

last resort the finality, and therefore the authority, of faith resides in the region of actuality and of the soul's immediate commerce with the given. We may call this authoritative moment in experience an intuition, an " inner Light ", provided we admit that it cannot be confined to "religious experience" in the more restricted meaning of that phrase. There is no specific instinct or faculty exclusively at the service of supernatural influences. This moment of living contact with the real will occur in the experience of all men, although in varying degrees of intensity and constancy. At its lowest levels it will be that vague feeling of actuality—the sense of living in a real world, whereby we know we are awake and not dreaming. What of its higher manifestations? What of the supreme moment of religious faith?

Faith's final authority is neither purely objective nor purely subjective, for both of these are mere fictions, ideal limits within experience. Those who contend for a purely objective authority are seeking some power which can dominate our private whims and desires; while those who declare that faith's authority is in the inmost recesses of the soul are really seeking a power which is authoritative by reason of its congruity with our truest selves, which strikes out an echo from the submerged heroisms of our manhood. Faith's authority meets both demands. There is a " given "—a fact which appears—and a self to whom it appears. The fact will constrain the self and the self will surrender to that constraint. And because of the congruity between the deepest meaning of the fact and the ultimate nature of the self, the constraint will be perfect freedom and the surrender the winning of the soul. And the entire experience will be at once the stimulus to all reasoning and spiritual activity, and the touchstone and final refuge of all values. Are there such moments in experience? Such, surely, are visions of noble ideals, high resolves to follow truth whithersoever it leads, the austere self-dedication of the scientist, and every act of moral grandeur or sacrificial love. In moments like these, and in reflexion upon them, we see that such experiences can be meaningless only if all experience is meaningless. The possibilities are narrowed down. Either these moments reveal the true nature of things, or they are sheer irrelevancies in an irrational world. And when from these foot-hills we turn our gaze to that lonely peak where the Cross stands, the issue becomes daylight clear. We reach an "either . . . or"—an absolute disjunction which exhausts the possibilities. The Cross is either the clue to the world's last meaning or the greatest problem of all in a universe for ever alien to man. But which?

In science, as we have said, it is sometimes possible to devise a " crucial instance "—an experiment which in establishing one hypothesis will finally exclude another. But even this experiment must still make its appeal to the normal observer—the detached

watcher of crucibles and clock dials. And so for yet another reason Christian experience lacks its normal observer, since none of us can be detached watchers—mere "spectators of all time and all existence". We are combatants, and the constraint of the real world moves us not only to rejoice in the possession of the eternal values but to contend to the death against all that threatens their final victory in this scene of changing existences. Therefore the Cross must appeal to us combatants and speak to our condition, saying, "Will you—dare you—live in a universe where goodness can triumph only at such a cost?" And still the men who would test the claims of the Crucified are themselves put on trial, and by their verdicts are themselves made manifest with Pilate or Peter, Caiaphas or Paul.

We cannot completely rationalize the Cross. We can neither explain it nor explain it away. It is the final act—the irreducible core of actuality in life's experience. And unless it shines by its own light it can only bring down darkness over the whole earth. I do not speak of theories of Atonement; in that region there can be no finality. But the Cross is fact, interpret it how we will; and it can be interpreted truly only by those who are willing to live by its power. The way of the Cross is the condition, as of the highest life, so of the deepest knowledge. And when through our weakness and sinfulness we cannot bear to look upon it, we know that we are missing the day of our visitation and losing the things that belong unto peace. For here is the meaning of God, and of that wondrous life wherein God is chiefly shown, and of all life, and of the age-long travail of creation waiting for the manifestation of the sons of God, and of sin with its torment, and of forgiveness with its wondering joy. We do not know why God should meet us here as nowhere else in the world. There are so many mysteries our minds try hard to probe, and try in vain. There is a time to be wise; and there is also a time to adore. There is a supreme moment when all arguments have been marshalled and all objections heard, and the noise of the long debate grows fainter and dies away, when we stand alone in the presence of One who judges men from the throne of His world-dominion, even from the Cross, "unto them that are perishing foolishness, but unto us who are being saved, the power of God".

H. F. Lovell Cocks.

RATIONALIZATION FROM THE INSIDE.

If the onlooker sees most of the game, the players at any rate experience the inevitable bumps, bruises, and collisions which the onlooker and critic escapes. I have read with interest Mr. Angus Watson's remarkable article in the July *Congregational Quarterly* on "The Human Factor in Industrial Rationalization". It travels over a wide area of ground, over part of which only I am able from personal experience to keep him company. His adjectives are a trifle too strong to my liking both in praising private enterprise and in condemning Rationalization. You have, Mr. Editor, in soliciting this article not let me loose, but have rationed me to about 1,500 words, which, I think, I shall best spend in telling your readers how Rationalization looks from *the inside* by one who has enjoyed some of its bumps, bruises, and collisions.

There is no magic in the word "Rationalization". Stripped of all elements of politics, speculation, and inflation, and looked at from the business point of view, it means co-operation taking the place of competition and the amalgamation of units affording opportunities for effecting economies in manufacturing and distributing charges. The intensive competition of the present day compels cutting out, pruning, and the weeding out of unfruitful growths. Even our Theological Colleges would be all the healthier for the pruning hook. Half the present number would suffice to train and house all the men our churches need, but when an attempt was made we soon found ourselves up against the bumps and bruises of vested interests and local sentiment. So for the present the pruning hook has been hung up. The principle is, however, at work in the church-grouping idea.

We see the principle gaining foothold all over the world. Japan has so successfully adopted it that 70 to 80 per cent of its exported cotton goods is handled by three firms, and four firms produce 40 per cent of its cotton output. In contrast, Lancashire has 1,800 manufacturing firms and 800 merchanting firms.

I shall best tell my story under three headings—Laying the Track, Getting on the Rails, and Running Experiences.

Laying the Track. Things only run by themselves downhill. I had little idea before starting that the amalgamation of two Companies engaged in the same industry entailed so much uphill work. The initial negotiations had to be conducted in strict secrecy and a tacit agreement arrived at by the two Boards of Directors as to the relative value of the two concerns. An accountant of high standing, whose opinion would carry weight, was called in, and the books and balance sheets of both Companies for the past ten years were placed at his disposal. The shareholders had then the scheme explained

to them and their authority asked and obtained to carry the matter through.

The lawyers next came on the scene to bring the Articles of Association of both Companies up to date. As one of the Companies was English and the other Scotch, progress was slow. In one of Sir Walter Scott's novels the litigant said "he preferred to submit his case to ae drucken glower of his lawyer than to the judgment of the Bench". The distinguished Scotch lawyer of unquestioned sobriety was far from satisfied with *one* perusal of the documents and would not give his sanction until every sentence was approved and every *i* dotted and *t* crossed.

Getting on the Rails. Having at long last got on the ring and completed the union for better or for worse, we set about pooling our experience as to the best method of manufacture, allocating to the different factories products specially adapted to their machinery and skill. The adjustment of mechanical processes was not so difficult to achieve; it was when the human factor entered that tact, consideration, and patience had to be exercised. Before the union each Company had its own travellers, foreign agents and representatives all over the world, competing with one another for business. Competitors had now to be changed into co-workers and comrades working for a common firm. Had the business standpoint only been considered, a number could have been dispensed with. This we felt would be unfair to men who had served their respective Companies well in the past, so we explained to them our difficulty. We said that we should watch how they ran in double harness, and as time went on and experience was gained, we should do the best we could for them. Where the human factor comes in we can only draw through the economical comb with a wide mesh before using a finer one later on. Some had unexpired agreements, and some were nearing the retiring age, and both classes would be fairly considered at the appropriate time.

I may explain here that we have a Workpeople and a Staff Contributory Fund into which the Company pays shilling for shilling with the workmen and staff. At the age of 65 the member gets a pension, the scale of which depends on his weekly contribution and length of service—no pension for the workmen to exceed £80. If he leaves the service or dies before the retiring age, all his contributions *plus* three per cent are returned to him or his relatives; if, already on the Fund, he dies before he has received in pension all he has paid in, the balance plus three per cent is paid to his relatives; so that actually it is a savings bank in which he is bound *not* to lose a penny. The Company undertook to put the Fund in a state of solvency and to bear the whole capital liability, a cost of £100,000. These and other sympathetic considerations helped to assist matters on to the rails, and reduce the inevitable bumps and jars.

Running Experiences. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed since the amalgamation to speak very definitely as to results. On the mechanical side we have reduced costs by concentration and the closing down of unprofitable units. The pooling of technical knowledge has resulted in lessening the amount of defective work. A healthy rivalry between the different factories has also been engendered, stimulating output and avoiding waste. On the administrative side no savings have as yet been effected, the tendency being in the opposite direction; until we have had a longer run on the new lines I am unable to see without inflicting injustice on individuals where the pruning knife can be applied.

The swift and unforeseen depression in trade has made things much more difficult. With factories working half-time, overhead charges immediately leap up and paralyze all attempts to keep costs down. I am glad to state that the spirit of team work between the different units is abundantly evident, and this augurs well for the future.

In laying the track and getting the amalgamation on the rails, the directors certainly have not had an idle time. To the uninitiated, directors are supposed to have an easy job: they stroll in at the head office about once a month or fortnight to sign cheques and listen to reports. This is far from my experience. In the Holding Company of which I am Chairman, we have a Capital of £2,100,000, comprising factories in England, Scotland, Canada, and France. We control the policy in each, and all expenditure above a certain amount has to be submitted to and passed by the parent Board. This family group demands unremitting attention, and is in daily communication by wire, 'phone, and cable.

Conclusion. I regret to realize that small units and private enterprise, owing to keen competition and economic pressure, have had to give way to co-operative effort in kindred industries. The old individualistic era to which we owe our national prosperity during the Victorian Reign has gone, with its valuable personal and intimate family contact with the workmen. I am connected with a London Foundry established over 120 years ago. In its early days the apprentices were all housed by the proprietor, who, with his wife, looked after them by day and by night, and were responsible for their conduct. To-day, alas, in firms of any size, the men and boys are largely unknown to the principals, and are lost in the crowd which daily streams through our factory gates, but on whose goodwill and hearty co-operation the success of the factory depends. Industry can never be shorn of its human touch except at the loss of efficiency. Men are men even when they become to some extent cogs in a machine, but the better the men and the women, the more silently and smoothly run the cogs, and it is the duty of the directors

to encourage and contribute to all that promotes the well-being of their workpeople.

It is difficult to place one's investigating finger on the cause of the trade depression which has clouded the industrial horizon throughout the civilized world. It has been the subject of many conferences and endless speeches, and many reasons have been given. I fear nothing in these days is more unpopular than to advocate *hard work*. My remedy is very simple—work harder, work better, and save more. Do not buy what you cannot pay for whether it be domestic, social, municipal, or national welfare; then the wheels of industry will again begin to revolve.

ALEX. GLEGG.

THE DECAY OF DUTY.

THE ECLIPSE OF A CONCEPT.

The world of thought, like the physical universe, is one of constant change. We like to talk of the steadiness of the stars and of the fixity of truth. Yet in the wide stretches of stellar space is endless movement and frequent agitation. Here a nebula whirls with fiery agitation and there a new world is born, while great suns rise, fall, and at intervals suffer eclipse. No less disturbed is the universe of ideas. Thinking may be a dangerous, it can never be a placid, occupation. Was it not Carlyle who reminded us of the agitation that followed God's "letting loose a thinker upon the world"? The modern man may still believe in the fixity of truth, but he is even more conscious of the clash of ideas. And ideas, like the great suns, have their history. They are born, develop, become cold, and eventually perish. And on occasion they too suffer eclipse. Now an eclipse presents us always with an interesting situation. We find ourselves led to enquire into the forces which bring it about and so to enlarge our knowledge of the universe. And in the temporary darkness there is always the chance of seeing some things more clearly.

Thus emerges the purpose of this paper. It may be that it is incorrectly named, that we are confronted not with the mere eclipse of a concept but with the definite and permanent waning of light from one of the larger suns of our moral world. There are not wanting those who take this view, who believe that Duty has ruled the world too long and that, if its day is not nearly done, the close is at any rate within calculable distance. We do not defend this position, but there is no denying that the light of duty is less evident than it was. The concept may not be declining, but there is every evidence at least of eclipse. Why this is and what are the forces which have brought it about we are anxious to enquire. First let us look at the phenomenon itself.

We are surrounded to-day by numerous demands for and assertions of freedom, some of them vociferous, most of them confident, and many of them successful. Everywhere man is busy striking the shackles from his wrists. Kings are out of fashion (though Mussolini still keeps his grip upon a people); rules are disliked, regulations resented, and authority mistrusted. Everywhere man seeks for life and liberty, even when he knows no better way to it than the gratification of his impulses. As *religion,* when it is serious, always implies some interference with the naïve ways of the natural man, it is looked on with suspicion; and the *traditions* which control, in their own way, the waywardness of a man's conduct, are regarded with

mpatience. It is possible to take a somewhat gloomy view of the prospects of this modern revolt. The following passage from Walter Lippmann's *A Preface to Morals,* a characteristically modernist production, is anything but cheering:

> We are living in the midst of that vast dissolution of ancient habits which the emancipators believed would restore our birthright of happiness. We have come to see that Huxley was right when he said that " a man's worst difficulties begin when he is able to do as he likes ". The evidences of these greater difficulties lie all about us: in the brave and brilliant atheists who have defied the Methodist God, and have become very nervous; in the women who have emancipated themselves from the tyranny of fathers, husbands, and homes, and with the intermittent but expensive help of a psycho-analyst, are now enduring liberty as interior decorators; in the young men and women who are world-weary at twenty-two; in the multitudes who drug themselves with pleasure; . . . in the millions, at last free to think without fear of priest or policeman, who have made the moving pictures and the popular newspapers what they are. These are the prisoners who have been released. They ought to be very happy. They ought to be serene and composed. They are free to make their own lives. There are no conventions, no tabus, no gods, priests, princes, fathers, or revelations which they must accept. Yet the result is not so good as they thought it would be. The prison door is wide open. They stagger out into trackless space under a blinding sun. They find it nerve-wracking.

That is an aspect of the matter which it is perhaps as well, for our balance of mind, not altogether to forget. But of the revolt and the aspirations after freedom there can be no doubt.

It is only to be expected that in these conditions there should be much talk of " mere " morality, and that the idea of duty should be somewhat unpopular. We do not sing Odes to Duty to-day. We speak of the rights of man and of those of the dispossessed. In the Rev. Malcolm Spencer's words: " The characteristic spiritual longing of the world to-day is not so much a longing to be blameless as a longing to ' make good ' ". It may be, as he goes on to say, that in this aspiration the world is nearer to the mind of Jesus than it has ever been before. But it is evident that this modern mood is a different one from the old one of " duty whatever the cost ".

There is perhaps little need to illustrate at length a fact so obvious as the decay of the sense of duty. We meet evidence of it in the frequent complaint of the difficulty of procuring obedience from children, while everyone knows that to appeal to the duty of religious observances, whether we have in mind Sunday, prayer, or attendance at worship, is to leave a very considerable number of people completely cold.

This is not to say off-hand that the age is thoroughly immoral. You may do the right thing from many motives, and it by no means follows that the traditional motive is the only right one. It is as creditable to love your neighbour because you are really interested

in him as it is to try and love him from a sense of duty. It is perhaps as welcome to find people (though they may be less numerous) coming to worship because they love it as it would be to find them coming in greater numbers because " they felt they ought ". In any case there is the fact we have to consider. Duty is no longer the force it was. The old charm does not work; some of the magic has gone; and we are faced with a new situation.

It is not immediately obvious that we are worse to-day than our fathers. No one can contemplate the greater extension of the spirit of service, the increased seriousness and sincerity in literature, the wide interest in matters of international justice and the condition of primitive peoples, and our uneasy conscience about social affairs, without feeling that moral values are both recognized and served in the world of to-day to a very impressive degree.

We suggest that there are two positive features of the present day which make the " decay of duty " a little more intelligible. In the first place, this is very largely an anti-intellectual age. " Merely intellectual " has become a term of reproach and even in philosophy the emphasis falls on some other " faculty " than reason. We rather boast of being practical men, and " pragmatism " is a popular modern creed—or was until quite recently. In metaphysics men turn to Bergson when they have grown tired of the wizardry of James; and in psychology we find the school of McDougall with its emphasis on instinct and feeling disputing the ground with Watson and the behaviourists. This anti-intellectualism is no more than we might expect if we remember the nature of intellect. Its work is to judge, compare, and classify. But first the data must be gathered by observation and experiment. The concept descends upon a field crowded with observations and perceptions and reduces them to some kind of order. We see this illustrated in the forming of a scientific law. Science arose in the true sense when the multiplicity of men's observations made it necessary to devise some way of holding them together. It pre-supposed, that is, a period of enquiry and discovery. The same thing is repeated in the individual life, for the simple child is not a scientist, he is an observer and experimenter. Only when the pressure of data on his ground reaches a certain tension does he ask " Why? " and " How? ", and come to definite concepts.

Now duty is in the first place a concept. By its means we introduce order among actions. If we can arrange this, that, and the other type of action under duty-headings we have increased our power of dealing with the facts of life. When we have got to the point of seeing that " This kind of thing " is not done (*e.g.*, telling tales), we have opened up a way through the tangle of conduct. When we are able to see that "Just things ought to be done. A, B, C are just things. Therefore A, B, and C ought to be done", life is taking to itself a definite order. This is Aristotle's " practical syllogism ",

but it is evident that it implies a certain level of reflexion—a level beyond the capacity of early childhood, for instance. But where it is carried out we have the distribution of possible actions round definite duties. Conduct is, so to say, pigeon-holed and a man's life falls into more or less clearly marked divisions—his duty to his neighbour, country, church, children and the stranger within his gates. But all this implies that he is at least interested in this kind of classification. And it is this interest which seems to be less strong than it was. In other words, the data of life accumulate so fast to-day that men are interested rather in gathering and exploring than in making an inventory of them. This may be a testimony to the fact that we are living more fully. It is at least some reason for the modern lack of reflexion. The world is indeed " full of a number of things ", many of them very fascinating. It is not to be wondered at that an age which has seen an enormous development of mechanical devices, where travel and easy communication have opened up new worlds and where, all the time, we are on the verge of epoch-making discoveries, should be comparatively unreflective, more interested in unearthing facts and getting things done than in thinking it all out. We are almost submerged under the mass of accumulated data, and we literally have not the time to stand back and reflect upon it. In morals this means that the emphasis is less on the abstract "ought" and more on the exploring of new avenues of conduct and new experiments in living. It is almost certain that this represents a phase only. If men are to live together and harmonious life is again to be achieved, we must pass out of this stage of incoherence to something more shapely. The time will come when we shall be in a position to map the new continents in men's knowledge and to detect the main contours in the new areas of his activity. For that we shall need concepts and they will be forthcoming. But will duty be one of them? Shall we again recover the old simple forms of life where men's moral actions conveniently arranged themselves round a few paramount and numerous subordinate duties?

If we are to answer this it is necessary to try to understand the nature of duty. If we find the concept inadequate we shall have discovered the second of our reasons for the " decay of duty ". To the common man duty implies obedience to a law externally imposed. It is only by a process of moral education that this law is made his own and so ceases to be external. In most men this process of moral education is at least incomplete. If it were not they would not resent the decrees of duty, for you do not resent what you have accepted and made your own. This will perhaps become clearer if we consider duty as a form of obligation. One of the fullest discussions of the matter is contained in Prof. A. E. Taylor's *The Problem of Conduct.* He has discussed the three forms of obligation—to God, to Society, and to oneself. Of the last he says :

> When a man comes to the point of saying to himself " It's a sin and I shall be sent to hell for it, but do it I must ", he has reached the stage of moral development at which the sense of obligation ceases to be theological and becomes purely ethical. In this, its final development, the sense of obligation becomes independent of a belief in an external law-giver and an external sanction. . . . Moral obligations, in this form, carry as they do not at either of the stages of development we have hitherto been considering, their own warrant and sanction along with themselves, and morality thus becomes a law without either law-giver or penal code.

But this is an ideal state not usually reached by the common man:

> It is worth remarking perhaps that the sense of obligation, as it actually exists in the average civilized man, is a complex thing made of convictions and sentiments in all the various stages of the process we have just described. " I ought " or " I feel obliged " means to the ordinary Englishman partly " Society expects this of me ", partly " God will require this at my hands ", partly " I cannot respect myself if I do not do this ". The theologian to whom the sense of duty habitually takes the form of obedience to the Divine will, and the philosopher in whom it wears the shape of reverence for a self-imposed law, are exceptional instances of men in whom the whole mass of moral convictions have developed pari passu and homogeneously; in the majority of practical men various parts of the whole mass will be found to have attained very different levels of logical evolution. " I ought to keep my word " means perhaps " I should despise myself if I lied " to the same man to whom " I ought to say my prayers " means " God expects it of me " and " I ought to stand by the privileges of my order ", " My social circle will be offended if I don't ". It is only the "ought" that means " I expect it of myself " which is the true and proper "ought" of specifically moral obligation.

Bradley's analysis,[1] though put in a different form and using one or two terms which are perhaps open to dispute, is not in principle different:

> The ought is a command; it expresses something which neither simply is nor is not, but which both is and is not; something in short which is to be. Further, when addressed to myself it puts before me something which is to be done and which I am to do. A command is the doing of something by me, which doing is willed by a will, not me, and presented by that will to me. In the ought the self is commanded and that self is the sensuous self in me, which is ordered and which, if I obey, is forced by the non-sensuous formal will which stands above the formal empirical element, and equally with that is myself. The ought is the command of the formal will, and duty is the obedience, or, more properly, the compulsion of the lower self by that will, or the realization of the form in and against the recalcitrant matter of the desires.

Although Taylor's is the less open to objection of these two accounts, we may take it as agreed that duty is the doing of that law which is imposed by the self on the self. The matter is put more concisely by Kant in the well-known saying " Duty is the obligation of acting from reverence for law ", the law being that categorical imperative which my noumenal self imposes on my phenomenal self.

[1] *Ethical Studies*, pp. 146,f

But Taylor seems to be correct in his insistence on the fact that in what he calls the " average Englishman " the sense of obligation is not of this pure philosophic form but is very mixed, the sense of an external obligation not having been entirely dissolved out. That is to say, men do in practice frequently perform their duty from immoral motives. It might thus be argued that all we have to do is to educate them better. Duty, it might be said, is resented only because not understood. If we could succeed in bringing home to men its real nature they would both love it and obey its behests.

But here we meet the objection of Bradley that while the only way morally to do your duty is to do it for duty's sake, this in itself involves you in contradiction. Duty for duty's sake is purely formal, but duties are concrete. Thus you are to carry out a universal law and at the same time to do particular things which by their nature contradict the universal :

> Everybody knows that the only way to do your duty is to do your duties ; that general doing good may mean doing no good in particular, and so none at all, but rather the contrary of good. Everybody knows that the setting out, whether in religion, morals, or politics, with the intent to realize an abstraction is a futile endeavour ; and that what it comes to is either you do nothing at all or that the particular content which is necessary for action is added to the abstraction by the chance of circumstance or caprice. Everybody suspects, if they do not feel sure, that the acting consciously on and from abstract principles means self-deceit or hypocrisy or both.[1]

There is a further difficulty with which Bradley, in his characteristic way, makes play—the difficulty occasioned by the so-called "conflict of duties". What are you to do when one law universally obligatory without exception imposes such and such a line of conduct, and another, equally universal and equally obligatory, imposes another and contradictory line ? The situation is a common one and is solved in practice by a man's practical genius or insight. But we have thus deserted the level of universal law and given foothold to the doubt whether, after all, it was ever sound ground to stand on.

If it be thought that Bradley's excessive love of dialectic carries him to extremes and that his psychology is not altogether sound (for both of which suspicions there is some ground) the matter may be put more moderately and still bring us to a similar result. Mr. H. J. Paton has recently published a detailed and exhaustive examination of the moral fact under the title, *The Good Will,* from which I quote[2] :

> Duty itself is only a shadow, the shadow that is cast by the intrusion of our passions between us and the light of goodness. But there are some men like the Spartans, who seem to fight better in the shade. . .
>
> When a man follows his duty in pain or danger we begin to feel for him warmth of admiration such as is aroused originally by a more spontaneous and whole-hearted goodness. Yet the triumph of goodness is the death of duty.

1 *Studies,* pp. 152, f.
2 p. 329.

It is in the last sentence that we discover the clue we are seeking. It is not after all merely duty that we are seeking, but the good. It is true that duty is a law imposed, and that it is imposed by the self. But its power is derived from the fact that, like all law, it is instrumental, instrumental to the life of goodness.

If we recognize the claims of duty it is only because we have first felt the allurement of goodness.

It is an inadequate analysis which sees the moral fact as " myself *plus* the law of duty ". In the first place "myself" in this isolated fashion does not exist. The individual isolated from his circumstances and times is, as Bradley rightly points out, a mere fiction :

> To know what a man is you must not take him in isolation. He is one of a people, he was born in a family, he lives in a certain society, in a certain state. What he has to do depends on what his place is, what his function is, and that all comes from his station in the organism. . . . The mere individual is a delusion of theory; and the attempt to realise it in practice is the starvation and mutilation of human nature, with total sterility or the production of monstrosities.

Here then is the first error of the " myself and my duty " conception.

But there is another, on the other side. For what the individual is faced with is not a neat arrangement of moral laws but a crowded mass of facts, the circumstances of his daily life, the solicitations of desire, some worthy and others not, the presence of other persons—some obstructing the pursuit of his worthy desires and others promoting it, his own ignorance and inexperience, and a confused mass of half-understood ideas. This is his *reality,* and the chief defect of the insistence on duty *per se* is that it has unduly simplified reality. The fact is that we are all the time in touch with a world, a world of concrete happenings and passing events. In the midst of this constant flux of things we have somehow to achieve the good. We have so to work upon, control, and shape the changing scene that we create out of it things of worth, here justice, there brotherhood, and always nobility of life. The moral fact, that is to say, consists in the recognition of and response to moral values. We are living morally when we are so manipulating the facts of life, both our circumstances and ourselves, that we produce a thing of beauty. It is not obedience to a law that is required, nothing so rigid or, we may even say, so dull. It is delicacy of appreciation, discernment, taste, on the one hand; and on the other, skilled workmanship, power of controlling our events, and making out of the fluid substance of our lives a construction that gives to vague aspirations a comely form. This is art and it is the theme of this paper that the moral life is an art, if it be not indeed the greatest of the arts.

But here it is important that we should understand something of the way the artist works. We commonly talk about his embodying his ideal or expressing through his artistic medium, be it stone or

paint or words, the images of his mind. But the account given by Alexander[1] seems to be both more true and more illuminating. One quotation will suffice:

> I suggest that the artist's work proceeds not from a finished imaginative experience to which the work of art corresponds, but from passionate excitement about the subject matter; that the poet sings as the bird sings, because he must; that his poem is wrung from him by the subject which excites him, and that he possesses the imaginative experience embodied in his words just in so far as he has spoken them. In no sense is the poem the translation of his state of mind, for he does not know till he has said it, either what he wants to say or how he shall say it—two things which are admittedly one. The imaginative experience supposed to be in his mind does not exist there. What does exist is the subject matter which detains him and fixes his thoughts and feeds his interest, giving a colour to his excitement which would be different with a different subject matter. Excitement caused and detained by this subject, and at once enlarged, enlightened, and inflamed by insights into it bubbles over into words or the movements of the brush or burin or chisel.

Or, I venture to add, into moral action and achievement.

At the root of moral action, then, is a peculiar kind of excitement. The situation confronting us, the thrust and pull of our own desires and the glow of moral values stir us to a strange excitement. This excitement overflows, "bubbles over" in Alexander's words, into act, but an act adequate to the situation, which uses circumstances but is not mastered by them, which includes desire, but controls, and in controlling, refines it, and which is in itself a beautiful thing.[2] Some of the philosophers have discerned this, notably Bradley and, even more, Bosanquet. But the aptest expression of what I am trying to maintain occurs in the *Lectures and Remains* of that rare spirit, Nettleship[3]:

> A strong man is always a man who feels strongly *and* who can get his feeling out; and it may seem fanciful, but as far as I can see, if you are asked to *describe* action, you have to do it in some such way as you would do in the case of art. I mean any act, like any work of art, is measurable in time and space, and the more of an act it is, the more measurable is it, the more form there is in it.

The word "form" is the vital word here; and, though we might hesitate to apply Nettleship's account to all kinds of action, it does certainly seem to apply to moral action.

The poets have of course got the same idea. Note for example Browning's attack (similar in substance to Bosanquet's) on false idealism in Bishop Blougram. The Bishop is speaking:—

1 *Art and the Material.*

2 *Cf.* Moffatt's translation in Mark 14^{3-8}: "She has done a beautiful thing to me".

3 Quoted in an essay by Bosanquet on "True and False Idealism". See Bosanquet's own statement of the same position in *Social and International Ideals*, p. 93.

> The common problem, yours, mine, everyone's,
> Is not to fancy what were fair in life
> Provided it could be,—but, finding first
> What may be, then find how to make it fair
> Up to our means—a very different thing!
> No abstract intellectual plan of life
> Quite irrespective of life's plainest laws,
> But one, a man, who is man and nothing more,
> May lead within a world which (by your leave)
> Is Rome or London—not Fool's-paradise.

No, life is not the mere working of syllogisms, the referring of possible actions to the laws of duty. It is both more intricate, more creative, and more fascinating than that. "Life", in the words of Bosanquet, "is not choosing between black and white counters; it is making, contriving, inventing".

Two things follow from this position; both, I think, true, yet both in contradiction to common belief. In the first place goodness is not merely a matter of motive. It is not enough to mean well. We have to make the good thing prevail. We are artists, and when we miss our goal, though our intentions may have been of the best, there was something wanting to our skill. We must go back and try again. With his usual insight Bosanquet has put this point in one of his slighter works,[1] where, writing on the "Moral Imperative of Success", he says:

> The good must not only be willed but produced. The life of goodness is to produce a certain order in the world—failing that it fails in its object.

And later in the same essay:

> It was not that your motive was too good for this world; it was not good enough. It was not completed and filled out by the qualities of head and heart which would have given it adequate connection with the value you meant to elicit.

If our main contention has been sound this is but a necessary corollary.

The other point is this. You may have a morality of rules, or you may have the creative morality for which we have been contending in this paper. It may be that our contention is wrong; but let us be clear where the other line leads. If you are to have rules based upon duty then casuistry is inevitable. Once begin to formulate rules, then the clearer and more detailed they are the better. A few will not help you much, for life is admittedly complex and nothing but a complex apparatus of rules and regulations will be adequate to it. That is to say, the Pharisees were right after all. If you begin with ten or any number of commandments you will soon require more. Doubtful cases arise and you must supplement the Law with the "tradition of the elders". It may be that this is necessary. There are religious bodies which maintain that it is. But some of us look

[1] *Some Suggestions in Ethics.*

in another direction. In so doing are we not the more true to the spirit of Jesus, who was certainly less of a mere legislator than an artist? If His attitude is right it is something more than obedience that we need. We need the insight and the skill of the artist in life. We need the quality which someone has ascribed to Him of " being equal to the situation ", not in the sense of doing the thing commanded at all times, but of rising to the occasion, of transforming by His own genius the most difficult challenge into a moral triumph and the most taxing occasion into superb moral achievement. It was, I submit, because Jesus looked thus at life that He could say: "When ye have done all these things that are commanded say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do ".

F. C. Taylor.

FURTHER REMINISCENCES OF LONG AGO.

To some reminiscences of my life and my work which I wrote for the *Congregational Quarterly* some time ago (July, 1928), I have been asked to add further notes of interest, especially any incidents connected with our Church Aid work. I will do my best to meet the wishes of my too indulgent friends.

The call to take up the Secretariat of the Church Aid Society came to me quite unexpectedly, in the autumn of 1890, and the separation from my beloved people at Edgbaston meant real trouble. But I have always been thankful for the service that I was thus enabled to render, especially to the country churches, during the five years of my official life. While not forgetting the labours of our leaders—such men as Alexander Hannay, Andrew Mearns, Robert Bruce, and Alexander Mackennal—I feel that it is only right to bear in mind the rank and file of the workers in this enterprise. Philps of Coggeshall, Handley of Stafford, my own namesake W. Clarkson of Salisbury and Bristol, amongst the ministers, and Ford Goddard, Montagu Holmes, our dear friend Gerard Ford, and many others of the laity, carried on the good work amidst many difficulties, and put life and energy into the Society, which, without such aid, might have proved a failure. Nor can I forget the hearty co-operation which I everywhere received from men and women whose names and labours were little known, but who were working on with diligence and hope. During the five and thirty years which have elapsed since I left this special service I have noted the dropping out of one and another who zealously supported me in the great and blessed work, until I seem to myself as almost the only "sere and yellow leaf" remaining with still a frail hold upon this particular bough. But I am assured that we shall meet again, and we may then be permitted to work together once more in the glorious service of the same blessed Master for Whom we testified here below.

I had looked forward to serving under Dr. Hannay, but he was called to his rest a week or two before I began my Church Aid work, and the only thing that I call to mind in this connexion is his kind anxiety that I "should have a sunny room" as my office. Mr. Mearns was ever a wise and cheery coadjutor, while in Mr. W. W. Hancock I found more than a conscientious clerk—an invaluable helper and a true friend. A similar acknowledgment is due to all the members of the Memorial Hall Staff. I have already referred to the assistance received from friends all over the country, but I may adduce a special instance in Dr. Parker, who asked me up to his house for an evening that he might learn all about the Society, and

wound up a long and detailed enquiry by presenting me with a ten-pound note for the funds. One little incident which he described to me may be mentioned as illustrating his brotherly sympathy and readiness to help. A country minister had been consulting him about a change of pastorate. He could not get any church to hear him. "If", said he, "they would give me a Sunday and then decline any further action, well and good; but they will not help me even thus far. What am I to do?". Dr. Parker asked whether he might be perfectly frank, and on his visitor assuring him that he would be only too grateful, he said: "Well, I do not think that the churches take to a man who talks about 'Hapril weather'. Now I tell you what I will do, I will give you lessons in the letter 'h'—hear you read, point out your mistakes, and give you my reasons for correcting you". "Very kind of you, Doctor—when shall we begin?" "Oh, at once—nothing like the present time". And for an hour the Doctor did all that he had promised. Whether the pupil really benefited by the instruction thus conveyed I cannot say, but the very readiness thus to help gave Parker a higher place than ever in my own esteem and affection. Nor was this unshared by those who had to deal with him at the City Temple. I remember especially the verger, who from time to time had a chat with my dear wife after the Thursday morning service. It was a time when the Turks had been guilty of atrocities which shocked all Europe, and strong feeling was shown at what seemed to be the supineness of the British Government in not interfering. Dr. Parker had been strongly attacking the Sultan, and taking the Government to task for its inaction. The verger echoed his minister's views, and added, "But now that the Doctor has taken the matter up, something will be done".

This whole-hearted confidence of a fellow-worker in his minister leads me to say something on the compliments sometimes paid to ministers: I do not mean those given by brethren on the platform, sincere as these may be—and welcome—but rather the simple remarks, sometimes quaint and often stimulating, and awakening both humility and fresh resolution, that are offered by lowly and unlettered fellow-servants of Christ. When at college I had as a fellow-student Ernest Coulson Jay—a grandson of good old William Jay of Bath. One day he told us that on the previous Sunday, as he came down from the pulpit of a village church, a farmer's wife shook him warmly by the hand, and said "Thank you, sir, thank you; you've given us a full meal of clean corn this morning".

I myself was greeted in the same way, in a small Yorkshire town, by an old man who to hearty thanks for my sermon added the encouraging words, "It's a treat to hear a man of some steadiment". On another occasion the compliment was even more heartening. I was about thirty years of age, and had to give the charge to the

people at the ordination of a young minister. I urged the friends to encourage their minister by telling him of any help and blessing that his God-given messages had brought them. The next morning, while I was waiting on the railway platform, a woman came up to me and said, "You told us last night to praise you, sir—so I thought I'd just tell you that me and my friends thought you were only three and twenty, but we felt that it was all right *here*", tapping her forehead vigorously as she spoke. A valuable certificate to my sanity wherewith to return home!

Another incident, too trivial, perhaps, for these grave pages, greatly tickled me at the time, and may amuse some of my readers now. I was visiting a poor woman in the Workhouse, and in the course of conversation she spoke of having come from Colchester. My first pastoral charge was in that town, and the woman was delighted to find that I had lived there, though indeed it was some thirty years or more since I had left it. Coming away, I happened to pass a room where some three or four old cronies were sitting over a fire, and falling into talk with them I mentioned the friend I had just left, and described her excitement at hearing of my connexion with Colchester. I added—somewhat incautiously I admit—"She seemed so pleased that I almost thought that she would have kissed me". Whereupon one of the old dears said, "We should all like to kiss you, sir, if it were only proper". Whether I felt most flattered or alarmed at the prospect of all the old ladies thus crowding round to show their affection, I must leave the reader to decide. At any rate, such episodes serve to brighten the depression which may sometimes affect even the most buoyant and light-hearted amongst us.

But, thank God! He feeds and strengthens His servants with more substantial nourishment than these trifles would afford. The true minister of Jesus Christ must needs aspire to win souls for his Master, and is there a joy that can equal the joy of leading a seeker into the light of God? Often the knowledge of a gain so blessed is long hidden from us, but I can testify that again and again such knowledge is vouchsafed when and where it was little expected. The present year of grace 1931 was not far advanced when I received a letter from a perfect stranger who, having seen my name in connexion with some service, wrote to inform me that in the year 1885 when I conducted a Mission in the town in which he was living, he had attended one of the services, and then and there given himself to Christ, had been kept faithful to the decision then made, and had been for some years Secretary of the church that he had joined, and Superintendent of its Sunday School. One such incident as this in a life-time compensates for years of what may seem fruitless toil, but never really can be so when God has the matter in hand. He is "not unrighteous to forget your work".

Reverting now to denominational stalwarts, besides the names mentioned in my former paper, I think with pleasure and affection of such men as J. G. Rogers, G. S. Barrett, Hirst Hollowell, W. Pierce, Herber Evans, and many others. The last-named, I call to mind, was addressing a meeting of the Congregational Union in St. George's Hall, Bradford, and in enforcing the duty of hearty co-operation, told a story of two Welshmen who carried on a Sunday School of some forty children in some country district. One of them met with an accident which lamed him, and the other had to carry on alone. He found this beyond his powers, and when his friend was getting better, but still unable to walk, he arranged to call for him every Sunday, and carry him "pick-a-back" to the school and home again. "Now", said Dr. Evans, raising his voice to its highest pitch, "I want you all to *go and do likewise*". The audience received the suggestion with a hearty laugh, and a friend sitting next to me—W. G. Lemon, headmaster of the School for the Sons of Missionaries—nudged me and whispered: "Now, Clarkson, you begin with me", which, my friend not being the slimmest of men, I promptly declined.

It would weary readers were I to dwell on the pleasant associations that I have had with colleagues in service, and by this term I mean not brethren in the ministry only, but those who, having their own ordinary and secular duties in every-day life, have rendered generous service to the work of the Lord. I make but passing reference to men like Joseph Herrick, of Colchester, who could be a veritable lion in defending what he felt to be right and just, but showed himself as a father to a son when once and again he would call on me on a Monday morning, and take me for a walk in the fields, while we spoke together of the previous day's services, and exchanged thoughts on the truths we had proclaimed. Or of Enos Metcalf, of Lincoln, who with unwearied and unremitting zeal carried on the work of the church from which my own was originally an offshoot, or of G. P. Jarvis, of Wycombe, or of J. A. Chamberlain, of Brading, my honoured predecessors in those pastorates. But I will mention two names specially as illustrating subjects other than the personal. Mr. Attenborough of Newark was a cheery, witty old man who knew how to deal with any situation that might arise. He was invited to preach at a High Calvinist church in the country, and in the vestry one of the officials asked him to be sure and preach to the elect. He consented, and when the time came he said: "Dear friends, I have been asked to preach to the elect, and have great pleasure in complying with the request. But as I am a stranger amongst you, and have not the pleasure of knowing who of you are elect, I shall be obliged if the elect will kindly stand up, so that I may know whom to address". Of course no one stirred. Attenborough repeated his request, and the friends still making no

response, he said: "Well, as no one responds, and as there is no mark on your foreheads to distinguish the elect, I shall simply obey my Master's command, and preach the Gospel to every creature". Could any answer have been more apt?

The other name occurring to me is that of David Everard Ford, of Lymington, father of Mr. Gerard N. Ford. He was addressing a meeting of the Congregational Union which was discussing the question of Church Membership. He told us—I remember it well—that when he was a youth, seeking union with the Church, it was customary for a candidate to be required to answer questions that might be put to him in the meeting by any member. Amongst other questions that he himself was asked was this: "How would you describe the ancient Covenant between Jehovah and Israel?" The youth of eighteen years or so (I think) was a little nonplussed, but soon recovered himself and replied, "I think, sir, that in all things it was well ordered and sure". "A very good answer, if a little cheeky", was the good-natured comment of his questioner.

In my own case, when I joined the Church at Tacket Street, Ipswich, in 1855, I had to write a letter to my own father—then the pastor—giving my reasons for believing that I was truly converted, and for my desire to make a public profession of my faith. We may rejoice that regulations and practices such as these have ceased, but it is well alike for Church authorities, and for candidates for Church Membership, to bear in mind the need of a clear understanding of the reasons for making the public confession of Christ as our Saviour and acceptance of His service as alike an inescapable duty and an unspeakable honour.

This matter of public confession of one's faith leads me to mention a singular incident. In one of my churches I received as a member a young man who, after I had left, became an evangelist, and as such rendered good service. Laid aside by a tedious illness he spent much time in reading, and one result of his study was that he became a Baptist. He wrote to me about it, and said that he thought his family would regard his decision to be immersed with greater favour if I would perform the ceremony. I replied that I had no objection whatever, but that all would depend upon his securing the consent of the Baptist minister to allow me to act in his church in that capacity. It so happened that just then I had been asked to preach at the Baptist Church in the town to which my friend's family belonged. The minister had been one of Spurgeon's students and was quite willing that I should officiate. Arrangements were duly made for the unusual service. The minister expounded Baptist principles, my friend explained his own conscientious reasons for seeking the performance of the rite, and then I had to explain that I could not myself accept the need for the rite—otherwise I should be that afternoon asking to receive immersion myself—but that such

was my deference to the call of conscience that when the young man asked me to do this thing I could not possibly refuse. I therefore baptized him as desired, and I believe that the blessing of God rested upon all who took part in the unusual incident. It only remains to add that the young man laboured for some years with great earnestness and much acceptance, and was then called to his heavenly reward.

This suggests to me another singular experience. During a visit to Paris, in 1866, my wife and I attended a Sunday morning service at a French Mission church. At the close the Communion was observed. It was the custom here for communicants to rise and stand while the bread and wine were being distributed. We joined the company, but when the acting steward reached us he whispered, "*Êtes-vous Baptistes?*" On my indicating the negative by a shake of the head, he passed us by. We, as the Lord's disciples, remained standing to indicate our desire to partake. The very next morning we were taking a stroll in the Luxembourg Gardens, and while resting for a few minutes, who should come up to us but our friend of the day before! He explained to us most volubly the reason for what might seem to be an unkind action, and after a few minutes of most amicable talk we parted, the best of friends.

I cannot close this article without referring to the unspeakable pleasure that I have had throughout my long ministry and in all my churches in the conduct of special classes for the instruction and help of young people—from the children, the "lambs" whom Christ specially entrusted to the charge of Peter, up to young men and women, and from the simplest Bible lessons up to the study of the *Greek Testament* in classes of ladies as well as of young men. If my brethren in the ministry will allow a word of counsel, it would be that they should cultivate this kind of instruction and help for our young people more and more. No one can object to cheerful recreation, games, excursions, and the like, but let it not be at the expense of the higher nature which is waiting to be trained and cultivated. You may denounce Victorian methods and customs as being too sombre, too staid and dull for the bright young people of to-day; you may exalt the "Georgian" age of cinemas, whist drives, and amusements generally, as being far better suited to the glowing young life of this twentieth century, but the question for us is surely: what does the Master ask at our hands? That was a wise and brave utterance of my friend Carey Bonner as President of the Baptist Union at its meetings last April, and I heartily commend it to those who may be inclined to exaggerate both the necessity and the value of constant amusement. Surely our lads and our maidens are intended to be something higher than mere prize-winners in sports, and A 1 in all that is bright and amusing. Is it not for us in God's name and by God's strength to train them to be stalwarts in the Christian life,

enthusiasts in the service of Christ and the furtherance of His Kingdom? I believe also that this will more truly meet and satisfy the spirit of adventure and the aspirations after heroism which, we are told, characterize the youth of to-day. When Christ says, "Whom shall we send? Who will go for us?" we do not want our young people to stand aside, and take no interest in the glorious mission. And when He bids His servants to take up the Cross and deny themselves, we should mourn indeed if these bright generous young souls were deprived of the honour and the joy which might be theirs in obedience to their Lord.

In bringing to a close these reminiscences of my long life and ministry I call to mind Keble's paraphrase of Ps. $73^{24, 25}$; and as I would humbly seek that they should embody my own experience to the very end, so also I earnestly trust that all readers of these lines may be able to accept them as summing up their own abounding confidence and hope.

And I—with Thee, O God! I am always
Through the extension of the days.
Me—my hand holden—Thou wilt guide along
With counsel sweet and strong;
And, when life lies behind, take me therefrom
Magnificently *home,*
Whom have I in the boundless heavens above?
On earth, what other love?
Faileth and is foredone my flesh and heart,
Rock of my heart,
And portion evermore, O God, Thou art!

Wm. F. Clarkson.

DEVELOPMENTS AND EXPERIMENTS.

This Section of our Journal aims at chronicling not only developments in theological thought and in ecclesiastical organization, but also practical experiments in all branches of religious life and service.

Often when successful attempts have been made to solve some problem in one part of the country, the rest of the Churches remain ignorant, and we trust that these pages will not only serve as a clearing-house of ideas and a record of changing emphasis, but also broadcast valuable information of progress in Church and denominational life.

Our representatives in the Colonies and the United States will from time to time contribute accounts of similar movements. The Editor will be glad to consider brief articles serving this purpose.

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL.

The Biennial Meeting of the National Council of the Congregational Churches of the United States convened in Seattle, Washington, 25th June. The meeting was held in conjunction with that of the General Convention of the Christian Church.

For those who live outside of the United States, and even for most people who live in them, it needs to be explained what the "Christian Church" here mentioned is. It is not the comparatively large body which is often called the Campbellite, after its founder, Thomas Campbell, which was organized toward the middle of the last century. The technical name of this body is "The Disciples of Christ", but it is also popularly called "The Christian Church". It was not with the Convention of this body that the National Council met and it is not these churches with which the Congregationalists of the United States have now formed a federation, looking toward a more complete union until the two shall form one denomination. The "Christians" with whom we have just met are a group of churches which came off from several denominations in search of a more democratic form of government, the separation occurring some seventy-five to ninety years ago. Since these churches adopted a Congregational, rather than a Methodist or Presbyterian polity, their natural affiliation is with us rather than with any of the churches from which they originally came. They represent approximately 1,000 churches, with a membership of 115,000, located in Virginia, North Carolina, and adjacent States, though strong also in Indiana, and represented sparsely even in New England.

The national organization of the Christian Church is the General Convention, and this General Convention and our National Council held their meetings in conjunction at Seattle. The meeting opened with simultaneous, but separate, sessions of the Convention and the Council, immediately followed by a joint meeting for the organization

of "The General Council of the Congregational and Christian Churches". The Moderator of the National Council and the President of the General Convention are to be, until 1935, co-ordinate Moderators of The General Council. The Missionary Societies of the two Churches are to be co-ordinated and, in large part, this co-ordination has already been effected. Until a more complete union is formed the individual churches of the two denominations are not immediately affected. "Christian" Churches will continue to be called by their old name as will our Congregational Churches. Where Congregational and Christian Churches are functioning in the same community it is probable that some combination may be effected, and the closer relations which are naturally suggested by the new affiliation may be expected to produce a new friendship between Congregational and Christian Churches and the ministers of both. The proceedings toward union have so far gone on in the utmost harmony, and the whole movement is a fine example of the manner in which "church union" may be attained. It is hoped that the example may be followed by similar steps among other bodies.

After the adoption of the constitution of the General Council on the second day of the gathering, all business meetings were meetings of the General Council, except when the National Council, or the General Convention, or both, desired separate sessions for the consideration of business more nearly concerning themselves alone. Aside from business sessions, the two bodies participated in the programme throughout.

Two features marked the programme of this Council in comparison with former Councils. The first was the establishment of a Lectureship, four lectures being given by the same lecturer on successive afternoons, these lectures to be later published by the Congregational Publishing Society and sold in book form. The lecturer for this year was Dr. Albert W. Palmer, President of the Chicago Theological Seminary, who spoke on "Paths to the Presence of God". The second feature was the holding of simultaneous Seminars, one each on the Gospel and the Individual, the Gospel and the Family and Youth, the Gospel and the Church, the Gospel and Community Life, the Gospel and National Life, the Gospel and International Life. Delegates were assigned to these Seminars, though if any delegate found himself assigned to one and preferred to attend another, he might exercise his choice. Delegates were expected, however, to attend one Seminar or another and not merely to visit around.

This experiment of the Seminars grew out of the feeling that the Council programmes frequently contain too many platform addresses, without time enough for free discussion of subjects in which individual delegates were vitally interested. Each Seminar submitted well-considered findings to be adopted, rejected, or modified by the

Council at the close of its session. When resolutions were introduced into the general business meetings, they were referred by the Council to the proper Seminar for discussion. The action of the Council on all questions concerning which it desired to pass resolutions was thus guarded much more carefully and prepared for much more fully than could be done by a body of resolutions presented by a small committee appointed for the purpose for drawing them. The experiment was a happy one, and it is expected that it will be followed in the programmes of succeeding Councils.

Among individual features of the programme, one may single out, without a reflexion upon those not mentioned, the addresses of the retiring Moderator, Mr. Fred B. Smith and of Dr. S. Parkes Cadman, the devotional services led each day by the Chaplain of the Council, Dr. O. W. S. McCall, the lectures already referred to by President Palmer, and the address of Colonel Raymond Robins on the subject of "Prohibition and the Eighteenth Amendment".

The attendance was remarkably good, 536 voting delegates out of a possible 700 being registered, besides many secretaries, officials, associate delegates, and visitors from near and far, most of whom were quite as constant in attendance at the meetings as if they had been delegates. The Christian Church sent 77 delegates, and 13 secretaries and other officials. The number of interested attendants was well indicated by the fact that 1,000 copies of the findings of the Seminars were printed for the Council session in which they were debated, and this large number was entirely absorbed. When it is recalled that Seattle is in the extreme North-western corner of the United States, only a few miles from British Columbia, this large attendance becomes truly remarkable. Massachusetts, at the opposite side of the continent, had 92 persons in attendance.

Several other National Councils have been held on the Pacific Coast. But it has heretofore been felt by the Eastern sections of the country, in which Congregationalism has its stronghold, that the choice of such a meeting place was a concession to a far away constituency, made at the expense of the church at large, since the Council would necessarily be a small one. The outstanding success of the Seattle meeting registers a distinct growth in the national consciousness of our Congregational churches. It is also hoped that the election of the Moderator from California, the first Moderator to be elected from the Pacific Coast, will still further advance the growth of this consciousness.

The pronouncements of the Council included such matters as war and peace, the recognition of Soviet Russia, and (under another name) the ever-present subject of birth control. This seems to bring us quite down to date.

Carl S. Patton.

YOUTH GETS ON WITH THE JOB.

THE MODERN WAY.

It must be difficult for the average citizen to understand the motive which prompts a young man to spend not one week-end, but many, in crawling about ditches hiding from imaginary enemies, in trying to imitate the calls of the birds, and in making plaster casts of foot-marks in the mud—to mention just a few of the bizarre activities which have aroused the curiosity and mild indulgence of many more conventional citizens in the lanes around some of our big cities during the past few week-ends.

When first I spent a week-end with one of these companies of adventurers, I must confess that I found it a little difficult to enter into their intense satisfaction when, after lying for half an hour hidden in thick undergrowth on a cool day, a bird hopped across a piece of specially prepared ground, intent on gaining a morsel of fat which had been purposely placed as a lure. The joy with which they proceeded to dig up the special soft preparation, combined with the anxiety they displayed lest it should be damaged, and their satisfaction when it was safely baking in the camp oven, struck me as grotesque and eccentric.

But more surprises were in store. It was impressed upon me that I must be able to deceive the birds themselves before I could hope to be much of a backwoodsman, and they then and there proceeded to teach me how to imitate an owl, a wood-pigeon, and a cuckoo, just to begin with. After frantic efforts to produce the correct noise by holding both hands together and pressing my thumbs against my lips whilst I sent vast draughts of air into the space thus formed, I began to realize that I was getting quite anxious about my inability to succeed, and to feel really worried. Unconsciously it was getting a hold on me, this backwoods stuff.

They then took me to a perfectly flat field to practise stalking. They showed me how to lie down, how to crawl, and how to "freeze" when an alarm was raised. I was asked to go into one of the tents for five minutes and then to come out and count the number of people visible, blowing on a whistle when I wanted them all to betray their whereabouts. I looked all around most carefully when I came out of that tent, but I could see no one. When I blew the whistle, the thing I had mistaken for a log of wood came to life and stood up, the heap of blankets lying outside the farthest tent proved to be alive, and the others had chosen little hollows in the ground so cunningly that they rose apparently out of the earth. It seemed impossible that so much cover could exist on a flat field.

The leader described a simple walk of about a quarter of a mile in length, and asked me to follow it in a few minutes' time and see how many of the fellows I could spot without leaving the path. There were a dozen of them. I spotted one in a tree and another behind a tree, but the one I didn't spot, amongst others, lay flat on his face behind a log in the open field. I looked at this log quite distinctly, and there was absolutely no cover, but he wore a khaki shirt and he kept still, and it was the latter fact which deceived me.

By this time, not only was my interest thoroughly awakened but my pride was rather piqued by my repeated bungling, and so when they suggested that I should go for a walk from a point near a certain School, in the direction of a distant church, and that they would successfully spy on me without being observed, I accepted with alacrity.

I duly covered the prescribed course and with some misgiving I arrived back a couple of hours or so later, having seen no one. They did not refer to the incident again that day, and we spent the evening learning how to make a fire, without flint, tinder, or matches, by rubbing two pieces of wood together in a certain way, and when the spark had been produced transferring it successfully to some dry material, which could then be fanned into a flame. Needless to say, I couldn't do it.

The next morning they presented me with several photos of myself, nicely developed and printed, which they had taken during my walk. There was a view of me looking right into the camera, about six feet away. It had been taken, so I was informed, from the back of a hay cart in which one of their number had been concealed. Another was a view taken from a tree as I passed underneath and looked up. The third was a back view taken through a hedge. It was altogether a smart piece of work, for I didn't exactly walk with my eyes shut.

Being by now completely in love with the idea, I sought further enlightenment. The leader explained :

> Well, we are training to be Scoutmasters, and we can't teach the boys until we are thoroughly proficient ourselves. Scouting aims at developing the five senses by means of woodcraft study and games. The qualities which go to make a backwoodsman are the same as those which go to make a good citizen ; a healthy body, an alert mind with all the senses trained, resourcefulness, reliability, a sense of responsibility, love of all things living, understanding and appreciation of the ways of nature which comes with studying her—these are the things we want to teach the boys of our cities. Every boy on joining agrees to abide by our code of honour, known as the Scout Law, and we try, by forging a chain of brotherhood through our Scouting practices, to bring an appreciation of the simple and wholesome joys of life which somehow are so often missed by many people.

I thought of some streets and homes in our cities full of teeming hordes of unkempt children. If, in addition to the appeal to the youth of every social class which Scouting makes, something is being

done on these lines for these children—and I am assured that it is—then, while politicians and Councillors discuss ways and means of abolishing slums and improving standards, our young men are getting on with the job in the oldest way in the world, and yet in the most modern way.

ALEC. R. ELLIS.

HOUSING REFORM FOR THE CHURCH.

THE provision of Church buildings in new suburban areas and in small towns is often unduly postponed on account of straitened means and the high cost of labour and of materials. Yet if the actual needs of the fellowship are frankly faced, it seems clear that adequate accommodation could often be secured at quite a moderate cost and without unnecessary delay.

Perhaps it would be well to recognize at the outset that Church extension for Congregationalists ought to mean primarily the extension of the fellowship and not the erection of buildings. It is not in accordance with our genius to put up great buildings and then seek to gather a fellowship to fill them. Our schemes ought to aim first of all at the simple and adequate housing of those who are already agreed in Communion, together with just that margin of additional room which may be deemed needful for the normal growth and expansion of the fellowship. The buildings ought to grow with the Church, and we ought not to be content that any part of the scheme should be but little used. It surely is doubtful economy that the largest and most costly building in our premises should so often be the part that is barred, padlocked, and bolted for six days of the week.

If we consider for a moment what is the Congregational conception of the Church, we shall the more readily appreciate the sort of scheme that would be most appropriate for our needs. We think of the Church as the fellowship of believers who by common worship and mutual edification seek to equip themselves for the service of Christ in His Kingdom and for the winning of souls. There must therefore first of all be a prayer-room at the centre, a room that will be used more than any other, a room large enough to contain the normal gathering of communicants, yet not so large that the members of the congregation are lost in it and out of touch with each other. This room should be furnished simply and beautifully, in such a way as to suggest worship. We are all of us more sensitive to atmosphere than we sometimes admit.

Then because the next function of the Church is the business of Christian culture, which, of course, includes the work of the Sunday School, three, or better four, additional rooms will be needed at the outset, not small class-rooms, nor yet large halls, but sufficient in size for the numbers that may reasonably be expected to fill the

departments of a moderately graded school. The fact need scarcely be emphasized that the surest way of extending the fellowship is by growing it from the Primary Department upwards. For every single adult non-churchgoer who is attracted into our normal church life, there are at least a score who come to Christ and join the Church through the teaching and influence of the School. For this reason the type of building appropriate to our need will approximate more nearly to the scholastic or collegiate than to the ecclesiastical.

As the fellowship grows, not merely in numbers, but in the sense of ministry, other rooms should be added to increase the efficiency of the senior end, and to give the members an outlet for wider service, the final goal being a hall large enough for public gatherings. This should have a platform-stage, a cinema or lantern fixture, and equipment for a gymnasium. If chairs are used for the furnishings, the hall could be more readily adapted for a varied programme of social and religious propaganda. It will probably be found an advantage to use this larger hall for the Sunday evening service, for we have to recognize, as a psychological fact that cannot be ignored, that the people we most want to influence are more readily attracted into a hall that is used for varied purposes and not set apart exclusively for the worship of God. We have to be all things to all men if by any means we may save some. This hall, however, is the last objective. We have first to grow the fellowship that is capable of using it wisely for the ingathering of those who are now separated from the Church.

In the suggested scheme that follows, the prayer room, or chapel, is an upper room and an integral part of the buildings, so that it can be used at the close of every day for family prayer by the subsidiary societies of the church, meeting in the different rooms for their educational and other engagements. One would no longer be in doubt at the end of a social or a concert how to bring the affair to a suitable conclusion, whether to sing "God Save the King", or pronounce the benediction. We should loyally announce, "After the singing of the National Anthem there will be family prayer upstairs. All who care to stay with us will be welcomed". As to cost, this scheme should not run to more than £3,500 and could be brought within the £3,000 figure by various modifications. The chapel here will seat 190. This accommodation could be increased to about 250 by including the ante-room. Where the completion of the scheme is not likely to be realized for a considerable time, this might possibly be preferred.

To Mr. J. Mansell Jenkinson, A.R.I.B.A., of Sheffield, I am particularly indebted for sympathetic interest and valuable advice, and for the great care with which he has drawn out the scheme in detail.

H. R. Moxley.





NOTE.
ANTE ROOM TO BE USED AS EXTENSION TO CHAPEL ON SPECIAL OCCASIONS.

SCALE of FEET
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FIRST FLOOR PLAN



ON LIFE AND BOOKS.

MARK RUTHERFORD.

I have heard it said that no one to-day reads Mark Rutherford, but this can hardly be true. It must be thirty years since I first read *The Autobiography* and *The Revolution in Tanner's Lane.* A little later I read *Catherine Furze,* and then nearly everything Rutherford published. What follows is based chiefly on the three books I have named. They give you the man as he was in himself, and they are his best work. He said nothing vital in his papers and other tales which is not as well or better said in these three; they are the freshest and the strongest things he did.

That Mark Rutherford has bursts of genius is not in doubt. But much of it is so irresolute, so inconclusive, and to many his field (but here they are wrong) seems so hedged in, that his influence breaks away from you just when you hope most from it; the revelation you expected ends as the highly intellectual and rather morbid melancholy of a disillusioned mind. This is the disappointment which awaits the most friendly reader of Rutherford's work. "What became of Zachariah and Pauline?", he asks at the close of *The Revolution*; and the answer is, "At present I do not know". But this is just what you want to know. It is the whole point. Cowfold is blown sky high; but the building of something in its place is left over. And Rutherford never did it. Perhaps it was because he was unable, as he himself says, to trust his own decisions. He listens incessantly to the gainsayings of men whose faith has gone to pieces, and though he is not convinced, and older moods sometimes return on him, he never does trust to the full his own spiritual insight. In one word, he was afraid to sail by the stars, though he knew it was the only kind of sailing that was any good to him.

The Autobiography is an imaginative setting of a spiritual journey. *The Revolution* is very largely a dramatization of that journey, and the main movement is parallel in thought with *The Autobiography.* It is not necessary for their interest to localize any of the incidents in either book in the author's own life, any more than it is necessary in reading *Lavengro* to know the details of George Borrow's life. Perhaps the greatest tribute to the author of these books is that he has created an individual, "Mark Rutherford", who is an arresting figure in himself; it is in this individual we are interested, and with him we are concerned.

In his early days when training for the ministry Rutherford was thrown, according to his own account, among a trivial and little-minded set, and he was not treated well by men in authority who had no understanding of youth, and no sympathy either with the turn of his mind or with his search for truth. They seemed to him to have sunk to the level of a dreary and shifty professionalism. Probably there were faults on both sides, for Rutherford was himself a trying man: with patience and a little more imaginativeness things might have been very different. One is bound also to say there was a touch of superiority in Rutherford's attitude to his fellow-students. But it is clear enough that he suffered from his surroundings, and never got over the slur those in authority cast on him. By a habit of brooding he came to see everything intensified and magnified in the shadow of those experiences; and the vengeance he took was to light

up with fearful lightnings the backwoods and underworld of Nonconformity, and to hurl thunderbolts at absurd hypocrites like the Rev. John Broad, or Mr. Snale, the obsequious deacon and draper. None knew better than Mark Rutherford that most of this was caricature, and was unfair. I do not believe that he really intended to be unjust. It was the unconscious warping of a delicately-strung mind.

Very likely it will be said in Rutherford's defence that this is not the whole of the case, and that he does give us now and then the larger aspect of the old Dissent; as, *e.g.*, in the dramatic preaching of Mr. Bradshaw at Pike Street, and in the home of the Allens at Cowfold. This is true. But it is also true that these are the exceptions, and that the general effect is to make Nonconformity ridiculous, often despicable. The atmosphere of Dissent in *The Autobiography* is suffocating, and the life utterly without thought, or truth, or feeling. Where there is strength or refinement, as in the noble and moving description of the Miss Arbours, these are characters who keep aloof and to themselves, and are suspected and not understood; and the open, attractive, honest minds, firm in their moral aim, and greeting the light, are sceptics like Mardon; or like Jean Caillaud, in *The Revolution,* and his daughter, Pauline. It is not that these men are not often as fine as Rutherford represents them, but it is the use he makes of them as almost the only ones without guile and the monopolists of straightforwardness. The same thing comes out in his depreciation of David in order to enhance the stature of Saul, in the brilliant essay on Saul. And so in the novel; Pauline, the half-sceptical, fascinating girl is shown off against a cad like Thomas Broad, and her active, revolutionary mind against the tea-meeting religion of Coleman's insipid wife. This is the essential unfairness of Mark Rutherford. It is a serious unfairness because it rests on embitterment, and means that he had never attained any settled calm, nor reached any goal in the things that matter infinitely more in life than some wrong we may once have suffered. If we are to take at its face value the verdict he passes on life in Reuben Shapcott's Preface to *The Autobiography,*

> One fourth of life is intelligible, the other three fourths is unintelligible darkness; and our earliest duty is to cultivate the habit of not looking round the corner:

this comes far too near pessimism and cynicism to be even approximately correct. Pessimism, some one has said, is always out in its reckoning. There is an accompaniment of melancholy and perverseness in the books which becomes an irritant, and at last a weariness. It explains why Rutherford never found the place he might have had in literature.

And now, having said so much by way of criticism, let me try to put the other side and say what it is that will give Rutherford an enduring hold on all who love good work; and why he will always be interesting to those who love the bypaths of literature. First of all, there is not a piece of shoddy, not a trace of literary cheapening, in his best work. He has the great classical models in his eye, and follows them. He writes an English style which is clear, nervous, convincing, unpretentious but exactly fitted to what he wanted to do. *The Autobiography* contains passages of supreme power, done in what Hazlitt called a familiar style—"the hardest of all to write, and the most dependent on purity of expression". Except that he lacks the imaginativeness of George Borrow, and cannot soar to the ethereal beauty of the description of Isopel Berners and life in the dingle, Rutherford has the same diamond edge, the same directness, and the same instinct for a dramatic moment.

So with the thought which the writing clothes and expresses. Rutherford's ruling aim was a crystal integrity of mind. He will have no dealings with insincerity or compliance, nor with those who

> . . . tell the clock to any business that
> We say befits the hour.

He makes no easy purchases of contentment. Swift and final as the Day of Judgment is his anger against all that tricks itself out and lacks sense, and for the snob, intellectual or otherwise, he has only the everlasting bonfire. Then his thought flames up, and the page becomes a furnace. All this means life, intensity, the Puritan's fervour; and it is this deeper undertone of the prophet, this "bow of burning gold", that gives Rutherford his power. He reminds you at times of Carlyle, but he is less fuliginous, and less ready to talk energetically to the gallery. His favourite book seems to have been *Ecclesiastes,* but he believed even that to be better than settling on the lees in Zion. Obviously these are tonic qualities, like a north-easter blowing in your face, or a buffeting in the Channel; they have their dangers, but they are healthy and restorative. The one element which is missing is humour, the laughter and merriment which ripple across life and leave no pain. Rutherford never laughed out loud over his work as Jane Austen is said to have laughed and laughed as she wrote her most diverting scenes. When Mr. and Mrs. Broad take tea and cress together in the study on Monday afternoon, the minister having recovered from his Sunday labours, and they discuss the capture of a wealthy son-in-law, the theology and prospects of Thomas, what Mr. Broad can safely preach on the following Sunday without giving offence, and on which Cowfold ladies Mrs. Broad may properly call, the humour is a trifle heavy, and the laughter has a sting. I am afraid it is meant to have a sting, and that is where Rutherford loses.

There is one other matter. Mark Rutherford belongs to the Victorian period, but he is already out of its atmosphere. He thinks ahead of his day, and sees further into the future than most of his contemporaries. He writes of the social revolution in its early stages, and of the new fashions in religious belief just when the break with orthodoxy was beginning, and his radicalism is in each case severely intellectual. He goes to the roots of reform as Charles Kingsley's sentimentalism never did; in theology (if he really had a theology) he is more subversive than many who were much more talked of at the time, and he seemed to have his finger on the pulse of the movement which threatened to topple down the reigning creeds. In these respects *The Revolution* and *Catherine Furze* are literature of the centre; not the greatest, it is true, but the living stuff of the mind; and without making the excessive claims which Mr. Massingham once made for them, they are of another brand altogether than *Yeast,* or *John Inglesant,* and the much-trumpeted *Robert Elsmere.* I doubt if there was in any contemporary fiction a better knowledge of the spirit that was then working in town and country. These little East-Midland places of Rutherford's seem a dingy theatre, but as he writes of them they open on a large world and have universal contacts. Had he possessed a gift for character and plot the equal of Thomas Hardy's, and one tenth Hardy's ear for the music of Nature, there is a thinking truer to life in Rutherford's best work than in *The Return of the Native,* or in *Tess.*

And then sometimes, when I delight in him most, another mood falls on me and I begin to ask if all this introspection of Rutherford's is not a mistake, and whether he did not in the end himself think so :—

> We think too much of ourselves . . . Don't bother yourselves with what is beyond you; try to lead a clean sweet wholesome life, keep yourselves in health above everything, stick to your work, and when your day is done amuse and refresh yourselves.

It is not heroic or high-sounding doctrine, but perhaps it really is better than everlastingly meddling with things we cannot hope to understand. There are days when I turn from Mark Rutherford and his distraught universe, and from all the brood of philosophical novels, back to the sunny gleeful pages of Jane Austen, and feel that she was right; and that whatever you may think about pessimism and optimism, or about Cowfold, or even the old Dissent, there is a shining world of good sense and mercurial wisdom behind what Mr. Knightley says to Emma when she is for making a match between the young vicar, Mr. Elton, and some "suitable" girl:—

> Invite him to dinner, Emma, and help him to the best of the fish and chicken, but leave him to choose his own wife. Depend upon it, a man of six or seven and twenty can take care of himself.

A. T. S. James.

TURNER.

Mr. Walter Bayes, artist and critic, could, we are quite sure, write a very racy volume of reminiscences. He could also, so far as we are qualified to judge, which is very little, write a good book on painting. But it is scarcely the thing to mix chapters of the two together, spice it with Turner, and call the result *Turner: A Speculative Portrait* (Bles, 10s. 6d.). Mr. Bayes himself confesses to a large measure of irrelevance, and at all manner of unexpected points he launches into an anecdote, or tells us what he said to somebody, or somebody said to him.

Every hair on the head of the reader trained in the scientific way of regarding history will stand on end as he regards Mr. Bayes's methods. Speculative indeed they may be said to be, for when he does not know exactly what happened he says, in effect: "It must have been a play, something like this: Act I . . . ". All this is not to say that Mr. Bayes is not thought-provoking as well as entertaining. His theory is that there is a definite connexion between Turner's private life and the character of his art. His periodical visits to Wapping, where he lived for days in squalid surroundings, his attitude to his barber-father, his succession of mistress-housekeepers, are all explained in relation to the development of his paintings. Indeed, Mr. Bayes goes so far as to argue that at one period Turner's subjects were deliberately chosen in order that his reputation might be securely established before his Jekyll-and-Hyde manner of life became public. At the end of the book we feel that indeed we have a portrait, but that it is one where the artist has been endeavouring to exhibit his skill rather than to reproduce the sitter. For one aphorism we are grateful: "There's many a bad lot that is a good sort".

Editor.

FOREIGN IMPRESSIONS AND REVIEWS.

Julius Köbner.

One of the most striking religious movements of the last hundred years has been the spread of evangelical Christianity on the Continent of Europe, and in particular the growth of the Baptists. Although it has happened so close at hand, it has been little regarded, perhaps because it has been in large measure a spontaneous growth, owing little to outside leadership or help. A hundred years ago there were no Baptist Churches on the Continent. To-day they are to be found in every country save Turkey and Albania, and the latest returns speak of nearly 2,000 churches, and over 240,000 members, excluding the large but uncertain numbers in Russia. Dr. J. H. Rushbrooke thinks that at a conservative estimate there must be reckoned a further 3,000 churches, and 1,000,000 members from that land alone. This remarkable increase owes much to three men, who must be regarded as the founders of Baptist work on the Continent, and whose influence spread far beyond Baptist circles. During their lifetimes they were affectionately nicknamed the *Kleeblatt,* or clover-leaf. The name of Johann Gerhard Oncken, "the Father of German Baptists", is known in this country; his companions were G. W. Lehmann, a fellow German, and Julius Köbner, a Dane.

Köbner was born a Jew, and had considerable literary gifts. He seems at first sight an unusual type to have become an evangelical pioneer, and it is not surprising that, nearly half a century after his death, renewed interest is being shown in Germany in his personality. In 1928 a well-annotated selection from Köbner's writings[1], with a critical introductory essay, was issued by Dr. Gieselbusch of Leipzig, and a few months ago there appeared an illustrated and documented life[2], written by Köbner's only child, Frau Baresel of Stuttgart. Dr. Adolf Keller has been complaining recently of how ill-orientated British and American opinion is with regard to Continental Christianity. Considerable insight into the evangelical section of it is given by knowledge of the story of Köbner.

I

Towards the close of the eighteenth century, Isaac Aaron Köbner, a young man of about twenty-five, left the colony of German Jews at Lissa in Poland, that he might see something of the outside world. He came of a learned and well-organized group of Jews, but the frequent political changes in Eastern Europe made their conditions of life uncertain. In spite of the cost of travel, and the disabilities from which in many places Jews still suffered, not a few chose to leave their homes, and seek their fortunes in other parts. Isaac Köbner appears to have made his way first to Breslau, thence to Berlin, and from there to Hamburg. The Napoleonic wars made his settlement in Hamburg impossible, so he moved to Lübeck, and there secured employment. The trade of the place was increasing, and after a while he was sent on business into Denmark, and settled finally in Odense, in the island of Fünen. Jews were not allowed to organize large colonies, nor could they take part in the ordinary trades and crafts. Some form of commerce was alone open to them. Köbner had studied the Talmud, and could act as Rabbi, and before long he was the recognized

[1] *Um die Gemeinde. Ausgewählte Schriften von Julius Köbner.* Auswahl und Einleitungen von Hermann Gieselbusch. Bund der Freunde Christlicher Bücher. Berlin. lvii + 213 pp. [2] *Julius Köbner. Sein Leben.* von Ruth Baresel. Kassel. 310 pp.

leader of the community. When he was twenty-nine he married the nineteen-year-old niece of a friend named Israel. Hannah Israel came from Jutland.

Nine children were born to this couple, five boys and four girls. It was the eldest who was destined to become a Baptist. His birthday was 11th June, 1806, and he was given the name of Solomon, and intended from the first as a Rabbi, like his father. His great-uncle Israel, who was childless, became specially attached to him, and for some years the boy lived with the old man throughout the week, and returned to his own family only for the Sabbath. This may have increased his natural seriousness and fondness for reading. Early his mind was busied with thoughts about God, and from books he learned of Christianity. The daily prayers led by his great-uncle seemed unnatural and formal.

Since he was good at drawing young Köbner was put with an engraver when he had finished his schooling. At languages, also, he showed marked ability, and this was later of great assistance to him. During his adolescence he was much perplexed about religion, and in particular about the problem of the person of Christ. He had come to love the Prophet of Nazareth in an emotional way, and even tried to pray to Him, resolving that when he left home he would become a Christian, and follow this more reasonable and spiritual religion. His chance came when he was eighteen. His father had always described Lübeck in glowing terms, and it was decided he should go there for a while to earn his living. Instead of making use of the introductions he had to leading members of the Jewish community, or taking advantage of his freedom to see the sights of the place, young Köbner went straight to the Pastor of the Reformed Church, and asked him to expound the Christian faith. "I heard then for the first time why Christ had come," he wrote later, "I received the most worthwhile of all gifts, the teaching of the divinity of Christ." This can hardly be described as his intellectual conversion, that was already past; it did not mark his moral conversion, that was to come. The interview with Pastor Geibel was, however, a milestone in his religious experience. If he remained in Lübeck, and identified himself with the Christians, he risked the interference of acquaintances from Denmark, so he proceeded to Hamburg. There a mood of reaction came upon him, the first joy that had accompanied the hearing of the gospel left him, and he refrained from publicly severing himself from Judaism. He worked at engraving, did a little teaching of languages, and began to write poetry.

Among his pupils Köbner soon had a certain Juliana von Schröter, aged nineteen, the daughter of a German officer in Danish employ. They were at once attracted to one another, and before long became secretly engaged. To ask her hand in marriage, while he remained a Jew, was to court disaster, and he was already convinced of the superiority of the Christian religion. In the summer of 1826, therefore, he was baptized in St. Peter's, Hamburg, and took the new names of Julius Johann Wilhelm, in place of Solomon. Dr. Gieselbusch urges that there can be no doubt that his conversion from Judaism to Christianity marked the bigger change in his life; "his joining the young Baptist Church was only the natural consequence of following the path on which he had set out". If we have in mind all the steps that led him from the faith of his fathers to his first baptism, this may be true, but it can hardly be said of the 1826 step alone. Other motives seem then to have been dominant.

At first the girl's father was adamant in his objection to the marriage. Köbner had also to meet the reproaches of his own family. He journeyed home to explain what he had done, and when neither side could be won by

reason, appealed over their heads to the King of Denmark, and secured from him a special licence for the wedding. It took place on 29th December, 1826, in a little church on the west coast of Denmark. There for a while the couple settled. They were not long without trouble. A baby died. Juliana found her post as housewife uncongenial. Köbner was greatly distressed at the death of his mother. He worked hard, however, not only at his engraving, but also at efforts to improve printing machines. Some of his poetry was published, and he found time to write a play commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the accession of King Frederick VI, and a prize essay on the provision of work for the destitute. The life of the city attracted both Köbner and his wife, and when he gained first prize for a further essay, this time on the employment of orphans in Hamburg, and his wife was offered a post as teacher in the orphanage, they decided to return. Köbner's favourite brother, Waldemar, was already established in Hamburg as a printer, which was an additional reason for moving there.

Their life was about to take a new and unexpected turn. While shopping one day, Juliana heard of an evangelist who was working in the neighbourhood where they lived, and being of an inquiring disposition, she resolved to hear him. The preacher was Gerhard Oncken, colporteur of the Edinburgh Bible Society, but already convinced of the truth of believer's baptism by immersion, and the leader of a small church of six members, constituted according to Baptist principles in 1834. Köbner refused to attend a service, so his wife paid her first visit alone. The fiery preacher with the sparkling eyes, who made one realize one's sinfulness, and who presented Jesus as Mediator clearly and impressively, so moved Juliana that she had little difficulty in making Julius go with her on the following Sunday. When he heard Oncken all his old interest in religious things was re-kindled, and what he had previously accepted as truth with his mind, he now accepted with his heart and will. After anxious thought and study, on 30th May, 1836, Köbner was, for the second time, baptized. A few weeks later his wife took the same step, then his brothers, Waldemar and Harry, and his sister, Serina. His relations with his brothers and sisters were always cordial, and he hastened to share with them his new joy and enthusiasm.

II

Oncken realized at once the ability of the new recruit, and sought his help in many directions, and particularly with regard to propaganda. Köbner's Jewish training had given him a detailed knowledge of the *Old Testament,* and he became an eager student of the *New.* He did nothing by halves, and having joined the Baptists, gave to them all his spare time and energy. After some initial hesitation, he was encouraged to preach, and though his pen remained for long his easiest mode of expression, he became so effective a speaker that in later years he was among the most sought after for both pulpit and platform. His poetical gifts found outlet in the writing of hymns. In 1840 he edited a collection for congregational use which contained fifteen of his own. The better known *Glaubenstimme,* published in 1849, had fifty-nine, and in its present revised form forty-nine. A few of his hymns are worthy of comparison with those of Zinzendorf and Tersteegen; all of them are of vigorous sincerity and piety. Within twelve months of Köbner's baptism, the little congregation had nearly doubled in numbers, and a larger room had to be secured for the services.

The civil and religious authorities soon gave attention to the new sect, and the Hamburg mob showed itself unfriendly. An official order forbade

the public assembly of the Baptists. Oncken refused to be silenced, and was sentenced to a month's imprisonment. Köbner soon joined him. He had sent to his leader, concealed in a loaf of bread, a list of the places where the Baptists were meeting secretly, and while using his handkerchief, Oncken let fall the piece of paper in sight of a warder. During his first term Köbner found prison life very trying to his spirit, but later he spent his time in literary work. The dispute with the magistrates dragged on for many months. An unsuccessful effort was made to get Oncken to go to America. Petitions from England and the United States showed the Hamburg Senate that the Baptists were not without influential friends abroad.

During the quieter intervals of the dispute Oncken sent Köbner to Denmark to organize Baptist witness there. It was thirteen years since he had visited his home. When his views were known, he had to meet strong opposition from the old Jewish Rabbi and his friends, but in Copenhagen a small evangelical group showed itself interested. Köbner returned in 1839, bringing Oncken with him, and the first Danish Baptist Church was formed. Persecution immediately broke out, and for some years visits by the leaders were affairs of danger and adventure, owing to the attentions of the police and the mob. In the winter of 1841 Köbner journeyed to Berlin, and there came to know Gottfried Wilhelm Lehmann, an engraver of copper plates, who had become pastor in Berlin as a result of Oncken's influence, and who was destined to be the third of the triumvirate to whom the Baptist movement on the Continent owes so much. Lehmann and Köbner became close personal friends.

A settlement with the Hamburg magistrates came by unexpected means. Köbner had hardly returned from his Berlin visit before the terrible fire of May, 1842, occurred. For four days large parts of the city were in flames. The Baptists offered their new meeting-house for the shelter of the homeless, and for six months housed there some seventy persons. Oncken proved himself an able organizer, and Köbner was doctor to both bodies and souls. The general attitude of the public changed completely as a result of what they saw the Baptists doing in the emergency. Persecution continued in a few localities, but there was no further sustained repressive movement. A season of rapid growth followed. An illness of Oncken's brought Köbner still further to the front as leader, and in 1844 he was formally ordained. The text that this former Jew chose for the sermon he gave on this occasion is not without significance : "His master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him for ever". Köbner was given the title of "Missioner to Germany", and travelled extensively throughout the country, and also in neighbouring lands, taking at the same time no small share in the publication work. After much discussion a Confession of Faith was issued. It was a compromise, for on the exact significance of baptism, the Lord's Supper, the Church, and Sanctification not all were agreed.

In 1847 Köbner's father died, in his seventy-second year. A few months later, at a time of unrest and uncertainty all over Europe, Köbner wrote a vigorous "Manifesto to the German People", urging complete religious toleration. " We demand freedom," he declared, " for every man who dwells on the soil of the Fatherland. We demand it for all in the same measure, be they Christians, Jews, Mohammedans or whatever else." In words like these there rings the authentic Baptist note, the passion for liberty which has been one of their most strongly marked characteristics. The Revolution of 1848 led to the acceptance in theory of the principle enunciated by Köbner, but fines and petty persecution continued locally the

lot of many smaller bodies for some years. A general conference of Baptists from all over Germany was, however, possible at once, and in 1849 some sixty representatives of thirty-six churches gathered in Hamburg under the chairmanship of Oncken. It was decided to form provincial Associations, and a general Union, which was to have its assembly every three years. In the debates Köbner showed independence of judgment, and gave warning of the dangers of over-centralization and of professionalism. A little book on the Church which he wrote about this time helped in the conversion of Andreas Wiberg, a Swedish clergyman, who became a Baptist pioneer in Scandinavia.

With both Lehmann and Oncken, Köbner was at the gatherings of the Evangelical Alliance in London in 1851, and there made his first speech in English, describing Baptist progress in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. The following Sunday he attended the Baptist chapel in Staines, and addressed the congregation on his conversion from Judaism.

III

The third and central period of Köbner's life began in 1852, when he left Hamburg and the immediate supervision of Oncken. Waldemar Köbner, the printer, had put forward views on Sanctification which brought him into conflict with Oncken, and led ultimately to his severance from the church, and emigration to Brazil. His brother's position was made somewhat difficult in consequence, and as a leader was badly needed in the industrial area of Westphalia, Oncken asked Julius to go as pastor to Barmen. To leave Hamburg and his friends was a big wrench, but the work waiting to be done he felt as a clear divine call, and from his new sphere he could continue both his general visitation of the churches of Germany, and his writing. There were many local difficulties in Barmen, but by 1856 a new chapel had been built, and the membership considerably increased. Köbner was a faithful minister, careful as to those he baptized, keen on the work among the young.

Together with Lehmann, he sought to link together all evangelical Christians. They were at the Evangelical Alliance Conference in Paris in 1855 at the time of the Great Exhibition. There was considerable misunderstanding of the Baptist position, and in certain quarters undisguised hostility, and the two members of the *Kleeblatt* had no easy task. In 1858 Köbner was with Oncken in Denmark and Sweden. A few years later he was again in England, appealing for financial help for the growing work. He spent some time each year assisting Oncken in training intending pastors, giving courses in German, World and Church History, Physics, Geology, and Astronomy. He found time to read, and among his writings during this period were a tract on Sanctification, and the poetical drama, *The Waldensians*. He engaged also in work among the prisoners of the 1864 war between Denmark and Austria. Köbner's stay in Barmen was a time of uninterrupted activity.

The years had their own peculiar sadness. As she grew older, his wife, Juliana, developed eccentricities that caused a good deal of trouble in the church. She was misunderstood, was certainly most indiscreet, became embittered, and finally was excluded from fellowship. When, in 1865, Köbner resigned the Barmen charge, and Oncken designated him for further work in Denmark, it was suggested that he proceed there alone, and that Juliana remain under Oncken's care in Hamburg. There she died, after three years of loneliness, in 1868, an enigmatic and pathetic figure.

But for this domestic sorrow Köbner would have returned to work in his native land with zest. There was plenty of scope there for a man of parts. The work in Copenhagen soon began to develop. A divided church was united and strengthened, and a new building erected. Köbner edited a hymnbook, in which more than a seventh of the hymns were from his own pen. His years in Germany had modified his views on political questions and he found it difficult to understand his congregation's sympathy with France in the 1870 war. Though suffering a good deal from nervous asthma, he would have found the Danish years happy ones, but for the developing trouble in Germany, where for some time the life of the denomination was to be darkened by internal conflict.

Difficulties arose over the independence of a mission chapel in Altona, a suburb of Hamburg. Oncken was not in the best of health; two accidents had resulted in injuries to his head, and he was in frequent pain; he sadly missed his dead son-in-law, Schauffler, who had been of great assistance in all his work. He felt that his own personal position was being challenged, and in an effort to assert his authority over certain of his deacons made matters worse, and finally caused irreparable mischief by calling in the police to a disturbed church meeting. Thus provoked, the members met in his absence. He declared their proceedings out of order. Köbner and Lehmann were sent for, but at the same time Oncken enlarged the area of the dispute by despatching a letter on the subject to the Baptists of Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, France, Poland, and Turkey. The members of the Altona congregation felt bound to reply. Tempers rose, unwise and uncharitable things were said by all parties, and it soon became evident that the quarrel was to divide the "cloverleaf" itself. The relations between Oncken and Köbner became most strained and bitter, particularly after the latter had in the heat of the moment declared that he was convinced "that the Lord would not let Brother Oncken die, but that, if he did die at once, he would certainly be among the lost". American friends who had made generous contributions to the work withheld their assistance when they learned of the dispute, thus further adding to the confusion and suffering. Köbner had recently published a new poem, "The Song of God"; this was condemned as unorthodox. As the conflict developed the whole question of the relation of the individual churches to one another was raised, and the denomination split from one end of Germany to the other.

On Köbner himself the effect of the strife was most unfortunate. His health gave way. He could not carry on his usual duties, was troubled with insomnia, and found no relief in literary work. Finally his friends advised him to marry again, that he might have once more the comforts of a home, and fresh interests. He recalled the devotion with which a certain Dorothea Stagsted had cared for her invalid mother, and sought her as his wife. They were married in 1875, she being thirty-nine, and he sixty-nine years old. A year later, a daughter, Ruth, was born, to whose pen we owe the recently published life of her father.

It was in 1876 that at last an end came to the long and unfortunate controversy which had so hampered and embittered Baptist work in Germany. The local trouble in Altona was settled, and a revision in the constitution of the Union made it more democratic in form. Some of the changes made had long been necessary. For a while relations between the leaders continued strained, though Köbner made gestures of friendship towards Oncken. A long journey through Germany and Switzerland that Köbner undertook in 1877 helped in reconciling conflicting local parties, and in pulling the denomination together again. It is astonishing that at

his age he could stand such lengthy travel. Conveyance was often in open carts, on bad roads, in rain and storm, with poor sleeping quarters, gatherings in dimly-lighted ill-ventilated rooms, and sometimes three or four addresses to be given in one day. Hamburg, Berlin, Stettin, Dantzig, Königsberg, Saxony, Middle and South Germany, Strassburg, the Rhineland, Bremen, and Schleswig were all visited. Everywhere Köbner was well received, and as in former years, did he best to make contacts not only with Baptists, but with those outside the churches, and particularly with the Jews.

After the birth of her child, Dorothea became seriously ill. When Köbner returned from his long itinerary he did all he could for her restoration to health, but it was in vain. In the early hours of 1878 she died, to his very great grief. This brief second marriage was a happy interlude, and it gave him a little daughter to cheer and comfort his last years.

IV

Julius Köbner, aged seventy-three, for a second time a widower, and now with a little child to care for, had to start another chapter of his life. Friends in Barmen and Elberfeld approached him with a view to his returning there, and he decided it would be well to leave Copenhagen and its memories.

In Barmen he had once more to set things in order. There had been quarrels over finance. He gave himself to the organization of what in this country would be called "lay preaching", and held regular classes for sermon preparation. His interests were wide as ever. He became an ardent supporter of homœopathy. He continued a keen worker for the Evangelical Alliance, and was at the Basel Conference of 1879. Other journeys in Germany occupied him, for he continued in his old position of "Missioner". At the Assembly of the Union in 1879 neither Oncken nor Lehmann could be present owing to age and infirmity, but Köbner was able to take a leading part. Three years later in Altona, he gave two powerful addresses, though then seventy-six years of age. In 1880 he went for a walking holiday in the Alps.

From a literary point of view, also, this second Barmen period was one of fruitfulness. It was as if he were gathering the harvest of all his earlier thought and experience. Seven small books on theological subjects followed one another swiftly from his pen, setting forth his views on Miracles, Eschatology, the *New Testament* Church, the sin against the Holy Ghost, Church Government, and the relations of Church and State. They do not show great originality, nor would their statements be now generally accepted, but they are proof of Köbner's energy and continued alertness. In addition he wrote a prose poem, *The Violin Player,* for his small daughter. He refused to call it a novel, but it is in that form. The scene is in England, and the heroine an ideal figure, full of purity and grace.

Köbner thought to end his days in Barmen. He lodged happily with the family of one of his church members, where his own interest in music was shared. In 1882, however, there came a call to Berlin. G. W. Lehmann, seven years older than Köbner, had recently passed away, and his gifted son, Joseph, who had always been thought of as his father's successor, was needed for the Preachers' Seminary in Hamburg. Köbner was consequently pressed to come to the church in Berlin.

There is something grand, though not a little touching, in the picture of the old man of nearly seventy-seven preaching his induction sermon in the Schmidstrasse Chapel, Berlin. It was in May, 1883, and he chose as text: "For I long to see you, that I may impart unto you some spiritual

gift, to the end ye may be established". The union began auspiciously. Köbner had no difficulties to clear up as in his former pastorates. He was among a united people, who had for years honoured and loved him. Early in 1884, however, there came the news of Oncken's death in Switzerland. It was a sad blow to Köbner, who was thus left the sole survivor of the "clover leaf". At the graveside in Hamburg he delivered an address with great difficulty. He seemed to feel that his work was now ended. A chill, caught at the funeral, laid firm hold of him, and it was only with an effort that he was able to preach to his own congregation the following Sunday. For a while he was a prisoner in his room, then in his bed. For the last three days of his life he slept peacefully, and on 2nd February, 1884, died.

"An Israelite in whom there is no guile" was a description used of Köbner at his funeral. It draws attention not only to the essential straightness and simplicity of his nature, but to his Jewish origin and training. A man so versatile, and coming from such an unexpected quarter, is an unusual figure among evangelical pioneers. He played a very large part in laying down the lines along which the Baptist movement on the Continent has developed. Some of its peculiarities are his peculiarities. His varied imaginative gifts and interest in history and theology were a valuable counterpart to Oncken's organizing and directing genius. Dr. Gieselbusch suggests that the Baptists have lived for the last forty or fifty years very much from hand to mouth. Much devoted work has been done, but there has been little inquiry into principles, little practical freedom, and small adjustment to changing conditions. This gives to Köbner's writings an importance quite independent of their literary merit. It gives also a new interest to the story of his life.

ERNEST A. PAYNE.

Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. By Edmund Husserl. Allen & Unwin. 16s.

Apart from a short article by Husserl himself in the new *Encyclopædia Britannica,* the present volume of the "Library of Philosophy" is introduced by the translator (Dr. W. R. Boyce Gibson) as the first opportunity given to English readers of acquainting themselves with a movement in German thought of more than 30 years' standing—still in full vigour, and claiming a great tribe of disciples, although there are many adversaries. Prof. Husserl is an enemy to Empiricism and Naturalism. He conducts a running fight against most of the psychologists of the age, not *qua* psychologists but *qua* empiricist philosophers and slaves to induction. He is conducting his readers, through a long series of volumes, towards an exhaustive study of necessary truths; of possibility (and impossibility); of what must be. We are not handed any such exhaustive study even in this volume. Everything is still introductory. The orchestra continues to tune up. The concert has not begun.

The two classical studies of necessary truth being the sciences of Logic and Mathematics—the relation between these two being itself a philosophical problem of no small difficulty—Husserl approached his life work by a treatise on Logic (1900). Now, however, he seems to have undertaken a task which many smaller men have wished they could achieve—the task of re-writing the *Critique of Pure Reason* upon surer lines. Husserl's "Phenomenology" is "transcendental"; and by the latter word he means something quite in the same neighbourhood as what Kant meant by it, although in his usage of "transcendent" he seems to be much further off from Kant. We are promised that we shall escape from Kant's scepticisms. Our ideas, according to Kant—I am not speaking of ideas in

any specially Kantian sense—get between us and the reality. They force themselves upon us irresistibly; there is no escaping from them; but they lead us astray from the truth, and maroon us in a wilderness of contradictions. Husserl in reply appeals to intuition; to self-evidence. His test, like Descartes', is "clearness"—what he calls the clearness of the "primordial" intuition. Strange indeed if, after all, *this* should prove a clue to the whole mysterious labyrinth! If so far he might seem to be moving in the direction of the old Scottish intuitionalism, we presently find him taking a different line. He uses a much sharper scalpel. He piles distinction upon distinction; and he invents for these distinctions a new uncouth terminology, worse even—incredible as this might seem—than that of Kant.

The author excuses himself by lack of space for not criticizing his predecessors (whom he boldly claims to supersede *en bloc.* This is the way; walk ye in it!). But why not, at least, explain the relation of his terminology to that which they employed? Hegel began his career with a Phenomenology—the *Phenomenology of Mind;* and his doing so probably naturalized the word in the modern world, though he could not stereotype its meaning. Another thinker of considerable rank—Hartmann—is registered in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy, etc.,* as having made extensive use of the term. Why then does Husserl say nothing about Hegel, and nothing about Hartmann? He is able to spare half a page for the use of the word by Stumpf (1906). Now, true as it may be that the living dog is better than the dead lion—the living puppy certainly keeps assuring us that it is true—does not Husserl's behaviour reveal a degree of partiality that is hardly philosophical?

One might have thought that, with scientific theories of Relativity in the ascendant, the present was an unhopeful moment for the preaching of *necessary truths*—their time will come round again. In this volume, however, neither author nor translator exhibits any trace of nervousness.

Readers must understand that in the present volume the author does not approach even the fringes of ethical and religious problems. There are some hints—questionable hints—about the speculative conception of God as a possible perfect Intelligence, about what such a Being can do, and especially cannot do. But, beyond that, nothing.

The translator must have had hard work. Why does he use "Tuition" (p.133) and "ignore" (p.149) in quite unEnglish senses? Does the verb "fixate" (p. 192) really enrich our language? And, honestly, are the following sentences *English*?

> P. 395: In this direction we very soon reach a general insight, namely, that not merely "object that truly is" and "to be rationally posited", but also "truly being", and an object to be posited in an original and perfect thesis of the Reason, are equivalent correlates.
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> P. 373: Instead of saying "May S be P", we say "May it be that S be P", it is as wished (not is wished); in the place of "S shall be P", we say "That S be P, that shall be", it is as willed, and so forth.
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> P. 354: Thus it would have been the *doxic* form dwelling in respect of all its component aspects within the experience of feeling that made possible the adjustability of the expression, as an exclusively doxothetic experience, to the experience of feeling, which, as such, and in respect of all its members, is multithetic, but thereunder necessarily doxothetic also.

Much of the weirdness of these sentences is due to the Husserl terminology; but the translator has his share in it.

Lastly, why such a wilderness of commas? Would not a few additional semi-colons have articulated the material in more satisfactory fashion?

ROBERT MACKINTOSH.

CURRENT LITERATURE.

" Read not to contradict and confute, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find talk and discourse, but to weigh and consider."—FRANCIS BACON.

" A good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life."—JOHN MILTON.

(*The place of publication is London, and the date* 1931 *unless otherwise stated.*)

SOME BIOGRAPHIES.

As we read Mr. A. P. Grubb's *Jean Cavalier: Baker's Boy and British General* (Allen & Unwin, 10s. 6d.) we seemed to be back in our G. A. Henty days, when one of life's major problems was how to get another Henty from the School Library a day or two before the proper time. Mr. Grubb's story of Cavalier's life is as exciting as any Henty, especially the chapters which tell how his hero kept vastly superior forces at bay by the mobility of his men and the cleverness of his strategy. Cavalier was leader of the Camisards, and he so led his little army of Protestant guerillas in the Cevennes that before he was 25 his generalship had won for him the respect of some of the finest soldiers in Europe. When, tricked by the astute diplomacy of older men, he accepted an armistice, his heroic days were over, and his subsequent life with the British Army and in Ireland is very much of an anti-climax.

Mr. C. E. Vulliamy's *Rousseau* (Bles, 10s. 6d.) is an extremely interesting study of one of the most striking figures of a century which had more than its proportion of remarkable men. It is, of course, impossible to classify Rousseau, though we note that Mr. Vulliamy has not been able to escape the jargon of the moment, and introduces the term "introvert". Perhaps the words he uses in introducing the chapter on *Emile* best sums up Jean-Jacques :

> It is very singular, that a man who was never educated, never saw children and was wholly incapable of method, should have written the best, and the only readable, work on the subject of education. The life and performance of Rousseau are both full of paradox, bewildering and often tragic, and here, perhaps, is the most remarkable paradox of all.

The summaries of Rousseau's writings are well done, perhaps especially that of the *New Héloise.*

Mr. Vulliamy has the confidence and dogmatism common to the present-day biographer, and sometimes he arouses protests : the description of Calvin as "the man who so victoriously robbed the Christian teachings of every trace of cheerfulness and hope" will certainly not be universally accepted.

But the book is readable, and on the whole the writer makes out a good case for his contentions. To such much may be forgiven, even one or two misprints.

The only fault we have to find with Mr. F. B. Chancellor's *Prince Consort* (Allan, 21s.), is its price : a guinea is too much for a book of 300 pages. Mr. Chancellor has performed a difficult task with great skill and success, and nobody can read his sketch of Albert's life and character without understanding the Prince—and sympathizing with him too. No one can say that Albert's life was easy—to be the husband of Victoria and the father of Bertie furnished sufficient problems, while he had to fight

against the unpopularity which was the foreigner's common lot, especially when he was deemed an interloper. The Prince Consort, without doubt, was a martyr to his sense of duty, and Mr. Chancellor well describes the weight of the labours which finally brought him down. Had he possessed a sense of proportion and a sense of humour he might have lived much longer, and the history of Britain might have been very different. Mr. Chancellor thus sums up:

> Yet no man ever devoted himself more faithfully to the duties of a great position, and no man received more unfair criticism for his trouble. By some strange perversity of human nature the good man—and Albert was assuredly this—is often looked upon askance. He is usually regarded as a hypocrite, and if he is serious-minded as well as virtuous he is inevitably held to be conceited. So it was with Albert.

There is no doubt that Emil Ludwig can write, and in *Schliemann of Troy* (Putnam, 21s.) he has a congenial subject. He calls the book "The Story of a Gold-Seeker", and describes Schliemann's wonderful career in five chapters, "Shadowed Youth", "The Gold on the Earth", "The Gold under the Earth", "Envy of the Gold", and "The Gold Grows Dim". How a German pastor's son learnt many languages and amassed great wealth, how his dream of Homeric excavations were realized and his name made famous the world over, Dr. Ludwig tells with characteristic gusto. His hero's personality is one that appeals to him:—

> Schliemann could not live except in a state of perpetual emotionalism, of exaggeration of all his joys and sorrows. He was always, as it were, translating his existence into hexameters. His nature needed this suggestion of epic life in order to bring it into harmony with the ideal world of the great epics.

Schliemann, having divorced one wife for incompatibility, wrote to the Archbishop of Greece to find him a beautiful Greek girl, with black hair, enthusiastic about Homer, and with "a good and loving heart". Sophia Engastromenos filled the bill, and made Schliemann the best of wives. It all makes a strange story, though in his Introduction Sir Arthur Evans confines himself to the archæological side of it.

The jacket of Colonel Archer's *William Archer: Life, Work, and Friendships* (Allen & Unwin, 16s.) reminds us that Sir James Barrie once said that Archer had "done more for the English stage than any man living". While it is scarcely possible to accept that verdict, there is no doubt that the English drama owes much to the translator of Ibsen, the fearless and informed critic, and the friend of many great playwrights at home and abroad. The letters with which this book is studded reveal both the range of Archer's interests and the strength of his character, if, too, they disclose his limitations. It is pleasant to think that one who laboured so much in criticism achieved conspicuous success with *The Green Goddess* toward the end of his life.

Ibsen, of course, plays a great part in the book, but the letters to and from George Bernard Shaw and Gilbert Murray are as refreshing as anything. Chesterton appears when Archer writes to him for a cast-off suit for a gigantic Belgian, for whom no clothes could be found. He sent

> one which he had offered in vain to his local refugees, as no one could be found to fill it. Thus is the eternal fitness of things vindicated.

He calls on Strindberg, who took out his watch and said to his visitors, "At two o'clock I am going to be sick". Perhaps Shaw's most characteristic appearance is where he says:

> There are a great many men who sin against the light because they can't do without wine and cigars and £1,000 a year or £10,000. They go to hell

because the train has first class carriages, whereas the train for heaven has third class ones.

Colonel Archer has done his work well, and given us an informing book.

Mr. Alex. Gammie's *From Pit to Palace* (Clarke, 3s. 6d.), is the life story of the Rt. Hon. James Brown, M.P., better known, perhaps, as Jimmy Brown. The appointment of Mr. Brown, who had for thirty years been a working miner, to the post of the Lord High Commissioner of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1924 struck the imagination of all English-speaking people. Right well did Mr. Brown carry out the duties of his office, both then and in 1930; right well did he deserve the honour bestowed upon him. Reliable, sincere, a strong and conscientious Christian, he had served his Church faithfully and well, especially in the work of the Sunday School. He has strong convictions and sticks to them—he has steadfastly adhered to his resolve not to take part in political meetings on Sundays. Mr. Gammie well brings out the salient points in Mr. Brown's character, as does the late Secretary of State for Scotland in a section he contributes.

Perhaps the first thought on picking up Mr. H. G. Wood's *John William Hoyland of Kingsmead* (S.P.C.K., 7s. 6d.), is about the spate of biographies. Who should decide whether a man should have a biography? It may be that some will think that the life of J. W. Hoyland will be of interest merely to the limited circle of the Society of Friends and to old students of Kingsmead. It is possible, however, that when the history of religion in England during the 20th century comes to be written, one of its most important features will be the growth of the group of Colleges at Selly Oak—and in that development J. W. Hoyland played a great part. Mr. Wood's story presents a striking picture of the life of the Evangelical Quakers in the last half of the 19th century, stressing especially the growth of the missionary spirit, and touching on many of the leading figures in the Society. And it is the story of a good man.

The Rev. A. F. Webling's *Something Beyond* (Cambridge Press, 10s. 6d.), is a "Life Story" of an unusual kind. The author, who writes easily, was the son of a horse dealer, and began life as a clerk. He had a strong sense of application, and determined to secure a degree. Frustrated in his endeavours, he found that he could take Orders in the Church of England by way of a Faculty of Theology of the University of London. That he did successfully, and became a curate in a seaside town. He had experienced something of Nonconformist life through attending a Congregational chapel with his mother, and now the influence of his fellow-curate—who subsequently gave his life on the Mission field—led him in the direction of Anglo-Catholicism. That curate, the vicar, the vicar's successor and a curate he brought along with him, are all faithfully described, vicar No. 2 being an amazingly narrow-minded priest. After ten years in Orders, the author began to make acquaintance with Biblical criticism—apparently he never met it during his college training—and became something of a Modernist. Presented to the living of Barnlands, a Suffolk village, he describes his life there as life in Arcadia, though by this time his opinions were far from orthodox. "Light on the path" came, however, through psychic research, which convinced him of survival. The book is an interesting study in development.

The author of *A Spiritual Pilgrimage towards the Threshold of the Catholic Church* (Longmans, 7s. 6d.) is evidently a clergyman of the Church of England who is only held back from crossing the threshold by his age and by the pain such a step would cause to his friends. His arguments in

favour of the Roman Church, convincing to himself, we found strangely unconvincing. Very conscious of the weaknesses of Protestantism, and especially of Dissent, the pilgrim is strangely blind to their merits. He says:

> Liberty to worship is one of the things Protestantism has hardly tolerated . . . Protestants have been amongst the worst foes of religious freedom.

He is, too, quite at sea in his understanding of the theory and practice of the Free Churches. Congregational Moderators, for example, may have many functions, but they would scarcely recognize themselves in the sentence:

> Indeed, the free Churches themselves are now adopting superintendents who are Bishops in disguise, to prevent further divisions.

EDITOR.

The Doctrines of the Christian Faith. By SYDNEY CAVE, D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. 8s. 6d.

In this comparatively short but close-packed volume Dr. Cave sets out to answer the question, "What is the Word of God, and how can we declare it?". Recognizing as he does that the old infallibilities have gone and that the modern outlook demands a new approach to the problems of theology, he none the less views Christianity as a Gospel of divine grace mediated through the Incarnate Son. After an introductory discussion of the place and method of theology, he gives us chapters on the Christian Conception of God, Salvation through Christ, Life in the Spirit (including the Church and the Sacraments), the Trinity, and the Christian hope of eternal life through Christ. His method in each case is to outline the *N.T.* conception, then the historical development of doctrine, and finally his own constructive modern view. He rightly insists that "the history of a doctrine is its best exposition" and that "we can learn from the past both what to avoid and what to follow". Nevertheless there can be no final theology, since the revelation of God in Christ has to be formulated by every age in its own categories.

God is known through Christ in the Spirit. The fundamental revelation, however, is not of a triune God, but of God's holy and redeeming love, which we can only rightly know in Christ. The doctrine of the Trinity is not a primary assertion of Christian faith, but is an intellectual formulation that owes much to secular philosophy, though its roots are to be found in the continuous faith and experience of the Church.

The doctrine of Christ's Person cannot be isolated from the doctrine of His work. "We learn Who He is by what we know Him to have done for men." The Atonement is presented on what are usually called "subjective" lines, though emphasis is laid upon the objective facts of God and His saving grace as central and constitutive. As to the Person of Christ, the definition of Chalcedon is regarded as no longer satisfactory, inasmuch as the obsolete categories of nature and substance have to be replaced by the modern category of personality. Nevertheless Dr. Cave, while standing for a doctrine of Incarnation, confesses that there is as yet no interpretation of Christ's Person which is perfectly satisfying. The central fact is that in Christ we have our answer to the fundamental problem as to the character of God and the nature of His rule, and therefore cannot evade the question, "Whom say ye that I am?".

Dr. Cave will have nothing to do with the modern notion that Paul owes his Christology to the mystery-cults. He did not originate among Christians the belief in Jesus as the Lord of men. His great discovery through Christ that the character of God was more gracious than men had

deemed was something entirely different from anything the cult-gods could offer. He was no sacramentalist, and it is false to ascribe to him a penal theory of Atonement.

In his doctrine of the Church, Dr. Cave, as might be expected, is a thorough-going Congregationalist. He points out that the Church of the *N.T.* is constituted, not by apostolic orders, but by its Gospel. Hence preaching is more fundamental than sacraments.

Finally, the Christian argument for Immortality is derived from the nature of God's grace. It is because of our experience of what God is and of what He is doing for us that we know that communion with Him begun upon earth can never end.

We thank Dr. Cave for a strong and well-reasoned statement in modern terms of the theology of divine grace mediated through Jesus Christ. A careful study of the book will help many perplexed minds, ministerial and lay, and will stir up some sluggish minds to some purposeful thinking.

There is a misprint at page 103. E. J. PRICE.

The Hellenistic Elements in Christianity. By ANATHON AALL, Ph.D. University of London Press. 3s. 6d.

The Spiritual Pilgrimage of St. Paul. By F. H. BALLARD, M.A. S.C.M. 4s. and 2s. 6d.

Dr. Aall, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Oslo, gives us the substance of three lectures delivered by him in the University of London in the spring of 1929. On the basis of his important work, *Der Logos,* he summarizes the process whereby Christianity, during the period from Paul to Augustine, became so deeply permeated with ideas derived from Hellenistic philosophy and mysticism as to become a characteristic product of Greek wisdom. He regards primitive Christianity as distinctively Semitic in origin, while holding that the attitude of Jesus displays a certain characteristic difference from the typical Jewish attitude. This relatively new way of feeling is basic in Christianity, and, while having nothing to do with Hellenism in its origin, was bound to seek modes of expression other than Jewish if it was to persist and to make its way into a wider world.

The process of transformation began in Paul, was continued in the Fourth Gospel and the Apologists, and found its completion in the Alexandrians and in Augustine. So far as the nature and necessity of this process are concerned the author makes out his case, but seems to exaggerate the part played in it by Paul. It is surely too sweeping to assert that the Jews of the *Diaspora* were eagerly receptive of the fruits of Hellenistic culture. This was true no doubt of Philo and his circle, but there is little evidence for it elsewhere. The Pauline letters do not by any means suggest that their author had received a general encyclopædic education in or about the Hellenistic University of Tarsus. At best he was a σπερμολόγος—a picker up of scattered crumbs of Greek thought.

The author's interest is primarily philosophical, a fact which no doubt explains his silence in regard to the nature and significance of Paul's conversion.

For Mr. Ballard, the scholarly minister of Highbury Chapel, Bristol, Paul's conversion experience is determinative for any real understanding of him. His book falls into two parts. The first is a study in religious experience, and deals with Paul as the Jew of Tarsus, the Christian convert, and the missionary to the Gentiles. Part II deals with some of the Apostle's practical problems.

If Dr. Aall is inclined to over-estimate the importance of the Hellenistic environment of Tarsus in the make-up of Paul's mind, Mr. Ballard tends to underestimate it; *e.g.*, he attributes to Paul's residence in cosmopolitan Antioch the *gradual* growth of his concern for the Gentiles. This is surely to fly in the face of the emphatic conviction of the Apostle that his call to the Gentiles was an inseparable part of his conversion experience. And this can only be explained on the assumption that already in Tarsus and in Jerusalem he had been worrying about the relation of the Gentiles to the grace of God.

Of making of books on Paul there is no end. Mr. Ballard, however, has amply justified himself in adding one more. Ministers will find a good deal of suggestion in it.

E. J. Price.

The Philosophy of Religion. By Rudolf Otto. Williams & Norgate. 10s.

This book is apt at first sight to raise expectations which it does not quite fulfil. Those who go to it expecting a systematic exposition of the Philosophy of Religion will be disappointed. It is a translation of a work which first appeared in German in 1909, and is quite obviously the quarry from which much of the material in *Das Heilige* was digged. It contains an exposition of the philosophy of Jacob Friedrich Fries—a very important name among the idealist philosophers of Germany, but one little known in this country. Otto finds in Fries and in the discussions and criticisms of the Kantian position which he originated, the materials for what he regards as a true philosophy of religion. The exposition of Fries and of some of his contemporaries contained in the book is extremely valuable, and Otto's comments on these writers are in every case most illuminating and suggestive. He argues that Fries's interpretation of the Kantian philosophy gives a true basis for a philosophy of religion by opposing the world of knowledge to the world of faith and by demonstrating clearly that faith is a form of knowledge with a basis in reason. As Fries says:

> Truth, Faith, trust in God, has the same basis in all men; it gains force only with love, with the uplifting of the moral will-power in godliness, and never through a mere scientific development of the understanding. No learning, no science can bestow on a man a knowledge of God different from and superior to that knowledge which comes through the first simple religious feeling. No learning, no science can find a basis for faith.

Words like these show the close affinity between Fries and Schleiermacher, and give ground also for the underlying contentions of *Das Heilige*. Fries has no place for Kant's attempt to find a basis for religious conviction in ethical conviction, but he is as convinced as Kant himself as to the close connexion between religion and ethics. His special contribution to the subject is qualified by his theory of *Ahnung* by which

> we understand something more than feeling, rather a conviction originating in the feelings, of the reality of the supersensual which gives us a reflexion of the existence of things in their phenomena.

In other words, there is a spiritual intuition on which Fries relies as able to introduce us to the realm of eternal things. Religion is this awareness of the eternal and the power to live in positive relation with it. It must not be imagined that Otto entirely accepts the position of Fries, but he certainly finds in it a sound basis for a religious philosophy, though it may be questioned whether it is an adequate basis and whether it can help in any very effective way to a philosophy of Christianity. The book, however, is extremely valuable for its exposition of certain forms of German idealism and for the light it throws on the development of the thought of Otto himself.

W. B. Selbie.

Primitive Man. By CAESAR DE VESME. Rider. 10s. 6d.

The Primitive Mind and Modern Civilization. By C. R. ALDRICH. Kegan Paul. 12s. 6d.

These two books are a good illustration of the strides made by anthropology in recent years. The study of primitive life and mentality has now become a science by itself, and has reached a point at which it becomes possible to realize the value of the contribution it has to make to both psychology and sociology. M. de Vesme's book is a translation of the first volume of a projected history of experimental spiritualism. The term spiritualism is used in a strictly scientific sense to cover all experiences which have no definite rational origin. These are treated experimentally in the sense that the data dealt with are founded in definite relatable experiences.

It goes without saying that the author is deeply concerned with religion. He believes that

> he can demonstrate that the origin of religions is specially due to the observation of supernormal facts whose true interpretation is still undecided and of which further study may therefore well show that the basis of religion is legitimate.

In pursuing this end he criticizes severely what he calls the errors of the anthropological school, by which he chiefly means the suggestion that, while the primitive tends to explain all things by supernatural and spiritual agencies, he gradually abandons this attitude as civilization advances and substitutes for it what is known as the scientific, and therefore materialist, explanation. As over against this M. de Vesme adduces a vast amount of evidence from observers of the life and customs of savage peoples to show that the spiritist explanation survives throughout, and is not based on any erroneous interpretation of natural phenomena, but has its foundation deep in the necessities of our human nature and also in the very nature of things. He argues that

> history shows us that the belief in spirits and in the immortality of the soul appears in proportion as primitives progress and it reaches its climax among those who have reached a high civilization. Then religions, after a period of abundance, fall, not to despair, but to become transformed.

It is, perhaps, unfair to criticize a book which is only half the story, and it is best to suspend judgment until the second volume of M. de Vesme's work is available. His thesis is undoubtedly an interesting one, and he supports it with a great array of facts and arguments. Like all writers on the subject, however, he tends to identify too closely the modern savage with the primitive—an identification which, if pressed, is likely to be the parent of many errors.

Mr. Aldrich's book is a very different work, though the subject matter of it is largely the same as that of his French *confrère*. It is a frankly psychological study and is recommended to the public by Malinowski and Jung. It is described as "an attempt to apply the findings of the Zurich School of Analytical Psychology to the explanation of cultural phenomena among both savage and civilized peoples". Its main purpose is to show that underlying the personal unconscious in every individual there is the racial unconscious, and that this is all important in affecting human life and relationships. Mr. Aldrich, in the course of his argument, describes the analysis of what he calls the primitive *psyche*, and has no difficulty in showing how much in the mentality of modern men and women is to be traced back to primitive habits and ideas which we moderns are apt to regard as childish and outgrown. It is argued that we never really outgrow our

nature, and that man's conduct both as an individual and as a member of the social group is unconsciously regulated now, as it has always been. The book is really an important contribution to the subject, and throws much light on man's development as both a social and a religious being, and it is not without warnings and directions as to the best method of adjusting the self to its human and material surroundings. We are constantly reminded that though man himself is a unity, he is a unity of great complexity and the outcome of an evolutionary process affecting both his personal and psychical life. The result of his study of this unity in the light of the primitive mind Mr. Aldrich sums up as follows :

> The race tends to progress from unconsciousness towards consciousness and during this progression three stages may be seen: first, an unconscious bio-morality, in which the primitive members of any social group co-operate instinctively; second, a period of savagery, in which the rise of egotistic tendencies requires that the group shall force the members to conform to a form of conventional morality; and third, a stage (not yet reached by any society, though many individuals in civilized societies have attained it) in which the members of the group consciously co-operate for the common good, and consciously restrain their egotistic desires in order to do so. The psychic life-history of every individual who reaches full individuality passes through these three phases of psychic development. W. B. Selbie.

The Right and the Good. By W. D. Ross, M.A., LLD. Clarendon Press. 10s. 6d.

This book by the Provost of Oriel is of a rare quality, written after the manner and in the tradition of Aristotle; it reads, indeed, like an excellent translation and as if the occasional awkwardnesses of style would be rectified if we had the text in the Greek original. As a model of clear statement, accurate definition, and rigorous logic the book would have an intellectual and æsthetic value quite apart from the particular views which it sets forth. These discussions of such subjects as "The Meaning of 'Right' " and "The Nature of Goodness" might at first sight appear cold and even arid; this is because the writer is a man of utter intellectual integrity; yet I quite misread the book unless beneath the quiet sentences and unrhetorical conclusions there is latent the glow of warm feeling and the inspiration of a noble faith. The Provost keeps strictly to his own subject, but his conclusions and the arguments that support them, are of vital importance to the philosopher of religion.

> There are not merely so many moral codes which can be described and whose vagaries can be traced to historical causes; there is a system of moral truth, as objective as all truth must be, which, and whose implications, we are interested in discovering; and from the point of view of this, the genuinely ethical problem, the sociological inquiry is simply beside the mark (pp. 14f).
>
> That an act, *qua* fulfilling a promise, or *qua* effecting a just distribution of good, or *qua* returning services rendered, or *qua* promoting the good of others, or *qua* promoting the insight or virtue of the agent, is *prima facie* right, is self-evident; not in the sense that it is evident from the beginning of our lives, or as soon as we attend to the proposition for the first time, but in the sense that when we have reached sufficient mental maturity and have order expressed in these propositions is just as much part of the fundamental given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself. It is self-evident just as a mathematical axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, is evident. The moral nature of the universe (and, we may add, of any possible universe in which there were moral agents at all) as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. In our confidence that these propositions are true there is involved the same trust in our reason that

is involved in our confidence in mathematics; and we should have no justification for trusting it in the latter sphere and distrusting it in the former. In both cases we are dealing with propositions which cannot be proved, and that just as certainly need no proof (pp. 29f).

I would maintain, in fact, that what we are apt to describe as "what we think" about moral questions contains a considerable amount that we do not think but know, and that this forms the standard by reference to which the truth of any moral theory has to be tested, instead of having itself to be tested by reference to any theory (p. 40).

The book tends not merely to the quickening of the reader's intellectual faculties but to the deepening of his faith.

NATHANIEL MICKLEM.

SHORTER NOTICES AND DESCRIPTIVE LIST.

*(Books marked * are recommended for ministerial reading).*

Dr. E. J. Goodspeed's *Strange New Gospels* (Cambridge & Chicago University Presses, 9s.), is a very interesting, very convincing, and very dear book—9s. for 100 pp. is altogether unreasonable, even remembering that the book comes from America. Dr. Goodspeed examines various modern documents which have been claimed to be early Christian writings, such as "The Unknown Life of Jesus Christ" (the "Life of Saint Issa, Best of the Sons of Men") the Eye-Witness's "The Crucifixion of Jesus", the Archko Volume, the "Confession of Pontius Pilate", and "The 29th Chapter of *Acts*". His chapters read like a barrister's merciless cross-examination of a lying witness, and he shows conclusively how publicity, piety, rationality, tradition, and avarice have all been motives for the perpetration of these frauds.

We are glad that the Rev. Leslie Peake has gathered together, under the title *Plain Thoughts on Great Subjects* (Allenson, 5s.), a selection from his father's papers. Dr. Peake had a wonderful way of popularizing Biblical and theological knowledge, and many will be grateful to have in one cover these addresses on subjects such as Atonement, Immortality, The Holy Spirit. We have been struck once again by the cogency of the address on Reunion delivered as President of the National Free Church Council.

It is a pity that Miss Rose Macaulay gave herself such a wide subject as *Some Religious Elements in English Literature* (Hogarth Press, 3s. 6d.). She probably knows that she has a fertile and ingenious mind which would continually be suggesting points irrelevant as well as relevant, and that she lacks the will-power to exclude a smart quip that she fancies. The result is a clever but over-rich "Hogarth Lecture", foreshortened in its treatment, and sometimes obscuring the wood by the trees. Nevertheless it ought not to be missed; few students whether of literature or of religion would fail to learn a good deal from it.

God and the Universe (Lane, 3s. 6d.) is a book interesting alike in its construction and in its contents. Introduced by Mr. J. Lewis May, it contains statements of the Christian position by an Anglican (the Rev. S. C. Carpenter, Master of the Temple), a Roman Catholic (Father M. C. D'Arcy), and a Congregationalist (Dr. B. Lee Woolf). The book is well worth the money it costs.

The Rev. H. G. Tunnicliff's *The Transforming Experience* (Sharp, 2s. 6d. & 1s. 6d.) is alive by virtue of its numerous and apt illustrations. A good example of the best type of Methodist preaching.

Mr. J. Anker Larsen's *With the Door Open* (Macmillan, 6s. 6d.) is an account of personal mystical experience, telling how flashes of spiritual lightning gradually became more than flashes, until the writer could escape Time and Space and "experience eternity".

The Way to Pray (S.C.M., 3s. 6d.) is a study of the Lord's Prayer by the late Canon A. W. Robinson. It is prefixed by a memoir from the pen of his brother, the Dean of Wells, and biographical sketches by those who were associated with the Canon in different branches of his work.

Miss E. G. Kemp's *Mary, with Her Son Jesus* (Golden Vista Press, 3s. 6d.) is a pleasing, though quite uncritical, re-telling of the life of Jesus. It would do all Christians good to read it.

The Primitive Methodist Church has no formal scheme of doctrine, no creed to which its ministers or members must assent. It has, however, an official statement of doctrines held, the revision of which progressive Primitive Methodists, we believe, hold to be long overdue. While not directly attempting such revision, the Rev. J. C. Mantripp's Hartley Lecture, *The Faith of a Christian* (Holborn Publishing House, 5s.) does outline the beliefs generally held in the denomination to-day. All that Mr. Mantripp writes is marked by careful thought and sound judgment, and this Hartley Lecture is no exception.

A Traffic in Knowledge (S.C.M., 2s. 6d.) is called "An International Symposium on the Christian Message". Edited by Dr. W. A. Visser't Hooft, the volume comes from the World Student Christian Federation, and well deserves reading. The chapters are from France (M. Pierre Maury), America (Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr), China (Prof. P. C. Hsu), and Russia (Prof. V. V. Zenkovsky)—and the contributions are interesting as revelations of the environment of the writers as well as intrinsically. There is a very useful bibliography, with summaries of books.

The Rt. Hon. James Brown writes an Introduction to the Rev. G. A. Smillie's *Serving the Church in the World of To-day* (Clarke, 4s. 6d.), which is described as "A Book for Office-bearers and Church Workers on Training, Equipment, and Service". Though written by a minister of the Church of Scotland and mainly from the standpoint of that Church, there are valuable sections outlining the administration of both Episcopal and Congregational churches, while officers in every congregation could benefit by examining the call to service Mr. Smillie gives, and then by considering whether the duties of the various offices are carried out in the spirit and with the efficiency which he desiderates. A useful book which we hope will be widely read.

Dr. A. Herbert Gray introduces Mrs. Spalding's *God and the Little Child* (N.S.S.U., 2s. 6d.), a book for which many parents will be grateful. It tells how to teach a child religion, giving all manner of practical suggestions, and concluding with some stories about Jesus.

Mr. J. E. Wetherell's *The Land of Troy and Tarsus* (R.T.S., 7s. 6d.), is a popular account of the outstanding events in Asia Minor during thirty-three centuries from the Hittites through Homer, Alexander, Cæsar, Pompey, and Paul to Kemal Pasha. With such a range naturally no more than a glance at each episode can be given. If we were to have a map, surely it might have been a better one.

Last year we had the pleasure of receiving Mr. G. C. Heseltine's *Selected Works of Richard Rolle*. Another indication of the renewed

interest in Rolle is the publication of Miss H. E. Allen's *English Writings of Richard Rolle* (Oxford Press, 7s. 6d.). Miss Allen has already given proof of her careful study of Rolle's writings, and the present volume will appeal to both students of Middle English and students of mysticism. There are full notes, an adequate glossary, and a competent introduction. With Miss Allen's help no one need fear Rolle's English.

Mr. Piers Compton's *The Great Religious Orders* (Elkin Mathews & Marrot, 6s.), gives a popular account of the history of the sixteen main religious orders, beginning with that of St. Benedict, and ending with the Passionists. It is handy to have these accounts in short compass, and Mrs. Foster's illustrations, showing the distinctive habits of the Orders, add to the book's usefulness.

If the test of a book is the extent of the desire to follow up its subject it arouses, Mr. Gamaliel Miller's *The Problem of Decadence* (Williams & Norgate, 6s.) is a very good book indeed. What caused the decline of Rome? Mr. Miller examines many answers. Were the same causes operative in the case of other nations and empires? Are they operative to-day? The treatment is very suggestive and continually excites questions. Two-thirds of the way through we noted, "What about Spengler?" But Spengler's theory is examined later, and Mr. Miller's conclusions are, on the whole, unfavourable. The book well deserves reading, though a few sentences on p.155 suggest the writer knows less about Cromwell than he does about Cæsar.

It is a pity that Captain J. H. R. Yardley did not limit himself either to a biography of his namesake, Sir George Yardley, Governor of Virginia, or to a historical novel written around his life. There was sufficient material for the one, and sufficient action for the other, and Captain Yardley has a forthright style that would have made an exciting story—he has no doubt what should have been done with Opechanachough: he should have been "rounded up and hanged in the square". And is there not "La Belle Sauvage" to provide the "love interest"? *Before the Mayflower* (Heinemann, 15s.) was rather too ambitious a project, and one cannot help regretting Captain Yardley's attempt to become a literary man. Instead of letting the graphic story tell itself, there are throw-backs to Amy Robsart, ancestor of Lady Yardley, and all manner of intrusive commentary. Thus, of the Earl of Southampton:

> For what man or woman among us would refuse their tribute to the one and only authenticated patron of our inimitable bard, William Shakespeare? In that *rôle* and irrespective of all his other fine qualities, the whole world must bless his splendid generosity, for his gift of £1,000 . . .

We are informed that

> Neither the Temple of Solomon nor the City of Rome was built in a day, or finished without tears. Very few of the great things in life, which are worth while, have been conceived without tragedies or suffering.

Was ever Puritan preacher more trite? In 1927, we learn, the Duke and Duchess of York visited Norwich, and Sir Thomas Dale retired from Virginia in 1916 (but that is only a misprint). And all this when there is a thrilling story panting to be told which would convince even those who are proud to belong to *Mayflower* stock that heroism and sacrifice were displayed in the colonization of Virginia "before the *Mayflower*".

Once you grasp the idea that to Prof. H. W. Schneider the connotation of "Puritan" is America, and in a comparatively limited period—the book, to all intents and purposes, comes to an end with Franklin—you

will find that *The Puritan Mind* (Constable, 18s.) has something to teach you. Mr. Schneider cannot be said to be sympathetic to Puritanism, but it is well to have even a critic's analysis, though the limitations of the critic are obvious when his conclusion reads thus:

> But whenever sinners become convinced that they are instruments in the hand of God, elected to carry out His holy will, they lose their piety, and begin doing good to others. This is an ancient story, and as long as there are sinners, the story of the Puritans will be but one illustration of a universal theme.

Mr. Schneider's analysis deals with carefully selected features in the life of Puritanism. His best chapter is on Jonathan Edwards; indeed, the tone of study may be gauged from the words:

> Jonathan Edwards and Benjamin Franklin represent the two opposite poles of Puritan thought. It was Edwards who attempted to induce New England to lead a godly, not a sober, life: it was Franklin who succeeded in teaching Americans to lead a sober, and not a godly, life.

Mr. Schneider makes you think, and his bibliography is useful.

After reading Mr. Schneider, with his examination of the teaching of Jonathan Edwards, who has some right to be called the last of the Calvinists, it seemed natural to turn to Dr. B. B. Warfield's *Calvin and Calvinism* (Oxford Press, 15s.). Dr. Warfield's will provided for the collection and publication of his articles, and the present volume is the fifth of the ten in which they will be contained. Tribute has already been paid in these pages to Dr. Warfield's massive learning by scholars who can by no means accept his theology. The present volume, we are inclined to think, will probably be the most useful of the series. Opening with an essay on Calvin and his work, it deals in turn with his doctrines of the knowledge of God, of God, of the Trinity, and of the Creation. Then follows an encyclopædia article on Calvinism, and the concluding essay "On the Literary History of Calvin's *Institutes*". Again one cannot but stand amazed at the range and thoroughness of Dr. Warfield's scholarship.

Professor John H. Muirhead has long been known not merely as an authority on various branches of philosophy but as a teacher who can pass on his knowledge in attractive and readable style. His *Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy* (Allen & Unwin, 16s.) consists of "Studies in the History of Idealism in England and America". The first part, dealing with the early Idealistic Movement in English philosophy, is largely occupied by the Cambridge Platonists. Part II treats of 19th century Idealism in England; starting from Carlyle it shows how Hegel came to England, and then expounds the position of Bradley, to whom a large portion of this section is devoted. In Part III, "Idealism in America", Royce occupies the place taken by Bradley in Part II.

The volume makes an admirable summary and will serve as a convenient book of reference for students of philosophy.

Librarians in particular will welcome the announcement of a series of volumes to be edited by Mr. W. E. Doubleday under the auspices of the Library Association, and if they are all on the level of Mr. Arundell Esdaile's *A Student's Manual of Bibliography* (Allen & Unwin, 12s. 6d.) their gratitude will be unbounded. Comparatively few people who read books, or who write them, for the matter of that, know much about the art of book-building, and are inclined to shun the technical processes connected with paper-making, printing, illustrating, and binding. Mr. Esdaile's chapters dealing with these subjects are packed with information, while

subsequent sections show how books should be collated and described. If all library catalogues took Mr. Esdaile's examples as a pattern, much time would be saved for students. To some readers the chapter on "Landmarks in the History of Printing and Publishing: Type-faces" will be the most interesting, but those working among books day by day will value at least equally the chapters containing the classes and examples of bibliographies. A most serviceable volume.

Dr. C. Delisle Burns does not believe that we are decadent, for rapid change has always been a sign of growth, not decay. And, in any case, Gibbon allowed Rome eight centuries for its decline and fall, so we may yet be an unconscionable long time dying! One of the reviewer's difficulties with Dr. Burns's *Modern Civilization on Trial* (Allen & Unwin, 10s. 6d.) is that such a good summary of the book's argument is provided in the Preface that it cries aloud for quotation, and such quotation would merely bring the usual charge that reviewers read Prefaces only. And this book, despite obvious defects, is well worth reading. It discusses the new industrial revolution, and the changed habits of the masses arising from such inventions as electricity, the cinema, the wireless, and the motor-car. It shows, with abundance of statistics and illustrations, how these rapid changes are affecting government, industry, leisure, and education. Dr. Burns, as usual, expresses his views strongly, so much so that we fear his obvious bias will in some places prevent his book receiving the consideration it deserves. Unfortunately, too, he sometimes becomes cheap, and generally he is as doctrinaire as the economists and ecclesiastics he delights to castigate, while we are inclined to suspect that the further he is from subjects of which he has a first-hand knowledge, the more easily he generalizes. There are too many misprints, one of which we expect Mr. Punch to discover.

Dr. John Dewey's *Individualism Old and New* (Allen & Unwin, 6s.) deals with the United States, but it has its message for Europe. The title exactly suggests the argument. America is a house divided against itself; its institutions and practice contradict its creeds and theories; religion has never been "so thoroughly respectable, and so nearly totally disconnected from life"; it is "hardly possible to overstate the decline of religion as a vitally integrative and directive force in men's thought and sentiments". "Quantification, mechanization, and standardization" are the marks of American life; economic determinism has destroyed liberty. Some kind of socialism is inevitable, by whatever name it may be called. The diagnosis seems accurate, the analysis correct. There is little in the way of construction; we are left with the inspiring information that we must cultivate our own garden, and that our garden is the world!

A good deal of attention has been paid recently to the relationship of religion to economics. Those who have not been able to digest the larger books would be well advised to get and study Mr. J. A. Hobson's not very happily named **God and Mammon* (R.P.A., 1s. & 7d.) in which Mr. Hobson glances at economics in primitive religion, and then surveys the attitude of Catholicism, Protestantism, and Methodism to economics, concluding with an examination of the attitude of the Churches to modern economic movements. The little sketch is packed with information.

The Rev. T. W. Roff's *The Pinch of Poverty* (S.C.M., 1s. 6d.) talks plainly about what poverty means, and the duty of the Church and of Christians in regard to it. Miss E. E. Parnell provides an Appendix which contains the facts about unemployment and unemployment insurance.

The translation of M. Ilin's *Moscow Has a Plan* (Cape, 5s.) should be widely read in this country, and especially by politicians and social reformers. It is an engineer's account of the Soviet Five Year Plan, and was written as a textbook for the Russian people. The book leaves one with an impression of Russia's great resources, on the one hand, and of the immense energy with which the plan is being carried out, on the other. Criticism may be offered on many grounds—the naïve trust in machines, the failure to envisage over-production, the absence of idealism—but we wish we could think any one of our political Parties had either a plan so thorough for dealing with our economic problem, or even believed with equal conviction in such plans as they have. This book should have a stimulating effect all round.

Karl Kautsky's *Bolshevism at a Deadlock* (Allen & Unwin, 6s.) examines the Five Year Plan, which is said to have failed, and the growth of the system of collective farms. Kautsky shows where the Bolshevists have forsaken the plans of Marx and Engels, and he seems to think it likely that in time many of the workers will "unite with the peasants and intellectuals in the fight for democracy against the Soviet system". He does not dogmatize, however, for it is impossible to foretell what form the coming revolution in Russia will assume.

Miss Caroline E. Playne's *Society at War, 1914-1916* (Allen & Unwin, 12s. 6d.) is a valuable book. From diaries, published and unpublished, newspaper cuttings, and books, Miss Playne has shown the reactions of the War on the people of this and other countries. The great service of the book is that it shows to demonstration how, once war is started, it sucks into its vortex all sorts and conditions—idealists, scholars, the Church, women. Miss Playne's compilation serves as a dossier of evidence showing how rapidly and widely war fever extends.

The book loses a good deal because Miss Playne obtrudes her own views. Had she let her facts speak for themselves they would have been much more telling.

Mr. C. B. Eddy's *Greece and the Greek Refugees* (Allen & Unwin, 12s. 6d.) is a book that will be valuable not merely for the information it contains, but as a book of reference. The work of the Chairman of the Greek Refugees Settlement Commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, it furnishes a well-documented account of the work of the Commission.

Miss Olive Wyon's *The Dawn Wind* (S.C.M., 2s. 6d.) is a survey of "changing conditions among women in Africa and the East". Miss Wyon's vivid narrative describes a process which may prove as revolutionary as any in the world's history.

No one better than Professor Ernest Barker could have been found to write on *Universities in Great Britain: Their Possibilities and Their Problems* (S.C.M., 3s. 6d.). Professor Barker has had experience in both modern and ancient Universities, and this little book, written for International Student Service, will serve as a valuable handbook for students from other countries who desire to know what British Universities are like.

The new volume in the "English Heritage" series (Longmans, 3s. 6d.) is Sir W. H. Hadow's *English Music,* and an excellent addition indeed it is, not merely providing a readable survey, but also a useful book of reference. There is a racy Introduction by Dr. Vaughan Williams.

EDITOR.

If the first duty of a preacher is to have something to say, his second, according to the Rev. L. Maclachlan's *Religion for the Non-religious* (Clarke, 5s.) is to have somebody to say it to. For he may find himself with a congregation, but no audience, if he does not clearly realize that it is his business to secure a hearing. There can be no doubt that Mr. Maclachlan could get people to listen to these "popular presentations of the Christian message". He has a real insight into the mind of the modern man, whether inside or outside of the Church, and talks about things which do actually trouble him. Withal he has an unconventional manner that gets right home without injury to the dignity of his subject, and without truckling to any mere anti-church prejudice. He can be epigrammatic without thereby being false to the truth. We heartily commend both his teaching and his method, and hope to see similar volumes from his pen. We note one misprint at page 88.

E. J. Price.

Dr. J. S. Haldane's Donnellan Lectures for 1930, published under the title *The Philosophical Basis of Biology* (Hodder & Stoughton, 7s. 6d.), contain in a more popular form a good outline of the views the author advocated in his Gifford Lectures. Anyone with a fair knowledge of science, and of the way science is being driven back on the larger questions of philosophy, will find this a very interesting book. Against the solid, unimaginative armies of the "mechanists", who reduce all things to physics and chemistry, Dr. Haldane calls up the shade of Bishop Berkeley; and he seems to agree with Mr. Bernard Shaw that no man is fool enough to believe in his heart that life is just a question of temperature. Dr. Haldane, who is by no means a "vitalist", describes life as the maintenance of a unity or whole between structure, function, and environment; and his point is that you can explain no single scientific event in abstraction from this unity. Biology, therefore, must be more than the study of "living matter". It must be "the science which deals with the phenomena of life". It must relate itself to the rest of the facts; and especially to the fact that there is something percipient and originative in what we call life, something that reaches the fullness of personality in God. Unless we reckon with all this, the mere study of structures and environments will end only in dark mazes. This is what has happened to the purely 'physico-chemical" account of things.

Thus we are turned back to an idealism of a sort; and to one just enough Berkeleyian in type to confound the mathematicians and physicists who will have none of it; but whether it will bear all the weight the last lecture puts on it the reader must judge. The ultimate question about life is, of course, not answered. Perhaps it cannot be answered without a bolder plunge into religious experience; and from certain passages this seems to be what Dr. Haldane thinks. In the second lecture he illustrates his main position by an account of the processes of breathing; and written, as it is, by one of the first physiologists of the day, this lecture is very illuminating. Here and there the book strikes a sharply controversial note, and one sees that even science has its gorgeous battles. But Dr. Haldane has given us here a brilliant example of the finer spiritual vision in modern science.

The Rev. S. B. John, Baptist minister at Hatherleigh, Devon, has put into his book *The Finality of Christ* (Kingsgate Press, 5s.) the result of many years' study and meditation. The aim of the book is to present Jesus Christ as the focus of all thought, the clue to the meaning of the world, and the Redeemer. There is much that is suggestive. What is said about the relation of Christ to the truth of science and philosophy is so good that one could have wished more space had been given to it. A

deep undertone of personal religion runs through the book, and gives it a warmth and reality which will ensure responsive sympathy in the reader. Mr. John covers a wide field of scholarship, especially in comparative religion, without ever being formal or dry, and he writes clearly. A bit of thoroughly good and useful work.

The Miracle of the Galilean, by the Rev. Paul B. Kern (Williams & Norgate, 7s. 6d.) contains the Fondren Lectures for 1930. Mr. Kern gives us a popular pulpit presentation of the subject rather than a balanced study, and the lectures have the defects as well as many of the excellencies of that kind of work: there is perhaps a little too much of the pulpit accent. This is not to say they are wide of the mark. In fact they have much in them that mercilessly hits the point; and one hopes that in some of his pages Mr. Kern is unduly hard on his American fellow countrymen. But the main plea of the lectures for the re-discovery of the soul of religion is sound, and it is effectively put.

The meaning of the Rev. Walter Lowrie's *Religion or Faith* (Elliot Stock, 6s.) is obscured by the author's fondness for paradox, and by the still more dangerous habit of irony. The confusion this kind of writing produces in a reader undoes a good part of what Mr. Lowrie attempts, which seems to be the enforcement of a faith, or of a body of revealed truth, as the essential in a religion, and not, as some will say, the habit of being religious. Mr. Lowrie speaks of himself as under the influence of Karl Barth; but the impression his book conveys is of a mind shooting in several directions at the same time, and somewhat self-confused. Frankly, I do not understand the description of "the Protestant"; but if the writer means by the "Word of God" what he seems to mean, then the Protestant is nearer the centre than he gets credit for; certainly nearer than the rather sentimental account given here of "The Catholic". But what does Mr. Lowrie really mean?

A. T. S. James.

In *A Faith to Live By* (Williams & Norgate, 5s.) the Rev. John Lewis writes clearly and effectively on Christianity as both knowledge and power. He shows how it gives unique insight into the problems of life and mastery both over ourselves and our surroundings. He makes a really worthy attempt to do what we are so often told needs to be done, namely, to translate Christianity into the terms of present-day life.

Dr. J. C. McKerrow's *Novius Organum* (Longmans, 9s.) contains a series of essays on such subjects as "The World as Habit", "Vertebrate Evolution", "Phyletic Affinities", "Affection and Conation", "The Social Psychosis", *etc.* The writer's aim is to produce a philosophy which will take into account all that science has to teach us in regard to the nature of man and yet allow us to retain belief in his spiritual nature and in a spiritual world. Without suggesting that he makes good his case, we cannot deny the interest of his method of treatment and the importance of many of the suggestions which emerge in the course of it. The book will appeal to anyone who has a taste for abstruse metaphysical discussion.

Mr. Frank Baker's *Myth, Nature and Individual* (Allen & Unwin, 5s.) is described as dealing with aspects of the Philosophy of Art and Magic; it contains a series of studies in æsthetics and mythology of a rather objective and individual kind. The treatment of the subject is interesting if rather sketchy, and the general effect on the mind of the reader is that the writer raises a good many awkward questions without giving any very clear answers to them.

W. B. Selbie.

NEW EDITIONS, REPRINTS, *ETC.*

A New Oxford School Bible. Printed in response to the request by the Consultatative Committee on School Books for an edition in a large and attractive type at a reasonable cost. Oxford Press. 2s. 6d.

WINIFRED E. BARNARD and ELSIE H. SPRIGGS. *More Tales to Tell to The Children.* N.S.S.U. 2s. 6d. Illustrated. Suitable for Beginners and Primary Children.

PAUL DOTTIN. *The Life and Strange and Surprising Adventures of Daniel Defoe.* Stanley Paul. 7s. 6d. Cheap edition of a work issued in 1928.

S. T. COLERIDGE. *Lectures on Shakespeare.* Oxford Press. 2s. "World's Classics".

ROBERT GRAVES. *Good-bye to All That.* Cape. 4s. 6d. First printed, 1929; now issued in "Life and Letters" Series.

V. F. CALVERTON. *The Bankruptcy of Marriage.* Hamilton. 7s. 6d. First printed, 1929.

MARIE C. STOPES. *Contraception.* Putnam. 15s. 3rd ed., rev. and enlarged.

A Challenge to Neurasthenia. Williams & Norgate. 2s. 6d. and 1s. 6d.

ALSO RECEIVED.

H. HOGARTH. *Some Old Testament Characters.* Sharp. 3s.

J. A. DOUGLAS PARKER. *Environment, the Key to Life.* Alphac Publishing Centre. 4s. 6d.

HENRY PICKERING. *1,000 Acts and Facts Concerning Remarkable Men and Women.* Pickering. 2s. 6d.

GEORGE GOODMAN. *The Spirit-led Life.* Pickering. 3s.

New Gems of Song. Pickering. 2s. 6d.

BRENDA. *The Shepherd's Darling.* Pickering. 2s.

E. A. BLAND. *Only Us Three.* Pickering. 2s.

NORMAN C. DECK. *The Lord's Day or The Sabbath?* Pickering. 3s.

LECTURES, PAMPHLETS, *ETC.*

A. NAIRNE. *Immortality : The Christian View.* Cambridge Press. 1s. A lecture to Churchmen.

D. S. JOHNS. *The Education Bill.* Lancs. Free Church Education Association. 1d. A cogent statement of the Free Church position.

LINDSAY DEWAR. *Marriage without Morals.* S.P.C.K. 6d. A vigorous reply to Mr. Bertrand Russell by a Canon of York Minster.

PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS.

The Holborn Review (July). Perhaps the most readable article is Mr. W. G. Hanson's "Mahatma Gandhi". Among other contributions are the Rev. T. A. Thompson's "The Theology of Karl Barth", the Rev. Percy Austin's "Two Famous Heresy Trials", the Rev. C. H. S. Willson's "Some Modern Aspects of Prayer", the Rev. W. Bardsley Brash's "Wordsworth and His Teachers", and the Rev. G. H. Parbrook's "Jesus and Josephus".

The Hibbert Journal (July). A very interesting number in which we can mention only some of the articles. Dr. Vincent Taylor writes effectively on "Reunion and Nonconformity", the Rev. W. Watkin Davies on "Population and World Politics", Miss Petre on "M. Loisy's Autobiography", and Mr. R. H. Mottram on "The Faith of a Writer in the Twentieth Century": Mr. Roy Pascal's study of "The Class Basis of Luther's Reformation" is well worth reading, and

Dr. C. J. Cadoux appears in a new *rôle* in "Second Thoughts on Hedonism": Miss Rathbone discusses "Child Marriage in India", and Prof. Otto tells of the formation of an Inter-Religious League in Europe on the lines of a League which he has met in India.

The London Quarterly (July). Mr. E. E. Kellett, who is always interesting, writes on "The Fragmentary", discussing various unfinished books. The Editor writes on "President Eliot of Harvard", Dr. J. P. Milum on "The Story of Creation Read Again", and the Rev. W. J. Heaton on "The Religious Value of Neoplatonism".

The Baptist Quarterly (July). Mr. S. J. Price deals with "Laymen and Reunion"; Dr. Wheeler Robinson with "The Marriage of Hosea", and Miss Beckwith with "James Foster (1697-1753)".

The Modern Churchman (June, July). There is, of course, a good deal about the Birmingham controversy, while the Bishop himself writes on "Anglican Doctrinal Revision". Interesting articles are Prof. Percy Gardner's "The Literary Remains of Baron F. von Hügel", Canon Guy Rogers's "The Claims of Intercommunion", and Dr. E. J. Martin's "Do we owe anything to the Oxford Movement ?"

The Green Quarterly (July). This Anglo-Catholic journal is as interesting as usual, though it suffers from the fact that its articles are too short and scrappy.

The Church Quarterly Review (July). The six main articles are all very well worth reading. The Bishop of Gloucester opens with "Christian Theology"; then follow Dr. G. A. Michell's "Canon Streeter and St. Ignatius"; Dr. Sparrow Simpson's "The Religion of George Eliot"; the Rev. C. B. Moss's "The Relations of the Anglican and Old Catholic Churches"; Miss Sandbach-Marshall's "Three German Theologians" (Barth, Otto, and Heim); and Prof. G. D. Henderson's "Quietest Influences in Scotland".

The Expository Times. (July-Sept.). The Bishop of Liverpool writes on Sunday Observance, Dr. A. J. Gossip on "On Preaching the Cross". In the "National Contributions to Biblical Science" Dr. Donald Mackenzie deals with the contribution of America to systematic theology, Professor Fuglsang-Damgaard with that of France, and Dr. Cave with that of Great Britain.

The Friends' Quarterly Examiner (Seventh Month). There is a breath of fresh air about this number. Gardens, country lanes, and "June in England", all make their appearance, while the refreshing breezes, "From The House of The Four Winds", blow through all. The number well illustrates the Quaker interest in education and in history.

Bulletin of the John Rylands Library (July). A bulky and interesting issue, which includes obituaries of Prof. Herford and Canon J. M. Wilson. Most people will turn first to the new Rylands Library Manuscripts—letters of Dr. Johnson and Mrs. Thrale. Dr. Powicke continues the correspondence between Richard Baxter and John Eliot. Among other papers are Prof. Alexander's "Pascal the Writer", Prof. R. S. Conway's "The Value of the Medicean Codex of Vergil", Dr. E. F. Jacob's "Some English Documents of the Conciliar Movement", and Prof. Peet's "Mathematics in Ancient Egypt".

The British Journal of Inebriety (July). The new President of the Society for the Study of Inebriety is Lady Barrett. The two papers in this issue deal with the "Cocktail Habit", and the Prevention and Treatment of Drug Addiction.

The International Review of Missions (July). An extremely useful number, in which most people will read first Dr. Kagawa's "The Three Main Objectives of the Kingdom of God Movement". Prof. Hsu writes on "The Chinese Christian Church Coming of Age", and Dr. Latourette on "Toward a Comparative Study of the Spread of Religions". The Editor describes "Christian Missions in India To-day", and there is an important article by Dr. D. M. Donaldson on "What to Conserve and What to Abandon".

World Dominion (July). The Rev. Roland Allen and the Rev. Floyd E. Hamilton both discuss the "Nevius Method" of missionary development in Korea.

Dr. Keller writes on "Continental Protestantism", and other familiar names among the contributors are the Revs. W. Kendall Gale and J. J. Cooksey, and Miss V. M. Grubb. The Misses E. and F. French and Miss Cable write on "Trekking in Central Asia". A topical article is "How England 'Stepmothers' India", a defence of British rule by an American missionary.

The Evangelical Quarterly (July). Dr. H. H. Kuyper writes on "The Quinquagenary of the Free Reformed University at Amsterdam"; Dr. E. C. Unmack discusses "The Philosophy of Atonement", and Dr. T. C. Johnson "Saving Faith". There are also contributions by the two editors, while Dr. A. L. Lumb re-examines "The Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch".

The Harvard Theological Review (April-July). Scholars will welcome the articles that make up these numbers. Mr. M. S. Enslin examines Dr. Bacon's *Studies in Matthew;* Mr. R. H. Pfeiffer discusses "The Transmission of the Book of the Covenant", and Mr. J. Geerlings and Miss Silva New "Chrysostom's Text of the Gospel of Mark". Mr. Silas Rees writes on "Leontius of Byzantium and his Defence of the Council of Chalcedon", and Dr. Nerses Akinian and Mr. R. P. Casey print and examine "Two Armenian Creeds". In July, after a tribute to the late Editor-in-chief, Dr. G. F. Moore, we have Dr. W. L. Sperry's "The Nature of the Church", Dr. B. E. Meland's "Towards a Valid View of God", and Mr. C. H. Kraeling's "The Apocalypse of Paul and the *Iranische Erlösungmysterium*".

The Yale Review (Summer). Prof. Julian Huxley writes on "Human Power and its Control". As we read Mr. Harold Nicolson's "Hindenburg" we can hear his voice on the wireless. Miss Virginia Woolf has enjoyed writing "Aurora Leigh", while Prof. F. J. E. Woodbridge discusses "The Preface to Morals". The articles on "Commercial Aviation—Illusion or Fact?" and "British Colonials and the Commonwealth", make one think, while the story, "Two Merry Devils", by Lee Wilson Dodd, is extremely well done. Dr. C. P. Howland and R. W. Hale in "Free Citizens in a Free State?" examine the recent judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in regard to the admission of Pacifists to citizenship.

The Review and Expositor (July). Mr. J. C. Slemp answers the question "Whither Progress?"; Dr. R. C. Chambers tells of the work of the "Baptists in Modern China"; Dr. E. B. Frost deals with "Some Complementary Aspects of Science and Religion", while Dr. F. J. Mallett writes usefully on "Biblical Aids to Public Prayer".

The Biblical Review (July). Among the articles in this number are Dr. T. Bruce Birch's "William of Ockham", Dr. H. E. Dana's "Jesus' Use of the Old Testament" and the Rev. J. C. Siler's "Problems of a Country Minister". The Rev. John Greenfield's "James Montgomery" is mainly occupied with quotations from Montgomery's most familiar hymns.

The Anglican Theological Review (July) contains useful contributions by the Editors, Dr. Grant writing on "Adult Religious Education" and Dr. Easton on Dr. B. W. Bacon's *Studies in Matthew*. Among other writers are Mr. J. C. Ayer's "Translations of Bishops" and Mr. P. Carrington's "Astral Mythology in the *Revelation*".

CORRESPONDENCE.

LECTURE COURSES.

Dear Sir,

A good many churches run a series of lectures of one sort and another during their winter work. In some cases the Literary or Young People's Society organizes a series of popular lectures in conjunction with an agency or by individual bookings. It is curious how these lecture adventures come and go in our church activities, and to-day especially they have a hard fight with outside attractions. There surely is a place for this sort of work in our churches, but I imagine it must be more definitely educational, and at least more methodical and more carefully planned than in the past.

In any town of size there will be found many organizations which provide lecture courses as part of their particular work. There is the Y.M.C.A., the W.E.A., the Adult School, the Co-operative Societies, the Trade Unions, branches of political parties, the public libraries, local clubs of one sort and another. It would be very interesting to have a census of the lectures which are poured forth between October and March every winter. Then there is municipal evening education, which more and more lays claim upon the free time of our young men and women. With all this going on, is there room for the church? I believe there is. This is a field of work the church let slip in the latter days of last century, or at any rate at the time when the spate of mutual improvement societies began. It was educational work without the church which might well have been within the church.

We cannot hope to compete with the established organizations of to-day or to tread within the field of technical evening education. But we can make our lecture work intelligent, cultural, and useful. So many of our young people wearily attend evening classes in some "bread and butter" subject, and after the necessary certificate has been gained they throw over all interests in books and humane matters, and regard reading with the direst suspicion. So many middle-aged people, too, with the coming of "all this education" feel a little wistfully lost, and conscious of the disadvantages of their youth. Wireless has quickened many people in this respect, and one of the best ways we can use it is to form "listening groups" where after the talk someone competent can lead a discussion. One of the troubles of wireless, as it was once put to me, is that "you can't chivvy the bloke what's talking". In the lecture work of the church you should be able to do that. It should be informal and open to discussion, and free from all academic frigidity.

In a Lancashire church for two winters we have made an attempt at doing these things. In the first winter we arranged two courses of lectures or talks, to run on alternate Friday evenings. The first course was on "Foreign Affairs" and the syllabus was as follows: The East Africa Commission; The Colour Problem in South Africa; Egypt; British Relations with China in the 19th Century; China of To-day; Russia of To-day. After the Christmas recess the syllabus was: Turkey before and after the Revolution; The Balkan States; India in Transition; The Simon Commission; Australia and Asiatic Immigration; The Race Problem. It sounds formidable, but it had this great virtue that it showed to a great many outsiders who came that the church was vitally interested and had something to say on these great questions. It was not all left to the local political debaters, and the mis-information of the cheap press.

The parallel course of eleven talks was on "The Making of English Religion" based on Mr. Bernard Manning's excellent little book. These two courses were so much appreciated and, on the whole, well attended that two other courses were given last winter. The "Foreign Affairs" course was continued as a sort of running commentary on current world-politics, and the second course was on "Social Life: To-day and Yesterday" under the sub-headings of Work and Workers, Poor Relief and Pensions, Crime and Punishment, and World Life and Labour. The individual talks were: Coming of the Factory; The Town Worker; Co-operation and Trade Unions; Early Poor Relief; The Workhouse; Insurance and Pensions; Prison Evils and Reforms and Modern Experiments; Social Life and the League of Nations; The International Labour Office; Ten Years' Progress. The talks were given by two ministers and a minister's wife.

The talks meant a great deal of reading and preparation. We had a very mixed audience varying between twenty on some nights to sixty on others. It was by no means composed of our own people: we had rabid socialists, communists, keen young workers who had read and travelled, and groups of people who followed the talks regularly and asked intelligent questions. The talks generally lasted about forty minutes, and then followed twenty minutes questions, and discussion which often lasted longer. One interesting result, and to my mind an important one, was that it brought within the reach of the church a number of people who had no idea we were concerned with such things. It led to many interesting contacts, and gave the balance of a "liberal education" to work so often dubbed "non-religious". At any rate it has led a few of us to feel that it is work worth while continuing in the coming winter.

Yours, *etc.*,

CECIL NORTHCOTT.

THE FREE CHURCHES AND NATIONAL EDUCATION.

TO THE EDITOR OF *The Congregational Quarterly.*

SIR,—It is evident from the Rev. K. L. Parry's rejoinder to my article that I have written with more bitterness and aggressiveness than I realized or intended. I am particularly sorry that Mr. Parry should have regarded my criticisms of current Free Church attitudes as grave charges against distinguished leaders. Nothing was further from my mind than to pass strictures on the conduct of our leading representative in recent negotiations, or to doubt his sense of fairness. If anything in my article may legitimately be construed as reflexion on the integrity of any of our leaders, past or present, I would like hereby to express my regrets and apologies. I was making no personal charges; I was not even controverting the main principles and aims which we desire to see incorporated in the national system of education; I was simply urging, as emphatically as I could, that to insist on the rigid application of those principles and the exclusive realization of those aims involves injustice to minorities for which Free Churchmen ought not to be responsible. The national system we desire should be flexible at its fringes and have room for anomalies in its interstices. With all that Mr. Parry says about trusting educationalists, about the Nonconformist grievance in one-school areas, about the possibilities of co-operation with the Anglicans along the line of the Report of the Archbishops' Commission, I am in hearty agreement. My chief quarrel with Mr. Parry turns on his description of our good Protestant principle of toleration as a luxury. If to Free Churchmen this fundamental principle has become a luxury, I can understand why we should be willing to ride rough-shod over minorities in education, but I cannot quite understand why we should continue to call ourselves Free Churchmen. I cannot see that Mr. Parry has really answered any one of the considerations I advanced for reviewing our Free Church attitude towards Roman Catholic schools.

Clearly, I ought to have stated my misgivings in a more tentative and less aggressive form, because my main purpose in writing the article was to suggest that the time has come for Free Churchmen carefully to review the whole situation. We need a Free Church Commission on the future of national education, capable of making as thoughtful a contribution to present-day problems as is to be found in the work of the Archbishops' Commission. So far as our own policy is concerned, we have to ask whether the Free Church orthodoxy of 1902 is an adequate guide for 1931. Personally I do not think it is.

Yours, &c.,

H. G. WOOD.

THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC AND ITS MODERN RIVALS.

THE FIFTH THEOLOGICAL CONFERENCE OF CONGREGATIONALISTS, held at ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, JUNE 29th to JULY 2nd, 1931

AN IMPRESSION.

By Dr. Albert Peel.

The day before I went to Cambridge for the Conference I called on an old man just about to celebrate his 87th birthday. I found him greatly interested in the writings of Sir James Jeans, awake to the developments of modern science, and keenly critical of Huxley's famous illustration about the monkey which, if it played with the typewriter keys long enough, would produce Shakespeare's plays. It was for me a stimulating and encouraging interview.

The same feeling comes to me when I think of the series of theological conferences which have been held annually since 1927 under the Presidency of Dr. R. F. Horton. Dr. Horton had exercised a long and honoured ministry in Congregationalism. He had led the way in helping the churches to understand the movement of Biblical and theological thought, and had at times suffered the unpopularity that comes to the man ahead of his time. He had every right to settle down to a period of quiet and leisure, and had he done so no one could have blamed him. Instead, he conceived the idea of summoning Congregationalists to a Conference which would face up to modern developments in science and theology. In these pages in April, 1926, Dr. Horton wrote an article on "Free Churchmen and the Modern Churchmen" which resulted in the meeting of a Theological Conference at Oxford.

For five years now these Conferences have been held, in Oxford or Cambridge, and those who have attended them—those, too, who have read their Reports in our pages—are conscious of the debt they owe to Dr. Horton, and of the opportuneness of this Conference movement. It is only right, too, that the congregation of which Dr. Horton was so long the pastor should have a large share of the credit for this movement. It has not only given to the Conference its Treasurer from the beginning, Mr. A. B. Russell, but many of its members have attended regularly, and have also made it possible for ministers to attend. The general opinion about the utility of the Conference was seen at Cambridge not merely in a resolution to have a Conference next year, but in an instruction to the Committee to work out a Five-Year Programme of subjects for discussion.

The Conference this year was held at St. John's College, Cambridge, and to a Congregational Don of St. John's, Mr. E. Cunningham, a great

debt is due, for in every way—both by his contributions to the discussions and in his care for the welfare of the members—he rendered great service. St. John's proved a delightful spot for the Conference, and it is little wonder that members expressed the hope that it would be the venue of the gathering in some future year. The Rev. N. Goodall (Secretary) and the Rev. E. W. Johnson saw to it that all arrangements were efficiently made, and among the visitors who took part in the discussions were Principal J. W. Oman, of Westminster College. Other visitors were the Master of Ridley Hall, and local ministers. Prayers in the Chapel were conducted by the Rev. F. H. Ballard and the Rev. C. Deeble. The President of Cheshunt, Dr. Cave, and the minister of Emmanuel Congregational Church (the Rev. H. C. Carter) spared no effort to make the Conference a success.

The programme of the Conference was as follows :—

Monday, 29th June.—Evening : " The Situation to be Faced." Principal E. Griffith-Jones, D.D. Followed by Communion Service.

Tuesday, 30th June.—Morning : " The Christian Good : Its Basis —The Ethical Teaching and Practice of Jesus." Rev. A. T. Cadoux, D.D. Evening : " The Christian Good : Its Content." Mr. E. Cunningham, M.A.

Wednesday, 1st July.—Morning : " The Christian Good : Its Constitutive Principle and Validity." Principal R. S. Franks, M.A., D.Litt. Evening : "The Christian Good : How Achieved." Professor C. Anderson Scott, D.D.

Thursday, 2nd July.—Morning : " The Christian Good : Its Expression"; (a) In the life of Society. Rev. B. C. Plowright, B.A., B.D. (b) In the life of the Individual. Professor J. G. McKenzie, M.A., B.D. Evening : Summing-up. Rev. R. F. Horton, M.A., D.D.

Dr. Horton's prayer, printed in the Handbook, shows the spirit in which the Conference met—

> Holy and Gracious God, Who hast in Christ Jesus our Lord shown to the world the moral law and laid the foundations of a true society, have mercy upon us in these times, when the foundations are questioned and discarded, and men are trying to build on the foundation of their own making or imagining.
>
> Make clear to our age, we beseech Thee, Thy Eternal Law, and let its authority assert itself over our wayward and distracted wills.
>
> Grant, if it may be, that we, taking counsel together, may be led to clear and strong conclusions.

The President's "summing-up" at the end fitly gathered together the discussions of the week. In those discussions voices now familiar in these Conferences were again heard—those of the readers of the papers, and of Dr. C. J. Cadoux, Dr. Cave, the Revs. J. Bevan, H. I. Frith, E. W. Johnson, F. Lenwood, H. Partington, and Mr. H. B. Saint.

The informal after-Hall discussions for once in a way did not prove as lively and stimulating as we had come to expect, and most people went to bed unreasonably early.

All the papers are printed below in full, and it is unnecessary to discuss them here or to attempt to recount the course of the discussions upon them. Valiant efforts were made, at times when the Conference was inclined to soar, to keep its feet on the earth—to discover what a Christian ought to do about investing his savings, or about continuing to run a business at a loss. A layman made a powerful appeal for the evolution of a "technique of compromise", which, he said, would be of immense service to Christian

people. That indeed would be a useful task to which some thinkers might set their hands. When a Christian has to make a choice of what seem two evils, how is he to find which is the lesser?

It is fortunately not the business of an "impression" to discuss the subject of the Conference. I came away strongly convinced of the need for more and more Conferences of this kind, as I was made conscious time and time again of the gap between the thought and practice of to-day and the Church's appreciation of it. If such a time-lag is evident even in a Conference of this nature, how great must it be in the case of the average minister, church member, church, or denomination. Is it not true that too often many members of the Church are fighting battles with ideas that have been defeated and buried for a couple of generations? Even in this Conference some notions and some books which have for some time been discarded were discussed as if they were the very last word. Mr. Cunningham told us that so rapid now was the development of science that often theories were obsolescent within twenty years of their acceptance. Reading this week the latest book on bibliography I found that the writer went even further, suggesting that most scientific books were out of date in *five* years. When one thinks that the same is more or less true in theological and Biblical science one trembles. There are thousands of Sunday School teachers who have not so much as heard that there is a "Q", who, unless somebody wakes up, will just be passing the "Q" milestone a generation ahead, when the real army is leagues and leagues away.

I think of the spate of books that flows past me week by week. True, many of them are ephemeral and leave life and thought unaltered. But a considerable portion add some contribution, and gradually the bed and the banks of the river are changed, and so often the Church of Christ fails to notice, and perhaps wakes up to find that the stream has changed its course altogether and she is left high and dry. How many people in our churches know anything about the Humanism that was so much to the fore in these discussions? And yet, rightly or wrongly, I was told in America three years ago that the strength of the Humanistic Movement was already spent, and that other and graver problems were confronting Christian thinkers. It is well to remember that 80,000 copies of *A Preface to Morals* had been sold in the United States before it was introduced to this country.

And so with practice. There were certain books dealing with sex that, one speaker said, "I will not advise you to read". And the young people have been lapping them up in their thousands for a decade! It is high time that Christian folk recognized that they are not going to save the world by slothful ease, by being behind the times. They must wake out of their slumbers—dogmatic and otherwise—and they must be abreast of the thought of the time, and of the action of the time, too.

Naturally with a subject of this kind a good deal of attention—perhaps too much—was paid to the subject of sex. And here again one could not help but be struck by the failure to appreciate the situation among young people. On the one hand were older people who obviously were quite ignorant of the outlook and practice of young folk to-day. On the other were those of the middle-aged who patted the young folk on the back and cried, "All is well with our glorious youth. Better far this openness and frankness about sex than the old furtive, slimy way of regarding it". Now we quite agree about the openness and frankness, although, by the way, we think at times some speakers would be well advised to practice a little more reticence and reserve in audiences of both sexes and varied ages. But it was to be noted that such examples of glorious youth as were present in

the Conference did not welcome the testimonials given to their generation. They knew too much for that! I believe in youth, and I believe that youth will come through all right, but we lose tremendously if we do not recognize the facts of the case to-day. All is *not* well with youth in this sex business. Nobody who knows the life of a great city—its offices and its shops, its parks and its surrounding lanes with their motor-cars after dark—can say that it is, nor can anybody who knows the life of a country village. Youth, of course, does not deserve all the blame, does not deserve very much of it. Youth did not make the war and the moral laxity resulting; youth did not set the example on the screen and in the novel; sex has been flaunted before youth at a difficult time, in headlines, books, debates—everywhere, selected out of the vast mass of sensations that make up life as something unique and special and peculiar. Youth is not to blame for that.

But it is no use shutting our eyes to the fact that often youth does not stand up to the temptation. Would not some of our mentors who go up and down the country talking about the evils of repression do well to consider whether they are not doing a great deal of harm? It is not repression that is the main evil to-day, but the lack of self-control. Would not the descendants of the Puritans in this generation be doing their duty better by proclaiming the moral values in asceticism? That is their job, and not to recommend people to give the body its rein. Dr. Anderson Scott's week-end couple is not a mere academic problem; it is the sort of thing that is taken for granted by thousands of people to-day. I am reminded of an Englishman in America discussing companionate marriage with a friend. A fine, healthy, high-spirited girl came riding along, to whom he was introduced. Re-starting the discussion when she rode on, he said, "No, I don't believe all this talk. You could not imagine a girl like that, for example, going in for companionate marriage or that sort of thing", and he was astounded to get the reply, "Why, she has been trying it out with a man for the last three years". Let us realize all the promise and opportunity of modern youth, with its new frankness, its new knowledge, its new liberty. But let us realize too that we have let them in for a bad time, and that we are not going to get them out of it by pretending that all is well. It is not, and youth needs and deserves far more help than the Church of Christ is giving to-day.

And perhaps we can only give it by remembering what someone said in the Conference: "We are all at sea in ethics because we have abolished the transcendental". It is because the modern world has no real conception of God that it has no idea of authority, no theory of conscience, and no moral standards. It is because the Church is hazy about its doctrine of God that it is not providing leadership for the world. And so, despite the mood in which I went to Cambridge, I came away from the Conference depressed, because I had realized more plainly than ever before the appalling nature of the task confronting the Christian Church. Have we organized the thinking department of the Church? Are we doing anything at all adequate to keep abreast of the rapidly-developing world of thought in science, philosophy, psychology, ethics? Can we expect to keep abreast if the matter is left merely to individuals? Are we doing anything like what we should be to understand the problems the rising generation has to face? Movements like this Conference help, but they go but a little of the way. Can they stir the Church of Christ, can they stir the Congregational churches, to action?

THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC AND ITS MODERN RIVALS.

THE SITUATION TO BE FACED.

By Principal E. Griffith-Jones, B.A., D.D.

I.

The Christian Ethic has not been without its critics, and even its open enemies, from the beginning until now. Our interest at the present time, however, is in the ethical and anti-ethical thought of the 19th and 20th centuries, and more particularly in the fire of criticism that has been directed against the Christian Ideal with ever-increasing confidence—I had almost said arrogance—since the Great War. That terrible struggle, both in its contributory causes and its ruthless severity on land, at sea, and in the air, was a direct challenge to the Ethic of Jesus. It involved a four-years' moratorium in international morality, and as such it did incalculable damage to the moral sense of all the nations that took part in it. Especially did it shake the confidence of the rising generation not only in the churches that were presumed to be the repositories of the truth, but in the possibility of carrying on human affairs on a standard so exalted as the Christian Ethic appears to demand.

The new generation, moreover, in its childhood, missed the early training in high thinking and holy living which we older folk were privileged to enjoy in our own youth, and they are readier to listen to new voices, especially such as strike a note of severance from past ways of thinking and standards of conduct, even to the point of proclaiming the bankruptcy of the Christian Ethic. This accounts for the large post-war circulation of anti-Christian books, many of which are slipshod in thought and careless in style, which have made no mark on the saner and better-trained minds of pre-war readers. As a result, there is an ever-widening gulf between the older and newer generations, and a tendency among the young to treat the Victorian era with cheap contempt and ignorant scorn—a pose that does credit neither to their intelligence nor their moral insight.

II.

Long before this century began, however, there were influences at work which tended to undermine the foundations of our traditional morality.

I begin with the successive changes in the scientific view of the universe and of man's place therein, which have followed each other in steady succession from the dawn of the Renaissance, and which have culminated in the theory of Relativity—all tending to lower the status of man in his own eyes in view of the ever-expanding vastness of the kosmos, and of its apparently " total indifference to his very existence."

So long as the Ptolemaic world-view, and its correlative, the Apocalyptic view of man and his destiny, lasted, it was comparatively easy to believe in a Creator, in the uniqueness of man as a creature made in the image of God and the object of His providential care, in the incarnation and atoning work of the Saviour-Christ, and in His sure return to wind up history in the establishment of a kingdom of righteousness, not by slow evolution but by an irruptive Divine act of crisis and judgment. Man is here central to all things and the head of creation.

The next world-view, the Copernican, shifted the centre of the universe from our homely earth to the far-away skies, and made the earth a minor

planet of a wandering sun who carried his family of luminaries with him in an orbit of enormous diameter round an unknown centre. This change of perspective made it less easy for men to believe that their race could be of sufficient interest to the Maker of all things to be made the object of Divine solicitude and special treatment.

Then came the Newtonian transformation of the order of nature, substituting for the motion of spiritual or directly Divine agency in the motions of the heavenly bodies as hitherto held, the idea of physical forces and laws, acting automatically, and thus reducing the visible universe to the status of a vast machine controlled by unalterable laws. This tended to make the idea of God otiose and superfluous, and marked a retreat from a vivid theism to a pale deism. The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ became the God of the Far-away, whose function was completed in determining the primal plan, and in giving the initial push to the universe, leaving it then to carry on in virtue of its potential forces. Religion in such a world tended to become a cold cultus, and morality a conventional respectability.

Astronomy was now backed up by geology, both demanding an immense expansion in space and time in order to account for the present physical condition of the universe. Our planet and its human inhabitants shrank into further insignificance, and made the notion of a scheme of redemption for beings so puny and unimportant less credible still—at least to those who made size a criterion of value in worlds and organisms. So far, however, man might still be reckoned a supreme and unique being in virtue of his spiritual nature as contrasted with his special habitat and with his lowlier fellow-creatures, and be deemed worthy of special regard on the part of his Maker.

Another blow was struck at this idea of man's uniqueness by the Darwinian theory of his organic descent from these lowlier creatures, as opposed to the idea of being a specially created being made in the " image " of God, and " the heir of hopes too fair to turn out false". It seemed as though he must now sink back into the ranks of the crude organisms from which he sprang, and as he shared in their lowly origin, so must he share in their ultimate earthly fate.

This qualitative loss of status has recently been greatly emphasized by the rise of the New Psychology, as it is somewhat pretentiously called by its exponents; which asserts that man's spiritual nature is but a thinly camouflaged and rationalized " projection " of his sensuous organization; that he has no soul or spiritual self; that his very thoughts and imaginations are determined by physical conditions, his ethical and religious beliefs a mere bundle of organic habits and social conventions, and his final destiny a fall-back into the oblivion of non-entity from which he has emerged. In its crudest form of Behaviourism this New Psychology treats man as a physical organism in which even consciousness becomes a negligible fact, conduct being an automatic response to environal stimulus; in its higher forms of Humanism and Romanticism the process of " de-naturing " ethics of its content takes on loftier and more imaginative flight, but, as we shall presently see, it ends with equal certainty in the same bog of mechanistic determinism as does its more vulgar congener.

And what place does man take in the latest world-view on the grand scale that has just emerged into prominence—that associated with the name of Einstein, which has been accepted with such eager receptivity by current thought, partly, it may be surmised, because no one seems really to understand either the process of thought by which it has been reached, or its ultimate implications? In its central affirmation that

Reality is inherently a relative fact, it would seem that Browning's verdict on another level that " after Last returns the First, though a far compass round be fetched", is being illustrated on a cosmic scale, and that after 26 centuries of neglect Heracleitus, the earliest of the great thinkers of ancient Greece, with his doctrine of the relativity of all things expressed in his motto— πάντα ῥεῖ, "all is in flux"—comes to his own again with greatly added credit. Without accepting this strange new theory of the universe on its face-value for lack of competence to form an independent judgment on its validity, it is at least clear that the surface implications of the theory are not reassuring for those who would, if they could, cling to the conception of a world of moral values having absolute validity and universal authority. If it is true that everything perpetually melts into something else, then the only permanent thing is perpetual change. The world of values, like the world of matter, is thus a world of *relative* values, which can have no embodiment in any ultimate Personal Reality whose name is God. The only persons we *know* are the ever-changing persons we *are,* and as we ourselves are only tiny vortices in a vast whirlpool of changing entities, any "values" we may embody are as relative as ourselves.

Thus " God and the soul ", which, according to Newman and Browning, are the realities that "stand sure" amid all environal flux, disappear.

III.

We must now return to the 19th Century for two other lines of attack on the validity of the Christian Ethic which have had profound influence on the ethical thought of to-day—one in the region of biology, and the other in that of economic conditions of life.

The first is the Darwinian theory that all organic evolution is the result of the law of vital competition among living creatures, resulting in the fact of the " survival of the fittest." This description of living nature as an arena of internecine warfare is so familiar, as are its ethical implications for mankind, that I should not feel called to do more than mention it but for a mischievous error in the way it has been popularly understood and expounded by Darwin's followers—I do not think Darwin himself is guilty. Of course, the word " fittest " should be changed into " fit " in order to describe the process fairly. Nature is not so ruthless as to spare only the superlative specimens of each species for the purpose of individual survival and the propagation of their kind. She permits a vast number of creatures to survive which are quite average in their standard of efficiency for survival purposes, eliminating only such as can neither thoroughly enjoy life nor properly procreate their kind. It is a thousand pities that the competitive aspect of the struggle for life took so central a place and so ruthless a form in Victorian science, to the almost total ignoring of other and milder factors, which were left to later investigators to discover and vindicate. It is now widely recognized that " selection by death "—as the law of "natural selection" may be called—is only one of the methods by which nature has climbed the evolutionary ladder, but (at least among the higher animals) there has been another equally essential principle at work—the sympathetic, symbiotic, co-operative, one might almost say altruistic, principle—that expounded in Prince Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid* in the relations of animals in a state of nature; in John Fiske's *Man's Destiny viewed in the Light of his Origin,* with its revelation of the ethical implications of the great principle of parentage among mammals; a living thought afterwards convincingly developed in Henry Drummond's best, but least-appreciated, book, *The Ascent of Man.* These and other writers

have done much to restore nature's credit (so to speak) as the nursery of all the higher qualities of generosity, kindness, and altruism, which in mankind have taken on the glory of ethical virtues. If this aspect of the biological process had been discovered and driven home to the popular mind simultaneously with the picture of nature " red in tooth and claw ", many things in recent world-history might have been different. There might have been no Nietzsche with his horrible " Ethic of the Blond Beast" and the glorification of the "lust for power" which took such morbid hold of the consciousness of Young Germany in the later years of the 19th and the earliest years of the present century; and possibly there would have been no Great War. It is certain, at least, that the glorification of this so-called Darwinian law of Natural Selection as the central driving force of the evolutionary process had an immense and disastrous effect in injuring and even discrediting the Christian Ethic during the past fifty years; and it is equally certain that we are still far from having succeeded in restoring the balance of judgment in the general mind on this subject. " Nature is not ", as Carlyle said in his *Sartor* in pre-Darwinian times, " a charnel house, and a grave; she is Godlike and my Father's ". If this outburst is a little dithyrambic from a biological point of view, we shall have to come back a long way towards that outlook if we are to regain our just judgment of her ways, who is " the mother of us all ".

The second fact referred to at the heading of this section is the sudden prominence of the machine in industrial processes, which displaced skilled hand-work by mass-production, thus superseding the individuality of the worker, foreshortening his sense of personal importance, and transforming his function as a creator of wealth by his own skill and labour into that of a mere tender of mechanical processes. This damping-down of the factor of initiative among our workers, together with the crowding of so many into vast mills and workshops, had a disastrous effect on human character. The growth of enormous centres of population helped in the same direction. The organic fellowship of the village and small town, where everybody knew everybody else, gave way to the herd-fellowships of the city, where a closer physical proximity means almost complete social anonymity. This mass-production in the mill means mass-opinion in the slum and suburb; so that, in the words of an American writer, " society more and more tends to resemble a school of fish, so markedly alike, so spontaneous with the mass, that one might say there was a group soul. This has led to a loss of a sense of social responsibility, to a craving for exciting amusements in an attempt to make up for starved social instincts, and to a reckless turning from one object to another in a vain effort to make up for the loss of permanent attachments and a life rooted in lasting human relationships."

The rise of a spirit of exaggerated nationalism in the last century, at first filled with a high idealistic passion for liberty, as in the cases of Greece in 1829, Belgium in 1830, and Italy under Garibaldi, degenerated later into a lust for territorial expansion and the development of *real-politik* and the aggressive spirit which was chiefly responsible for the Great War. Another depotentiation of ethical values on an inter-continental scale!

Such were some of the influences, intellectual and practical, which during the past centuries of Western thinking have been slowly at work altering the moral perspectives of our world, and undermining the bases of our ethical ideas and practice. There have been, of course, other influences at work in the same direction which cannot be dealt with here.

The question may be legitimately raised, Has not Christian thought successfully met the various stages of this long process of sceptical attack

as they arose—from the time of Galileo on, and is there anything radically new in the present situation? The answer is certainly *Yes* to the first question; and *No* to the second. None the less, this has happened—that with the re-opening of the problem at each successive stage of the age-long conflict, it has always been necessary to travel over the whole argument *de novo*; and the question for us to-day is this, How is the situation being met by our present thinkers?

IV.

On the negative side of this issue, there is this differentiation between the 19th century sceptical writers and those of the present day: the former satisfied themselves with attacking the established positions of orthodoxy without providing an alternative ethical theory, while our present-day sceptics are eagerly engaged in attempting an ethical synthesis of their own. The leading Victorian thinkers in science and philosophy who openly repudiated Christianity did so not on ethical but philosophical and scientific grounds, and never themselves repudiated the Christian Ethic—I refer to such men as Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, and Spencer, whose lives would have done honour to the straitest sect of orthodox believers. Our New-thought exponents begin with an open and complete rejection of the Christian attitude towards life, and are busily attempting to readjust themselves to a frankly godless and non-spiritual universe. This is an entirely fresh situation. In the present phase it is full of interest and challenge. What are our Behaviourists, Humanists, Romanticists, Communists, trying to make of this universe, and of this life of ours?

Except quite incidentally, it is impossible here and now to deal with particular writers in detail, or to survey the whole ground even cursorily. Nor will it be possible for some time to come, in view of the fact that there is no concerted ethical attitude or programme of conduct being attempted. Every new Humanist has his own independent outlook, and what is common to them all is little more than a repudiation of the historic ethic in which as a nation (and a civilization?) we have been brought up for nearly 2,000 years. I will only examine the position of three typical post-war writers on a single point—their theory of values. They are Lippman in *A Preface to Morals,* Middleton Murry in *God* and one or two other books, and Powys in *In Defence of Sensuality.*

Mr. Lippman, after a trenchant attempt to clear the ground of the last shred of the Christian creed and attitude towards life, proceeds to his constructive business in a considerably chastened style, and with but little confidence. He finds his regulative virtue at last in what he calls *disinterestedness* of mind towards the problems and situations presented in life. By this quality he means nothing more than detachment of mind. —" to be free from one's passions and to understand them consciously is to render them disinterested ". I am not sure that I understand this as thus expressed, but I find more illumination in the following extract :—

> To transcend the ordinary impulses is the *common element in all virtue.* . . . To have virtue is to respond to the larger situations, and to longer stretches of time, and without much interest in their immediate convenience or pleasure.

This, truly, is a good feature in an ethical life, but as a central principle of conduct, without reference to higher and deeper ethical considerations, it appears to me quite irrelevant as the foundation of a new and universal ethic.

Mr. Middleton Murry believes firmly in a world of values, and they do not seem markedly different in their ethical quality from the Christian

virtues inculcated in the *New Testament,* but when we ask for the acid test of his particular world of values, he becomes increasingly vague as he unfolds his thesis. Man, he says, is "organic," by which I believe he means here he is a " systematic " being *in posse*, though at first he is far from being " systematic " *in esse*; and the universe in which he lives and moves and has his being is also organic *in posse* and *in esse,* though he does not clearly say in what sense. Now the test of a moral man as an organism is the attainment of a harmonized and coherent nature, hitherto in division and tumult (the "divided self"?). This subjective unity is not a *datum* of human nature—it is an end to be achieved, often after great struggles and much sorrow of heart. This inner victory, however, is not enough; it must be succeeded, or accompanied, by the achievement of harmony with the "organic unity" of the universe without us. When he achieves this subjective and objective unity a man becomes a true personality. It is easy to see that we have here the statement of the Christian view of life as achieved and described by Paul in his own case, with just one point of difference—that in the universe there are no values to which we have to assimilate ourselves, for values are only such for persons, and in the universe there is no such Person as we Christians believe to exist, and to be the fountain-head of all secondary existences, Whom we have found through Jesus Christ our Lord. One is tempted, as far as Mr. Murry is concerned, to say, "Thou are not far from the Kingdom of God ", and to hope that ultimately he will follow his star even unto Bethlehem. Until he does, his system of ethics is like the Indian juggler's rope flung up into the air up which he only seems to climb.

Thirdly, there is Mr. Powys, a writer of a different kind who is primitive and naïve in his view of happiness as the chief end and duty of man, whose criterion is threefold for a really happy life. In the first place, following on his statement that

> it should be an object for all of us to achieve a philosophy that can be simplified into a single mental gesture that we can reproduce almost automatically,

he goes on to say,

> Such a gesture is the capacity to be absorbed in the sensations of the moment. A certain complicated play of the senses, and of all those subtle psychic overtones and undertones that surround the senses—this is the fluctuating and yet eternal ground of my argument.

Since I only know Mr. Powys's views at second-hand, I leave him with this bare mention as a writer of some significance for our purpose, hoping that others will deal with him later who are better qualified to do so.

V.

I have tried to present an historical sketch of the stages during the last century and this through which the revolt against Christian faith and morals has passed, and an analysis of a few typical constructions of the Humanistic movement which for the moment is dominant. It remains for me to suggest what in my judgment is the best and surest way of combating the present anarchic situation.

I confess that my chief reaction to the whole Humanistic crowd is one of profound distaste and even impatience. Apart from the fact that the public mind just now is open to any wind that blows so long as it does not emanate from a traditional or philosophically and ethically " orthodox " quarter, there seems to me to be little worth answering in the contentions of this new and bizarre group of thinkers. Humanism is an impressionist revolt

against the Christian faith and morals, and little more; a reaction against all orthodoxies in philosophy, psychology, religion, and ethics. Like most reactions, it shows itself incapable of understanding what it repudiates, and of presenting any coherent substitute of its own. I find in these books much art and cleverness, not a little literary skill, and incidentally some interesting and valuable suggestions. But there must be a total lack of humour in the equipment of men who, for instance, solemnly set about rehabilitating religion as a radical function of our human nature, while sternly refusing to recognize the existence in any shape or form of God as the co-ordinate of man in this great business of the Good Life. Religion without God; man without a soul; a moral life without a standard of values, or with values that shift and melt and disappear as you look at them—what is all this but a Walpurgis Night of intellectual and ethical confusion?

As one form of remedy for this situation I venture to suggest that for our thoughtful young men and women we need a set of brief, well-written textbooks dealing with the various types of Behaviourist, Humanist, Romanticist theories of human life and destiny which would present the Christian answer to these latest forms of unbelief. So far little notice has been taken of these writers in our religious reviews; it is surely time the situation be grappled with by our best thinkers and writers. For the books of Julian and Aldous Huxley, Babbitt, Lippman, Powys, Middleton Murry, Joad, and others are circulating among our reading youths in their scores and even hundreds of thousands. If books of constructive Christian thinking were written with equal skill and fascination, I am sure they would be immensely successful and would fulfil a splendid function.

And as for us preachers—have we not a Gospel which, if adequately preached, combining knowledge with conviction, and zeal with eloquence, is more than sufficient to meet this new attack on the foundations of our faith? Is there not also a literature of Christian thought full of fine material for the formulation of a positive body of doctrine at our disposal in the works of James Ward, Sorley, Pringle-Pattison, C. C. J. Webb, W. R. Matthews, A. E. Taylor, and of theologians like Forsyth, Garvie, Horton, Oman, to say nothing of many lesser men? And may I suggest another choice textbook of the soul which has been the inspiration of more in number than the sands of the seashore, and which in its brief compass contains more cogent thinking on matters spiritual than all the libraries—the little book called the *New Testament?* How unperishable is its message, and how it fits the needs of to-day! How trivial and mean appear the belittlements of man supposed to follow the successive expansions of space and time against which his little earthly life is projected, when we read of the lily clothed by our Heavenly Father with a beauty Solomon could not rival, and of the Prodigal who was brought back from the far country and received home without question. May we not claim that the mind that can *feel,* even if it cannot *read,* the riddle of the universe is greater than the universe that produced the problem? If it is true—and do *we* not *know* it?—that "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them" do we need to trouble ourselves—except for the sake of the babes and sucklings of the flock—with the pretentious claims of these new Humanists that they can maintain the principle of ethical life without the sanctions which can alone give these principles a stable foundation on which to rest?

THE ETHICAL TEACHING AND PRACTICE OF JESUS.

By The Rev. A. T. Cadoux, B.A., D.D.

I.

For a study of the ethical teaching and practice of Jesus, little directly useful material is to be found outside the first three Gospels; and even they are not without observable tendencies which must be allowed for. We cannot think we have exact history in *Mark's* story of the cursing of the fig tree, and *Luke* shows a questionable emphasis in teaching that touches property. The First Gospel generally corrects any suggestion that Jesus modified the Mosaic law. Its anti-Pharisaic discourse is prefaced by "The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat: all things, therefore, whatsoever they bid you, do and observe", which can hardly have come from the lips that accused them of making void the word of God by their tradition. We have the same tendency in *Matt.* 5^{19}, "Whosoever shall break one of the least of these commandments, and shall teach men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven", the reference evidently being to the Mosaic law plus the teaching of Jesus regarded as a stiffening of its demands. And we have it in what follows—the attempt to regard the teaching of Jesus as a code or as coded addenda to the Mosaic law. Here we have what is obviously a written compilation, not the report of a spoken discourse. Had Jesus intended to leave a code, He would have left it in writing.

These considerations touch one of the most debated points of Jesus' teaching. *Matt.* $5^{21\text{-}48}$ is arranged in paragraphs under a series of contrasts between what was said of old time and what Jesus said. This introductory contrast seems to be an essential part of the sayings about anger, scorn, and lust. It introduces the saying about divorce in a different and less circumstantial way than *Mark* $10^{1\text{-}12}$; and if, in the case of swearing, it is genuine, why did the early Church not understand that vows to God were forbidden? But we are specially concerned with vv.$^{38\text{-}48}$. Here *Matt.* has in two paragraphs what *Luke* has in one, and *Matt.'s* paragraphs are prefaced respectively with, "Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil", and, "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy", neither of which has any equivalent in *Luke,* and though it might be said that Luke had no interest in the contrast with the old, that would not account for his omission of "Resist not him that is evil" if he found it in his source. In these Matthæan prefaces themselves we note that "thou shalt hate thine enemy" does not appear to have been part of either Jewish law or tradition, while "Thou shalt love thy neighbour" is not in point as contrast, for a neighbour may make the most annoying of all enemies. There is greater difficulty with "An eye for an eye, *etc.*" which in the law is addressed to the legal executives of the community with regard to the infliction of penalty for damage done by one Israelite to another, whereas in the sayings that follow it in *Matt.,* Jesus is in every case speaking to the private person. And had Jesus condemned all such legal infliction of penalty, He could not with honesty have made the argumentative use He did of "He that speaketh evil of father or mother let him die the death". "Resist not him that is evil" obviously cannot be taken literally, otherwise we should yield to every tempter and leave every lie unchallenged, and when we look at the five concrete instances, the beggar and borrower are certainly not

always evil, and of the others, one is an official making use of impressed service, one a pursuant at law, and the other has given a blow on the right cheek, which is probably not the blow of injury, but the blow of moral repudiation given with the back of the hand, so that these are cases rather of disputed right than of evil, and in each case we are told to cooperate actively, so that in themselves they do not seem to speak of the undoubtedly evil; nor are we here told to rebuke the wrongdoer as we are elsewhere in the case of explicit evil (*Luke* 17^3). In *Luke's* version these concrete injunctions follow the command, "Love your enemies", and this order is repeated in the questions, "If ye love them that love you . . . if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive" and again in the summary, "But love your enemies, and do good and lend . . . ", so that unless Luke here edits far more drastically than we know to be his custom, we may conclude that his source had in one paragraph what *Matt.* has in two.

Luke's order is confirmed by the *Didache,* the date and provenance of which make it probable that it was not entirely dependent upon our Gospels for its version of the teaching of Jesus, a possibility which would account for the form in which this document reproduces the sayings under consideration, for here it has contents that are not in *Luke* and contents that are not in *Matt.,* and contents that are in neither, while its order here is as compact as either but different from both, except that it confirms *Luke* as against *Matt.* in placing the concrete injunctions after the command to love our enemies and in following them by an appeal to the bounty of God. It also supports *Luke* against *Matt.* in having nothing corresponding to the *O.T.* citations nor to "Resist not him that is evil". This is the more significant because the author of the *Didache* was certainly acquainted with the First Gospel, though his acquaintance with *Luke* is improbable.

The evidence thus suggests that in the earliest form of which we have any trace this passage of Jesus' teaching began with the command to love our enemies, then went on to speak of disputed right, private, legal, national, and then of need, the beggar and the borrower, motiving all by our relation to our Father who is kind to the evil and to the good. It may be conjectured that "Resist not him that is evil" in *Matt.* 5^{39} is due to the tendency that in 23^3 enjoined the observance of whatever the Pharisees taught, *i.e.,* the desire to show that the authorities need fear nothing from the action of Jesus' followers.

II.

The teacher of ethics may be philosopher, law-giver, reformer, prophet, or saviour, and each has his own characteristic conduct and incidence of teaching. The philosopher tries to understand the matter as a whole, the law-giver tries to regulate conduct over the whole field, but neither is committed to the brunt of the ethical struggle. The reformer must select, for to have many points of attack lessens the chance of winning an effective following for any. The prophet, consciously (or more probably sub-consciously) aware of the whole field, speaks as the mouthpiece of God in assault upon those wrongs that have become an intolerable torment to his conscience. His economy of animus makes him effective, but often apparently or really narrow. The saviour (as in Gautama and Jesus, and hardly a third) finds his task in discovering and supplying the essential need of man as an ethical being. Like the philosopher, he must see the whole, but, unlike him, seeks not only to understand but to meet the need. Unlike the law-giver his chief interest is in the springs of personal

activity. Jesus differs from Gautama in two outstanding respects, in both of which He comes nearer to the prophet. To anyone who can separate the religion and ethics of Jesus, Jesus has never been a teacher of either. And then, too, the crisis of human ethics with which He had to deal was also the greatest crisis in the history of the nation that was leading the world in religion and ethics. We have, therefore, in the teaching and practice of Jesus the urgency and concentration of impending and supreme crisis, and to forget this is to misjudge Him. The urgency is seen in the brevity of His public life, and the way in which, having systematically roused the nation, He forced a decision at Jerusalem. It appears in sayings like, "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few", "Salute no man by the way", "Let it alone this year also", "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished". The apocalyptic school accounts for this by telling us that Jesus expected the world to come to a speedy end. It can only be said that there is not the slightest trace of such an expectation in the ethical teaching of Jesus, especially where, had it been in His mind, it could hardly have escaped expression. It does not appear in His pronouncements on marriage, as it does in Paul's. In the consideration of "laying up treasure", it is not only completely absent, but the main relevant factors of the future are given as moth, rust, and thieves, telling us that Jesus expected a continuation of the conditions of life as hitherto known. The same appears in "The poor ye have always with you".

But both John the Baptist and Jesus evidently apprehended the terrible possibilities that were realized in A.D. 66-70. Jesus in His call to His people offered them the only alternative to the fanatical nationalism that was driving them to this ruin. When they told Him of the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices, His answer was "Except ye repent, ye shall all in like manner perish". And at the end when, rejected, He left the Temple, He knew that He left it to destruction. His own death was but the first act of a wider doom, so that the women of Jerusalem had reason rather to weep for themselves and for their children than for Him.

Such urgency must affect both conduct and teaching. When a man's house is on fire and his children are in the top storey, his impatience with impeding onlookers, his callousness about his neighbour's rose trees, may be seemly elements of the situation and spirit of his heroism. "Let the dead bury their dead" sounds harsh, but not when it is a man's choice between his father's funeral and his children's life. "Shake off the dust of your feet" sounds narrow, but if there is only one way of escaping doom, is it narrowness to stress the fact? Jesus found the influence of Scribe and Pharisee blocking His people's one alternative to doom. Can we ask that in breaking their influence He should weaken His endeavour by avoiding painful words?

The urgency of the situation also explains omissions. With the very life of the nation at stake, with the impending possibility of the cry 'Blessed are the barren", a programme of social welfare would have been nothing but an absurd detraction from the main issue.

And the fate of Israel was only a part of a larger issue. Israel's was the highest of all national religions, and Jesus' alternative to a suicidal hardening of its nationalism was to lift it into the one effective universal religion, the religion for which the world of Jesus' day was in desperate need. Here again is a demand for concentration to the exclusion of lesser matters, for he who calls a nation to answer will defeat his end if he multiplies the issues.

III.

The transition from national to universal religion has its concomitant in the transition from customary to deliberative ethics, from unquestioning acceptance of a traditional code to open-eyed choice of what is worth doing.

Now when man begins to think about his conduct, to ask "why?", to want to see each act in relation to the rest of his interests, from that moment an inevitable and all-important factor is what he thinks about himself. Some psychologists have even resolved conscience into self-regard, and we know the power of self-respect and the commonness and strength of the appeal, "What will people think of you?" Nor, when once man is capable of a thought of self, can this factor be eliminated by omitting to form a consciously-held scheme of life. It is behind ambition, love of glory, of reputation, of power. The desire to feel self-sufficient and glorious helps to make the drunkard. Self-exaltation plays into the hands of lust; self-regard is the root of jealousy; self-bias makes quarrels, and pride makes them permanent.

As a factor in all conscious moral choice, the thought of self has several great dangers:—

(1) It is emotionally inflammable—a snub, and we boil.

(2) It is emotionally unstable. We swing from conceit to despair, from self-glorying to self-despising, and are often in painful tension between the two.

(3) We run easily either to self-righteousness, or to its perversion, the bravado of moral laxity, while regret is often little more than the disappointment of self-glory.

(4) Our thought of self is very prone to bias. We compare ourselves to others generally to our own advantage: and who judges his antagonist fairly?

So that at this all-important stage the master problem of ethics concerns what a man thinks of himself. And much of the teaching of Jesus turns upon the nature of the self and the importance of a man's thought of himself.

The essential unity of the self and its characteristic bent towards becoming a more thorough unity are recognized in several sayings: "No man can serve two masters"; "He that is not against us is for us"; "He that is not with me is against me".

Instead of the common Rabbinic debate as to what came of the good deeds of a man whom God ultimately rejected, we have several sayings implying that any real beginning of good in a man will ultimately bring in the whole personality to God: "Whoso shall give you a cup of water to drink because ye are Christ's verily I say unto you he shall in no wise lose his reward"; "Come ye after me, and I will make you to become fishers of men"; "The cup that I drink, ye shall drink".

Like modern psychology, the parable of the two builders tells us that the man who will not, in life and act, adopt what he knows to be the truth is inducing an inward weakness which in time of stress will show itself disastrously. Thus also, of our idle words—words giving evidence of an understanding that has no counterpart in act—we shall give account in the day of judgment.

Jesus saw over against the disordered life, with its quick and patent damage to the self, two marked tendencies to a wrong order which produced still worse results. Man tries to buttress his thought of himself by

achieving prominence in possessions, which, promising safety and self-indulgence, power and precedence over other selves, stands, as Mammon, God's rival claimant to the throne of man's heart.

Or we may cherish a thought of self grounded and glorified in what others think of us. "This", writes Hazlitt, "is a bolster to lean upon; a lining to your poor, shivering, threadbare opinion of yourself". Hence desire for fame, glory, reputation, admiration of one sort or another. Hence righteousness done "to be seen of men". Hence those that "justify themselves in the sight of men", that love the "chief seats in the synagogues". And it was in life so entrenched that Jesus found the deadliest opponent of His teaching.

He knew that blind self-bias often lay behind the reformer's assumption of moral superiority: "Why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" He knew that bias towards others went with dire self-deception: "The lamp of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!"

He knew how self-exaltation dishonoured the self and how self-preference stultified the self: "Every one that exalteth himself shall be humbled: and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted"; "That which is exalted among men is an abomination in the sight of God"; "Whosoever would save his self shall lose it".

And He knew that for Himself and others the self's way to full stature was through that to which it gave itself at all costs: "I have a baptism to be baptized with and how am I straitened until it be accomplished"; "If any man would come after me let him deny himself"; "Whosoever shall lose his self for my sake and the gospel's shall save it"; "Every one shall be salted with fire".

We might here expect that a solution to the ethical problem of the self would be found in a man's religion, which must affect what he thinks of himself and therefore what he thinks he ought to do. It seems as though loyalty and devotion to a supreme Object should correct self-bias. But religion short of the highest seems rather to increase than to lessen the vagaries and dangers of self-thought. The Jews of Jesus' day were the most religious of all nations, yet we have seen what Jesus found in them. The law was a delight to the Rabbis, as is any highly elaborated etiquette to those who can make it the pedestal of their self-gratulation. Judaism certainly inclined the Jew both as nation and individual to despise others, and Jesus marked the desire for admiration, place, and prestige as the outstanding characteristic of the religious leaders of His day and people, in whom also He found His chief opponents.

The failure of Judaism to solve the ethical problem of the self lay in the too great difference it set between God and man. The prominence it gave to merit implied that God's good and man's good are not really one, that is, that there is no essential spiritual kinship between God and man. This could hardly be otherwise to the Jew so long as his law ranked ceremonial demands with ethical.

India also had, more consciously, set itself to the problem of human selfhood and had gone to the other extreme of resolving human personality into the one Infinite Spirit, or, as in Buddhism, of finding an ideal in the unravelling rather than in the wholeness of self.

The way of Jesus was neither of these. Far from Indian renunciation of desire, He stresses the initiative of life: "Ask . . . seek . . . knock . . ."

On the other hand the parable of the unprofitable slave tells us that Jesus found no room for the idea of merit between God and man. In His teaching God is to us neither altogether other nor the same but Father, and our true life is kinship, fellowship, and co-operation with Him. Jesus was the first to make central the thought of God as Father, but even this is too little to say, if we mean no more than that God will act in the spirit of love in which a father acts. We must add the thought of essential kinship. The argument, "that ye may be sons of your Father which is in heaven" implies a progress from the sort of action that denies our true being to the sort of action that expresses it. But we have not got to the core of His meaning until we see the significance of His insistence upon being towards God as a child, a little child. The child's consciousness of self is dominated by consciousness of relationship to father and mother, a continual sense of the greater, admirable and lovable. This greater, dear, wonderful other is the more important part of the little child's idea of self. Jesus thus transforms self-regard by refusing to regard self except in the humbling and dignifying context of the infinite majesty and love of "your heavenly Father".

This is expressed in many ways. The kingdom of God is only for those who receive it as a little child receives, "for of such is the kingdom of God". In the superlative command, "Love your enemies", His hearers are to find their motive in their thought of themselves, but of themselves as children of a heavenly Father whose love is not cancelled by man's wickedness. We must exchange our own ranking of ourselves, *i.e.*, our self-regard, for God's thought of us—as in the parable of "Friend, go up higher"—and therefore to be concerned with our priority is to degrade ourselves. The quest of reputation befouls a man in God's sight: "Ye are they that justify yourselves in the sight of men; but God knoweth your hearts: for that which is exalted among men is an abomination in the sight of God". Our inwardly rehearsed apologias inhibit His spirit: when we know we have to answer for ourselves, we are told, "Be not anxious beforehand what we shall speak: but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye: for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Spirit". It is the Pharisee's delight in his own excellence that stultifies the divine possibilities of his prayer. For man's first need is a true appreciation of the kinship and goodness of God: our prayer must begin, "Father, hallowed be Thy name".

Very significant are the words, "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few. Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he send forth labourers into his harvest". The apprehension of human need and opportunity is not enough; we are not fit to help until we recognize that effective help to man comes only from those whose desire to help has first found humility and power in the greater desire of God and has learnt that man's goodness is a response to God's.

We have nowhere else so characteristic an expression of Jesus' sense of the importance of this truth as in His reply to the rich ruler's address, "Good master". The question, "What shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?" is a question as to the true nature of goodness, as to what good it is most vitally important to do; and considering this, and that Jesus could at another time speak of "the good man", we should see in His answer, not a personal disclaimer, but a statement essential to the recognition of the true nature of goodness, "Why callest thou me good? none is good save one, God. Thou knowest the commandments . . . " True human goodness begins with the discovery of its source in the uniquely original goodness of God, and lives in active response to what

it there discovers. There is a rebuke in the answer, suggesting that Jesus saw in the ingratiating form of the man's address an appeal to self-glory and evidence that his heart was in love with the very motives that Jesus here brands as dishonest.

IV.

We can now consider a notable difference between the ethical appeal as Jesus made it and as it is made to-day. The appeal to the attractiveness of the moral ideal, and the suggestion, "Do you not want to leave the world better than you found it?", powerful and valuable though we find them, are almost entirely absent from the teaching of Jesus.

He makes very little appeal to the result of our acts on others. "See that ye despise not one of these little ones" would to-day be followed by a picture of the desolating effect on the little ones: Jesus' reason is, "that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven". Swearing is condemned not because of its results, but because it "cometh of evil".

When He does appeal to results, it is nearly always to the effect of the act upon the doer's relation to God. "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged: and condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned: release, and ye shall be released: give, and it shall be given unto you . . . for with what measure ye mete it shall be measured unto you again", the passives being the common Jewish way of speaking of the activity of God. God's forgiveness of us is made to depend upon our forgiveness of others. So in the Beatitudes, "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God . . . ". The laying up of treasure on earth is forbidden not because of economic results, but because it infects the heart with its insecurity and stands in the way of treasure in heaven. And this list might be lengthened.

Especially is the result of the wrong act depicted as inhibiting the doer's fellowship with God. "If thou art offering thy gift at the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way, first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift". "The things that proceed out of man are those that defile the man", *i.e.*, the wrong use of his initiative makes him incapable of God's presence.

On the other hand, the reward promised seems characteristically to be that of fellowship with God. Three times over in *Matt.* 6 the reward of being seen by men is contrasted with the reward of "your Father which seeth in secret": the contrast suggests a wholesome, divine fellowship of spirit, as against an unwholesome human staging; while for success in their specific ends (*i.e.*, the reward sought in them) almsgiving, prayer, and fasting need the fellowship of God, and having that, what more do they want?

We have many other forms of the same thing. Forgiveness is often spoken of as remission of debt or penalty, but the heart of it is the renewal of fellowship. In the parable of the unmerciful servant, cancellation of debt is shown to be worse than useless where there is no participation of spirit. And in the parables generally the reward is a more intimate fellowship and a greater trust, as also in, "Howbeit in this rejoice not that the demons are subject unto you, but rejoice rather that your names are written in heaven", *i.e.*, that you are citizens of the city of God. "He that receiveth you, receiveth me, and he that receiveth me, receiveth Him that sent me", is especially significant as giving Jesus'

description of the result to those who responded rightly to His emissaries' message, "Repent: the kingdom of God is at hand".

It is often taken for granted that the kingdom of God is, in the teaching of Jesus, the counterpart of the modern moral ideal. The apocalyptic school denies this rightly, but from wrong grounds. It is true that we are never given to understand that the kingdom of God is essentially a human achievement, but, on the other hand, we are told that it may be sought, approached, entered, received—terms which are not applicable to a divinely intruded catastrophe. The coming kingdom of God must in any case mean a state in which God is king in a way in which He is not king by the ways of creatorship, governance, or providence, for kingship in these ways He has already. The only prospective addition is that He shall come to be truly king of human hearts by their free and glad obedience. This in any case must be the chief thing in His kingdom to come, and it cannot be accomplished catastrophically; yet the key to it is rather in what man is brought to believe about God than in what man achieves by himself. Hence before the prayer, "Thy kingdom come", is the prayer, "Father, hallowed be Thy name".

The justification of Jesus' removal of emphasis from the desirability of the ideal or of being benefactor to our fellows appears in the relationship of this desire to the idea of self. If the desire is to be more than a passing whim it must connect itself with our conception of ourselves, and if this conception finds the setting that Jesus gives it, all thought of our own goodness dissolves in our recognition of the boundless goodness of God. But if we do not find and practise this resolution, then the desire to benefit, to lead, to teach, will make alliance with the pleasing thought of our own superiority, and lead to that self-righteousness which is moral and spiritual impotence and perversion. The process will be quickened as the demands of experience rise. When we meet with misunderstanding, ingratitude, opposition, obloquy, we shall be stung into angry contempt. Our only resort is to set over against the malice of man the magnanimity of a divine love that has suffered from our ingratitude, and so to find ourselves humbled and invincible.

V.

But if, when the stage of consciously directed conduct is reached, human goodness suffers perversion unless it finds its root in appreciation of, and response to, the infinite goodness of God, we see why Jesus put such stress upon humility. He speaks of it more than of love. It is the condition of God's activity upon a man: "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted", or, as we have it in the *Gospel of the Egyptians,* "He that wonders, shall reign". The publican finds in his humility a divine endorsement of his spirit's demand: to her to whom forgiveness is most, God's love is most.

Conditions which make for humility open the heart to God. "Blessed are ye poor . . . ye that hunger . . . ye that weep . . . " Any condition of prominence or privilege, national or personal, is one of danger and temptation, especially in the case of ethical or religious leadership. The nation that produces a prophet is most likely to reject him. In the parables of the supper and of the shut door the very sense of importance and privilege is at the bottom of the fatal refusal and delay.

The saying about the mote and beam tells us that humility and moral honesty are near kin, and both are essential in any moral help we are to give our fellows. And the unpardonable sin seems to be that of the

man who deliberately takes refuge in untruth rather than acknowledge a greater goodness than his own. Humility is the root of intellectual honesty.

And here we must notice the value that Jesus sets upon a man's appreciation of others' goodness. "He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet, shall receive a prophet's reward; and he that receiveth a righteous man in the name of a righteous man shall receive a righteous man's reward", which seems to mean that actively to appreciate another's goodness is to appropriate it. He honours appreciation above philanthropy. The man who cast out demons in His name but refused to follow with the Twelve, is defended, not by reference to the values of the cures, but because, "there is no man which shall do a mighty work in my name and be able quickly to speak evil of me". He ranks the woman's gift of spikenard above giving to the poor; and on this occasion the rightness of His judgment is patent in the self-righteous fault-finding of the would-be philanthropists. We have the same scale of values in the incident of Martha and Mary.

Jesus, however, does not enjoin the mere suppression of the instinct that moves to self-exaltation: He so interprets the truth of life as to show men that this instinct can get effectively to work only by becoming transformed—"If any man would be first, he shall be last of all, and servant of all"; "Whosoever would be first among you, shall be slave of all". Man's self-bias and self-glory come from the play of instinct upon a limited view of life: Jesus bids us see all and so find these tendencies transmuted by recognizing the ways of God's rule.

VI.

The transmutation of the self-bias of immature personality, as effected by setting the human self in its true context of divine fatherhood, naturally insists above all upon the supreme value of all selves. It is hardly necessary to quote here. The commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself", and Jesus' own addition, "I say unto you, love your enemies" both find their comment and inspiration in the spirit of His life and death.

Especially therefore are we warned against feeling or expressing contempt: "See that ye despise not one of these little ones . . . " "Whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire".

Turning to the goods which love seeks and its means to them, we come first to the relation of Jesus to the law. The Mosaic law, like all more primitive ethics, is an aggregation of customary modifications of instinct, and since those peoples whose customs have made for fuller, stronger, better life, will be the more likely to survive, the code of a much surviving people will on the whole be a sound and extremely valuable contribution to the means of achieving life's good. Hence, as we might expect, Jesus sets His ethical teaching in definite affirmative relation to the Mosaic code. This appears in His reply to the young ruler, "Thou knowest the commandments" and elsewhere. But in two matters at least Jesus explicitly countermanded the Mosaic law. Most notable and drastic was, "There is nothing from without the man, that going into him can defile him". But quite explicit also was His condemnation of Mosaic facility of divorce. And His insistence upon truth in ordinary utterance is a significant addition to Mosaic requirements.

Very marked in the teaching of Jesus is His recognition of the simpler and more natural values of life. He was not an ascetic in the ordinary sense. He defends the family against the refinements of "Corban", and

health against the impediment of the Sabbath. In the Golden Rule He bids us act on our actual desires under the impartiality of active unselfishness. Very striking in His teaching on marriage is the immediate conjunction of the physical difference of sex, "male and female created he them" with the divine union of personalities, "whom God hath joined together".

The importance of bodily presence to spiritual fellowship is reiterated: "He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me"; "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them"; one of the best attested non-canonical sayings is, "When thou seest thy brother, thou seest thy God": He sent his apostles out by two and two: He said that when they must answer for themselves, divine inspiration would come with the actual presence of their accusers. All this seems to depend in part at least upon the power which the bodily presence of others has to modify our self-bias.

Jesus does not disguise the conflict that may rise between the more instinctive and the higher values: "Who is my mother and my brethren?"; "I came not to send peace but a sword . . . to set a man at variance against his father . . . "; "He that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me". He withdraws Himself from the demands for healing that He may give Himself to preaching (*Mark* 1^{32-38}).

The economic side of life brings us to Jesus' teaching upon anxiety—"Be not anxious what ye shall eat . . . " His plea is first that the birds and flowers, with much less apparatus than we, manage to live under the provision of God; then that to be anxious for food and clothing is to spoil the greater for the sake of the less, to let worry about life's means spoil life, and to let the joy of health be clouded because we are not as well dressed as we would like. The cure is to find a higher concern elsewhere—"Seek ye first the kingdom of God"—only the kingship of the highest can free us from the tyranny of the lower. This choice between anxiety and a courageous refusal to enthrone the economic above the spiritual is the poor man's counterpart of the choice between God and Mammon. For against the anxiety of poverty Jesus sees the anxiety of wealth, with heart uncertain as its hoard.

When, at the close of the Galilean ministry, in comment upon the departure of the rich ruler, Jesus exclaimed, "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!", the extreme astonishment of the Twelve is evidence that a general condemnation of wealth had been no part of His teaching. When He told the man to sell all and give to the poor, it may have been because wealth was becoming too inextricably a part of the man's self, but, in any case, Jesus had to avoid any such charge as He brought against the scribes of "devouring widows' houses", *i.e.*, of making religious prestige the means to handling the wealth of others.

Jesus certainly saw great dangers in acquisitiveness. Its power to rob a man of his freedom and faith is given in the saying, "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon". Its power to lure a man to sinking the end in the means and so to spend his years in an unremitting labour of self-frustration is told in the parable of the rich fool. The difficult words translated, "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth" tells us that certain possessions are necessary to life, but that superfluity is a clog upon it.

The boast of Peter, "We have left all and followed Thee", is not an exact statement, for both *Mark* 3^{9} and *John* 21^{3} tell us that they still retained command of their boat, and according to *Mark* 14^{7} Jesus does not

reckon either Himself or His disciples among the poor. When He sent the Twelve to proclaim the kingdom, He sent them penniless because "the labourer is worthy of his hire", *i.e.*, because He was sending them to Israel about Israel's business, but when Israel had rejected Him, this rule was rescinded—"But now, he that hath a purse let him take it".

As to the problem of the uneven distribution of wealth, we have seen that Jesus condemned "laying up treasure on earth" because of its insecurity, not because of its selfishness. And if we may judge by, "The poor ye have always with you, and whensoever ye will ye can do them good", He saw no solution to life's economic disparities but one that relied ultimately upon a continual and costly generosity. And in His teaching, as in that of the best of the Rabbis, the duty of this generosity is most strongly stressed. In the parables of Dives and Lazarus and of the Sheep and Goats, He makes man's whole relationship to God in its eternal issues depend on the presence or absence of willingness to help the needy.

VII.

Very few of the sayings of Jesus generalize the form our acts should take. Those that do so are almost all negative. Some that appear to do so turn out to be rather commands as to the spirit, which must judge its occasion and choose its means, as "Give to him that asketh of thee". With Jesus (and this goes with the prevailingly positive nature of His ethics) the stress is on the spirit. The spirit of humility and love must by observation and experience find their own instruments and means.

Hence among the few cases in which Jesus speaks of the consequences of an act to anyone but the doer are two in which the outward shape of the act is modified by the likelihood of misinterpretation or abuse. Jesus would not have paid the temple tax but for the danger that His refusal might "cause them to stumble". And He warns His disciples, "Give not that which is holy unto dogs, neither cast your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn and rend you", on which maxim He acted in concealing His Messiahship and in refusing to answer the question, "By what authority doest thou these things?". We should probably include here Jesus' limitation of His work to Israel. Montefiore asks why, if "Love your enemies" meant "Love the Romans", Jesus did not openly say so. The answer is that all that we know of the Jews of that period tells us that, had Jesus from the first made clear the universalistic implications of His teaching, it would not have been allowed time to take root (*cf. Acts* $22^{21, 22}$).

Here probably we find the reason why Jesus did not attack certain practices which to us seem antagonistic to His spirit, especially animal sacrifice and slavery. Both were bound to be abolished by the growing influence of His spirit, but an immediate attack upon either would have foreclosed His main issue.

The teaching of Jesus makes the spirit, humility, and love, absolutely and always obligatory, but if we attempt to see in His utterances and example a code of the conduct in which goodwill must find its means, we shall be in difficulties. Against " Every one who is angry with his brother . . . " and "Whosoever shall say, Thou fool . . . " we read that "He looked round about him with anger" and that He said to the scribes and Pharisees, "Ye fools and blind". Against "Give to him that asketh thee" the wise virgins are commended for not doing so: Jesus Himself sometimes gave no answer to them that asked and, smitten, He did not turn the cheek to the smiter.

Especially in the last days at Jerusalem we find love, as it nears its supreme expression, using strange means. There is a strangeness in the pre-arranged and self-concentrated pomp of His entry, in His imperious assumption of command over the temple, and in the violence with which He cleansed it. He told His disciples, "When they persecute you in this city, flee into the next": He Himself did the opposite—His persistence in Jerusalem made the authorities choose between obeying Him and killing Him. There is evidence also that in Gethsemane the disciples carried weapons with His knowledge and consent if not at His command. This is so important that the evidence must be canvassed.

In *Mark* 14^{47} we read, "But a certain one of them that stood by drew his sword, and smote the servant of the high priest, and struck off his ear". The expression "drew his sword" implies that for the man to be armed was not unexpected: precisely the same phrase is used of the Philippian centurion. The fact is recorded without comment, which would hardly have been so had the Evangelist regarded it as an act which, though others might approve, the Christian must condemn. It therefore seems to have been recorded as a praiseworthy act, showing that at least one man took the part of Jesus.

In *Matt.* when the stroke is struck Jesus says, "Put up again thy sword into its place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword. Or thinkest thou that I cannot beseech my Father, and he shall even now send me more than twelve legions of angels? How then should the scripture be fulfilled, that thus it must be?". Jesus does not bid throw away the sword or destroy it: He bids sheathe it, as though it was this particular use of it but not all use of it that He forbade. By "take the sword", unless we understand the lawless as distinct from the lawful use of it, the saying is not even approximately true. And since death by the sword was the easiest death His followers might expect, the saying appears to aim rather at their present preservation (at that time a matter vital to Jesus' purpose) than at comment on the morality of the deed. And if, at Jesus' asking, God would send angels to do what the man had attempted with his weapon, it implies that the act was inopportune rather than wrong.

In *Luke* we are told with regard to the impending arrest, that "when they that were about Him saw what would follow, they said, Lord, shall we smite with the sword?" implying that, though they were not sure that this was the right occasion, they did not understand Jesus to condemn all use of weapons. And Jesus' reply, "Suffer ye thus far", seems to confirm this understanding by saying that this is not the occasion. Then we turn back a few verses and read "And He said unto them, But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise a wallet: and he that hath none, let him sell his cloke, and buy a sword. For I say unto you, that this which is written must be fulfilled in me, And he was reckoned with the transgressors: for that which concerneth me hath fulfilment. And they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords. And He said unto them, It is enough". Whatever these words mean, they tell us that the disciples thought that Jesus bade them be armed, and that He, knowing it, allowed them to think so—a conclusion which the just reviewed sequel confirms.

John $18^{10, 11}$ tells us that it was Peter who used the sword, and that Jesus said, "Put up thy sword into the sheath: the cup which the Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?" Here again Jesus bids sheathe, not abandon or destroy the sword, and here again His words contain no suggestion that all use of the sword by His followers is wrong, but rather that its use on this occasion was inopportune.

It is sometimes suggested that "the sword" which Jesus allowed to be retained was really a large knife used generally for other purposes than conflict. But the record does not bear this out. The word μάχαιρα is regularly used for the weapon of soldiers, and a weapon is certainly intended in *Luke's*, "Let him buy a sword", and *Matt.'s* "They that take the sword". A knife might be used to stab, but the stroke that severs an ear is a down stroke of a longer weapon aimed at the head.

We have here an almost unique concurrence of four independent lines of tradition all giving us the impression that neither Jesus nor the Evangelists looked upon the sword stroke in Gethsemane as morally wrong but rather as inopportune, three of them implying that the weapon was carried with Jesus' consent, and one of them telling us that it was at His command.

This is the record of what was done and said: the motive is less certain. It has been suggested that Jesus wished to avoid assassination and to compel His enemies to proceed against Him publicly. This wish is certainly evident in the public nature of His challenge to them, in the manner of His entry and the cleansing and occupation of the temple. It accords also with the secrecy of His private movements at this time. And His command to His disciples to provide themselves with swords is in *Luke* $22^{36, 37}$ closely connected with the resolution to die at the hands of the law, "Let him sell his cloke, and buy a sword. For I say unto you, that this which is written must be fulfilled in me, and he was reckoned with the transgressors".

VIII.

Had Jesus intended to leave an ethical code, He would have been neither leader nor saviour. The heroic is characteristic of His spirit, and heroism cannot be codified. A code (such as the Rabbis found in the law) details a quite possible achievement which gives a man the right to be satisfied with himself, whereas the teaching of Jesus is not so much a fence against trespass as a finger post to the inexhaustible.

The attempt to codify Christian conduct without omitting the heroic has in the past led to the proffer of a double standard, one for ordinary Christians and one for would-be saints. But this is to forget that the heart of goodness is not in the outward act which can be measured and standardized but in the spirit which is immeasurable. It defeats its end by giving the more serious a sense of their superiority; whereas he is best who is humblest and loves most, and humility and love laugh at self-measurement. When we try to make a code out of Jesus' teaching, we get discouraged and confused, and tend to lose faith in Him. Of the spirit in which we should act He gives direction by giving inspiration and power.

The supreme service of Jesus to the ethics of the world is that He not only taught us to know our need, but, by His life and especially by His suffering and death, made available the only conviction that could fulfil that need—the conviction that the goodness and love of God were of that intense, all-costly, invasive sort that evokes a response in like kind and makes us glad to exchange the self-glory of our pettiness for the dignity of children of God.

His way here is the way He taught. To Him man's goodness is essentially appreciation of and response to the goodness of God, therefore a truly good human act persuades men of God's goodness—"Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works and glorify your Father which is in heaven"; "Wisdom is justified by means of her children", *i.e.*, the truth of God is made credible to men by those who

live it. And since to suffer, especially to suffer shame and death, for love's sake is the most pointed and persuasive evidence of love, it is above all powerful in evoking faith in God's goodness. Jesus in His rebuke of Peter speaks of the suffering He had predicted as "a thing of God". And His comment upon the parable of the importunate widow implies that, but for the suffering of the saints, the Son of man would not find faith on the earth.

This appears in the few sayings of Jesus about His death. "To give His life a ransom for many" means, in its context of servitude, to make them free, but to Jesus, as to all Jews, freedom was only the negative condition of belonging truly to God. And men could be made God's in the sense in which they were not yet His only by so knowing Him as voluntarily to enthrone Him.

So with the symbolism of the bread and wine. The shared bread spoke to the oriental not only of life's need but of the most sacred bond between man and man, and Jesus tells them that He cannot help them to these things without suffering—"This is my body". But in this suffering for love's sake and in its effect is something more than human; the union of man with man depends ultimately upon that which speaks effectively of the bond that binds God to man—"This is my blood of the covenant".

THE CHRISTIAN GOOD—ITS CONTENT.

By Mr. E. Cunningham, M.A.

We are to consider here what good the Christian religion has to offer the world *to-day* that is peculiar to it as distinct from the best which non-Christian thought can give. If there is a Christian good which is to come with compelling force to those who have so far not accepted it, it must be one that possesses an intrinsic truth and rightness, independent of tastes, one which, in spite of neglect and unpopularity, proves itself to have a quality that is irresistible and permanent, one which makes direct appeal to men as men, not as Christians, to which human nature cannot in the long run do anything else than conform.

Christianity, therefore, must be more humanistic than humanism. It must have a view of human life more comprehensive than the most catholic of non-Christian outlooks if it is to be a real gift to the world. It must have room within itself for whatever is good, from whatever source it comes. As far as our knowledge of the physical universe is concerned, we recognize this. The Christian's view of the truth about the physical universe must have room for whatever is permanent in scientific and philosophic thought. In the same way a Christian philosophy of life is no philosophy unless it is broad enough to allow for whatever is permanent in the psychological study of personality, in the inevitable influence of heredity, in sociological analysis. It must not make an arbitrary selection on pre-conceived grounds, labelling this good and that evil.

This, you may say, is making our problem too large. Must not a Christian start with pre-conceptions? Else how is he a Christian? Does he not begin by making Christ his standard?

The answer to this is "Yes" and "No". He may start with a "yes" born of upbringing, association, sentiment. But he must not end there. He must end with a conviction which he can only justify after he has challenged his predilections. He must challenge Christ to justify himself in this modern world. He must be prepared to lose Christ before

he can make Him his own. We then have to challenge Christianity as severely as any modern moralist, but with a mind that is prepared to see good even in Christianity if it is there.

To clear the ground, I want to make one or two remarks relevant to the nature of religion. We may distinguish the ethical and the cosmological elements in theology. On the one hand there is that progressive, developing body of thought which endeavours to clarify ideas about the physical universe, its nature, and the power that lies behind it, which speculates about creation and a creator, about purpose and will ordaining and controlling creation, and, with it, mankind. In all these we cannot escape the hand of science and the influence of human knowledge as it exists at the time. When we read, " In the beginning God made heaven and earth ", with vivid details, we are hearing how, with the aid of imagination, men pieced together the knowledge they had some 3,000 years ago, a picture still acceptable to those who framed the Canon of the Scriptures. At the other end of the scale, when we read, " The creator of the universe must be conceived to be a pure mathematician", we hear how an eminent modern scientist pieces together the scraps of knowledge which we now have.

But these pictures that have come to us through the multifarious workings of thought are the working of the human spirit into the secrets of this mysterious universe. They are not data; they are not ultimate truth; we may not argue more than tentatively from them. They are provisional philosophy, cosmology, theism. They are not the reality, they are not final truth. At the present moment we have no picture whatever of a creation of the physical universe in time, and so our conception of a creator is in the highest degree abstract. The volume of known phenomena is overwhelming, the power of the mind to deal with them is being daily affirmed. We are able to speak with much confidence about a state of the universe when life as we now know it could not have existed, tracing its history back to nebulæ and forward to cold spheres. But there we have to leave it. We cannot think of nothingness before all things and an end in nothingness. And so we leave the problem of creation and turn to ask of the meaning and law in the universe. And what we find is that it is given to the mind of man not only to describe what it sees but to foresee. There is an essential accord between the mind of man and the complex of phenomena. His activities in logic and in abstract mathematics lead him ever further and further into the heart of the great universe. The qualities of his mind are closely akin to the meaning of nature. And so he goes on enquiring into the mysterious universe.

If we ask ourselves whence comes it all, what power is behind it, we can only reply with Jeans that that which is revealed to us in the universe, that non-material essence of all that we perceive, must contain within itself the quality of the highest minds and a great unknown beyond them. But, as Jeans stresses, the picture of an architect or a mechanic designing and directing a machine according to a closed body of law is completely inadequate. Thus in this scientific age we find man face to face with a mysterious universe, with a vast knowledge and a vaster ignorance, but with a faith in himself that is strengthened by and based upon experience, a confidence that he is in tune with the unknown, and an assurance that the unknown is not chaos but will reveal more and more truth to his mind. He knows that the form of his body must perish, that all things living are mortal. But of his mind he is assured that it has the quality of that which is inherent in the universe and in the atoms into which his body will resolve itself.

Now is all this relevant to the ethical, and in particular to Christian ethics, and if so, how? There runs in my mind a close parallel between this new scientific attitude and the humanistic attitude to ethics. Lippmann speaks of the great "fiction"—the belief that behind the invisible world of physical objects and human institutions there is a supernatural kingdom from which ultimately all laws, all judgments, all rewards, all punishments, and all compensations are derived. This is the moral parallel to eighteenth century theism which saw God as a mechanic ordaining, creating and sustaining the universe. But the eighteenth century mechanical God is dead. To that extent we go with Lippmann completely. But dead too is his great fiction. I am no great reader of theology and philosophy, but I imagine that most of our theologians and philosophers have got beyond a conception of God as ruling the moral world by laws, rewards, punishments, and compensations. But non-Christian writers still think that that is the basis of our faith, and we have yet to make it clear that we are not living in the eighteenth century, and that in fact we are in advance of the humanists, not behind them. We have to show that we do not base our moral judgments on a feebly conceived God, but on the moral life of man, which is intrinsically an intense reality, as much so as the physical universe. We have to show that we face the problems of man's moral needs with the same open mind as the scientist brings to the problems of physics, that the understanding and solving of these problems in thought and experiment is as much an avenue into the great secret as the work of the laboratory and the study. Our moral relationships are in the nature of reality as much as the laws of chemistry and biology. Through these we are always enlarging our thought about the mysterious universe. That which out of our own experience and that of those around us and before us—within and without the Christian communion—we find to be the truest and most certain possession of our whole being, in that we put our trust.

This is, I suppose, rank humanism, but as I read it this is the outlook of Jesus Himself. Jesus was an out-and-out humanist. He questioned the theology of His day because it was untrue to human life. It exalted a hypothetical judge aud autocratic ruler as God and a rigorous conventional moral code as the commandments of God, and sought to run human beings into that mould. All that, by what seems to us the most obvious examples, Jesus showed to be absurd. Your god, He said, will not stand the test of the humblest affairs of human life. Then he is no god. And they crucified Him for making Himself equal with God.

If I then am a Christian it is not that I have adopted a theology, or any theory about the relation of Jesus to God—but because Jesus seems to me to have gone, and still to go, deeper down into the truth about human life in its broadest setting than any other ancient or modern—and by that I do not mean only in the things He said, but in the things He did, the life He lived, the death He died, in the lives that have been lived in relation to Him these nineteen centuries since. Now where does this sort of humanism lead us? Does it leave room for something specifically Christian, does it include part but not all of the Christian gospel?

I quote Lippmann again only because in so much of his conclusions he seems to be speaking straight out of our book; *e.g.*:

> There is no itch in the religion of the spirit to make men good by bearing down upon them with righteousness and making them conform to a pattern.
>
> It seeks excellence wherever it may appear and finds it in anything that is inwardly understood; its motive is not acquisition but sympathy.
>
> Evil is to be overcome now and happiness achieved now, for the kingdom of God is within you.

Much more could be quoted to show what Lippmann has absorbed from the Christian outlook. But here is how he summarizes his religion of the spirit. It is " devotion to an ideal of personality ". What ideal? " One which ", he avers, " has been stated again and again, that only the regenerate, the disinterested, the mature can make use of freedom ".

Now how does this compare with the ideal which Jesus sets before us? For this we must come back from the intellectualizing process to which Lippmann has submitted life to the men and women of every-day life—not regenerate, disinterested, and mature people such as we would be, but unregenerate, very selfish, and immature folk. There lies the first trouble in the world, that most of us are in the habit of thinking ourselves disinterested and mature when we are the very reverse—and is it not common experience that when we have a difference with another, our first reaction is to feel ourselves more than ever to be the disinterested and wise party in the dispute? Here is one of the most frequent paradoxes in life—that the child thinks itself mature, the ignorant thinks himself wise, the proud thinks himself humble. Whether it is in a war between nations, or in a difference between man and wife, it is the same thing. And peace rules again only when a new mind is born in them. The proud becomes humble, right relations are recovered by a surrender of one's own desires, life is gained by giving away—and these are precisely the things most difficult of attainment. Yet they are the signs of the mature being. Unless ye be born again and become as little children ye cannot enter the Kingdom of Heaven. The set self-confident business man, the mass-producer, or politician, confident of his own judgment and power, is in this sense far from mature. Unless he is clear as to the temporal and provisional nature of those immediate objects of his endeavour, his house is not built upon a rock to withstand the rains and storms of change and chance. Blessed are the meek, for they are the true inheritors of the earth. True meekness is a mark of the mature. So, too, with the theorists confident in the power of their own minds to interpret the signs of the times, to predict the course of manners, to prescribe new conventions in regard to sex and marriage, to devise new economic systems. They are occupied with these things so near to them that they may see them out of perspective. There is no assurance that their devices will have the quality of the eternal. How shall they be sure enough that their heart is pure and their thought mature? Only the pure in heart shall see God. Only the sage grown poor in spirit has found the wisdom of Heaven.

The regeneration which Jesus portrays to us is very different from that which Lippmann commends to us as the entry into the ideal life. Lippman's grown man is an improved superman, disinterested and mature. He is cold and aloof. He is strong because free of vain expectations. Since nothing gnaws at his vitals, neither doubt nor ambition, frustration nor fear, he will move easily through life. Whether he sees the thing as comedy, or high tragedy, or plain farce, he would affirm that it is what it is and that the wise man can enjoy it.

That is not our ideal man. Let us indeed look at the world and affirm that it is what it is. But will it be " enjoyment " for the truly wise to contemplate it and to live in it? Will not tragedy have lost its meaning when the heart ceases to rebel against wrong and pain and suffering? Is he not less a man when he can speak calmly of " enjoying " tragedy, putting himself outside it as a spectator of a play? But Jesus entered into the tragedy of life, the agonies and distresses of storm-tossed souls did gnaw at His vitals. And that is a universal. Souls are no less torn to-day than they were yesterday. To go down into the depths with them

is the first condition of regenerating power. " The religion of the spirit has indeed no itch to make men good by bearing down upon them with righteousness and making them conform to a pattern ". That is true and it is something learnt from Jesus, I think. But, he goes on, " its principle is to civilize the passions, not by regulating them imperiously but by transforming them with a mature understanding of their place in an adult environment ".

This sentence indicates, as it seems to me, the double failing of the non-Christian ethics which we have been considering. They are static and they are egoistic. If each person is civilized, adult, mature, then each fits into his environment, the environment is also civilized, adult, mature. These words all suggest a process complete, adjustments perfectly made. This is what I mean by calling the outlook *static*. It is hoped by contemplating this finished ideal product, and by adopting a suitably designed educational or therapeutic method, "to civilize the passions, transforming them with a mature understanding of their place in an adult environment ". But I believe there is something logically wrong here. Only the mature regenerate man can have this mature understanding and then he will not need civilizing. This finished world of mature persons, all behaving in a perfectly grown-up way, seems to me only the vision of a mind that has lost the sense of infinity, that has come to believe itself capable of knowing everything. This is the common failing of intellectual egoism. It is a complete fallacy, for how can we know the extent of the things that we have not yet known? It is an unwarranted assumption that there is any condition worthy of the name of mature.

On the other hand, a process of developing, of growing on from stage to stage in knowledge and understanding, is one which we see at work all around us. It is a characteristic of life. And that is where we conceive the distinctly Christian contribution to the idea of good comes in. The Christian ideal of good is one which is dynamic—a power for transformation. It is a power which is not conditioned by education or culture, by age or race or century. It is the same in the slums as in the university, in the aboriginal as in the most advanced society. This distinctive element we have called by the name of love. The Christian ideal is not a finished character, attained by the elect alone, but a character within which this love is awakened. And this is a creative, regenerative, regulative factor in life. It awakens its like in others. It is a present power, not an ideal visionary or beyond reach.

We affirm the validity of the impulse towards one's neighbour which unlocks doors and surmounts barriers between man and man, class and class, nation and nation, which does prove stronger than passion, which enables men to face life with all its tragedies—not without fear, frustration, and anguish, but to face it victoriously and with assurance. It preserves that rebellion against the sicknesses from which society suffers unnecessarily, which one by one expels them. It gives society always something to aim at, immediate objectives for effort, and preserves it from that settling down which, if not death, is deadly dull. It keeps life full of zest, adventure, and joy, even while it keeps it sensitive to pain and sorrow and disappointment. It is the life that keeps society from decay and self-destruction. We do not wait for a Christian society one day to be realized. "The Kingdom of God is within you".

But we do not affirm the validity of love merely as a relation between man and man in an earthly sense. It is open to anyone to call in question the value of society, of the activities of men, as ends in themselves. Life as mere going on with one thing after another, perpetuation of the species,

has no particular value, and to spend it saving other people from trouble which they could avoid by dying, this is a poor justification for love.

The claim which we make is quite otherwise. What we must assert is that that range of life which is opened up to us in the exercise of this power is of the same validity as all the processes of thought, of achievement, of the sense of beauty and truth, which have led us to believe that the spirit of man is the essential part of his being and is akin to the essence of the whole universe. The sense of kinship so reached between man and man is a part of the sense of the essential unity of all things. The love for man is thus not to be separated from the sense of belonging to a universe which in essence is spiritual. Thus the dual commandment, " Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul and with all thy mind, and thy neighbour as thyself ", is no arbitrary commandment imposed by an autocratic deity with sanctions of rewards and punishments; it is a law of life, in the keeping of which is the key to fuller life. This seems to me to be sound doctrine, and I believe that it is both in line with modern thought and a message for which the times are now again ripe. The tremendous advances that have taken place in physical science in the last thirty years have been marked by: (i) a relaxing of hard and fast conventions built on Newtonian mechanical principles; and (ii) a fresh realization of the validity of mental processes, *e.g.*, pure mathematical thought. These two things have resulted in a great unlocking of doors and the revelation of an unsuspected volume of harmony between the physical universe and the mind of man. Even so, I am prepared to believe that this loosening of the hold which old moral conventions have had upon us, coupled with a courageous acceptance of the significance of the spiritual side of man in its widest sense, may open up a new era in the understanding of the wider universe that includes all the world of man's spiritual faculties. Thus we find that the old text, " God is Love ", has a bigger meaning than we suspected—a way that a great many texts have.

But what does this all come to? I should be sorry to speak like this to any but a theological audience. If I had to put it to an audience of undergraduates, bedmakers and gyps, unemployed, clerks, mothers, children, miners, I should have to be a good deal less abstract. But I should be sorrier still if all I had to give them was the advice to become mature, distinterested, and regenerate. The sum and substance of all I have been saying is to be found in Jesus Himself. I can imagine Him walking arm in arm with Jeans and Eddington enquiring with them about His Father's business. I can imagine Him coming with just the word that would straighten out the tangle into which young people had got their wives over modern problem novels. All the abstractions which I have tried to describe seem to me to be put into a plain gospel in Him. He may be still the Way, the Truth, and the Life. He has not changed in fact. Life is what it always was, and so is He. To Him we must return. It is He that we must preach to this day. It is not our story of Him that has to be brought up to date to meet a scientific age. It is our theology that must be pruned of Hebrew, medieval, and materialistic irrelevancies, and kept alive by a courageous facing of the fullness of life through which we come to our sense of the Divine Spirit.

THE CHRISTIAN GOOD: ITS CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLE AND VALIDITY.

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In opening this subject I am in the happy position of being able to join on directly to the conclusion of the preceding paper, as it is stated in the syllabus. It runs as follows :—

> The Christian Good must consist in a unification of experience not only within itself, but also within a satisfying intellectual conception of the nature of the physical world and its spiritual background. It remains for us to show that Jesus Christ still points the way.

Let us start then with the definition that the Christian Good consists in a unification of experience, which includes a satisfactory conception of its physical basis and its spiritual ground. If the definition is correct, the first thing that follows from it is that there is no such thing as a peculiarly "Christian" Good. There is only *one* Highest Good, whether for Christians or for anyone else—all that Christianity can do is to help us to conceive it, to follow after it, and to obtain it. As Mr. Cunningham said :—"It remains to show that Jesus Christ still points the way". This accordingly is what I shall try to do.

I shall divide my paper into five parts, as follows :—

(1) Some general reflexions on the meaning of the word "good" preparing for the analysis of the notion of the Highest Good into its element;
(2) This analysis in systematic form;
(3) Principles of synthesis, leading to a concrete conception of the Highest Good;
(4) The contribution of Christianity;
(5) The Christian reply to the attacks of contemporary Humanism.

I.

General considerations on the meaning of the word "Good" preparing for an analysis of the notion of the Highest Good.

The word "Good" is ambiguous. It is used in a narrower and in a wider sense. It is commonly used more narrowly to describe the end of ethical action. The Good is that which we strive after when we act ethically. This is a very right and proper meaning of the word; yet it certainly is not the whole of the meaning. The Good may also stand for the object of desire, whether it is to be attained by action or not. The Good may in some instances become ours as a pure gift. That was the Psalmist's conception when he wrote :—

> Many there be that say, Who will show us any good? Lord, lift Thou up the light of Thy countenance upon us.

In this sense, not only the object of religious desire, but also Beauty may be included in the notion of the Good, even though according to Kant the latter is no object of desire, but is the object of *disinterested* contemplation. The Good seems to widen out into whatever has value for us or satisfies thought and feeling. It becomes something much larger than the merely ethical good; it can be as wide as human nature and as high and deep as the Universe itself.

Yet there can be no doubt but that when we speak of the Good, the predominant connotation is that of ethics. In some special way the Good and ethical action are particularly associated, so that whatever else we include in the Good, the ethical element appears to be radical in it. There is a problem here which our further analysis and synthesis must attempt to clear up: why is the ethical element so vital in the notion of the Good, that generally speaking it is the first form of the Good that occurs to us?

II.

Analysis of the conception of the Good.

The preceding general considerations have prepared us to undertake the analysis of the conception of the Good in a more systematic way.

They suggest, first of all, a dual division of the Good into the Good as the end of ethical action and the Good as pure gift.

But each of these primary divisions requires to be sub-divided. We shall find four sub-divisions of the Ethical Good and three of the Good as gift—a total of seven sub-divisions altogether.

I will enumerate the seven sub-divisions at once as follows:—The four of the first head—Science; Art; Civilization; Fellowship; the three of the second—Nature; Beauty; God as experienced. The reason for the collocation of these seven elements in the notion of the Good I shall have to develop as I proceed.

To begin with the Ethical Good, its four sub-divisions fall into two pairs. The first pair is one that might easily fail to be included under the Ethical Good. It is divided from the second pair by an important distinction. Our action can have its terminus either within the mind or beyond it. The first pair of sub-divisions refer to ends that remain within the mind, the second pair refer to ends beyond it.

What, then, are the ends within the mind which are not always discerned as ends of ethical action? The forms of the Good we have named are scientific truth and artistic construction. There is a way in which science is included within the sphere of ethical action. Truth has a claim upon us and a value for us. The work of the scientist is a part of ethical action when he follows the truth, turning aside neither to the right hand nor to the left, not diverted by any private interest or seeking any private gain. Truth is a great good, and no conception of the Highest Good can be complete that does not include it.

Artistic construction is also a terminus of ethical action within the mind. Beauty as it appears in Nature is a pure gift to the contemplative beholder, but when the artist uses his natural endowment to conceive beautiful forms, that falls under ethical action. The poet and the musician, the sculptor and the painter, all act ethically in developing their gift by creating beauty. This creation takes place in the imagination, where, indeed, all original scientific construction also takes place. We distinguish from these inner creations the communication of scientific truth to others and the actual production of the external forms of art which convey the artist's vision to others. These things fall under the type of ethical action where the terminus is beyond the mind.

As has already been stated, there is here also a pair of forms of the Ethical Good. One has to do with the external result of action, the other with the fellowship of the actors.

As to the former, man reconstructs his universe not only in thought, but also in fact. Hence spring our civilizations, with their great ethical forms of the family and the State. These furnish the sphere of ethical

action in the strictest sense. They constitute the domain of the *bonum commune* of the Medieval schoolmen; the place of the transformation of nature by human activity that it may become a worthier and better home for our race.

This is the form of ethical action that will occur to everybody, but the second member of the second pair may be as easily overlooked as either member of the first pair. This second member has been named as fellowship. Fellowship arises in connexion with work and then becomes an end in itself. The ends of the family and the State cannot be served except by action in fellowship. Men must work together to transform nature. A Robinson Crusoe can only go a very limited way: his strength is more than redoubled when he has a Man Friday.

But what men further discover in united work is that fellowship itself is a good. And so, when work is done, we act for the sake of pure fellowship. Why else do we eat and drink together, or sit and talk together? Social intercourse becomes a great end of human action, which fills a very large place in civilized life. Friendship is a great good; but friends have to be *made,* and often it takes some doing.

We have, then, as four forms of the Good resulting from our action—Science, Art, Civilization, and Fellowship. We have named also three forms of the Good that come to us unsought, without our stir or effort. Our preliminary considerations have prepared us to recognize here the Æsthetic Good and the Religious Good; but before we come to them, let us thankfully admit the humbler and yet necessary form of good that comes to us from Nature itself. Man cannot live by bread alone, but he needs bread, and Nature yields it to him.

Our first form here is, therefore, the simple natural good. There are many goods "in widest commonalty spread", which are the very basis of human existence. Such are the air we breathe, the sunshine that warms and illumines us, as also that mysterious frame, the human body, which is our natural endowment and is the pre-supposition of all our civilization and our art. These are goods, though we do nothing to obtain them; and there are other such in endless profusion.

The Æsthetic Good transcends the simple gifts of Nature. Beauty is

> The light that never was, on sea or land,
> The consecration, and the poet's dream.

It is a pure gift for contemplation, while the good things of Nature are gifts to our senses and our practical needs.

Finally, beyond even Beauty, God gives Himself to us in religious experience, and no account of the Good is complete that does not find a sufficient place for this great factor in its total conception.

All these last three forms of Good—the gifts of Nature, Beauty, God as we experience Him—are independent of our action, and belong to a different category from the Ethical Good in the stricter sense. Let me just stop to meet the very natural objection that, as a matter of fact, we do seek after all these things: we pursue the goods of Nature; we search for the Beautiful; man's quest for God is one of the most fundamental things in his experience.

Nevertheless, for all our seeking, the gifts of Nature remain still gifts. It is our endowment that we live in a world where sunshine and air are ours, instead of finding ourselves on some airless ball in sunless space. As to our bodies, we have to accept them as they are—long ago we were reminded that by taking thought we cannot add one cubit to our stature.

The Beautiful, again, may become the object of human seeking; yet what artist would not acknowledge that his inspirations are a gift?

> We cannot kindle when we will
> The fire that in our heart resides.

And so, too, it is with God, the object of religion. After all our search, when we have experience of God, we have to acknowledge grace. Our eyes are opened, and we say, " Surely the Lord was in this place, and I knew it not ". It is impossible that by searching we should find out God, and yet He gives Himself freely to those who diligently seek Him. This is the mystery of grace, the fundamental thing in the experience of religion.

Our survey of the fundamental forms of the Good reaches its completion with the mention of the religious Good. In a sense it is clear that we can go no further. The Psalmist says :—

> Whom have I in heaven but Thee ?
> And there is none on earth that I desire beside Thee.

It is the common doctrine of religious men that God in Himself is the Highest Good, beyond which nothing more can be even so much as thought or imagined. Yet there are all the other forms of good that have been enumerated. Does the introduction of God into the notion of the Good rob them of all value? Is the only true form of religion that which negates the finite? A powerful Continental school does indeed exactly tell us so.

There are other voices, however, which not merely retort upon such a one-sided presentation of religion, but even deny the place of religion and of God in the Supreme Good altogether. In fact, almost every element of the Good that has been mentioned seems in its turn not merely to claim the first place within its manifold content, but also actually to endeavour to absorb the whole content into itself.

There is materialism, for which natural goods alone exist. There is the theory, " Art for art's sake ", with its apotheosis of Beauty. There is the deification of the State. There is the demand for the freedom of human fellowship from all restrictions by the ties of family life, the laws of the State, or the sanctions of religion.

What is necessary is a synthesis which may so organize the different elements in the Good that they may form an harmonious whole.

III.

The principles of synthesis.

The principles which we require must be immanent in the conception of the Good itself—they cannot be imported from without. Of all the forms of the Good which we have studied there are two which are fitted to become, one the starting point and the other the moving impulse of such a synthesis. These are the Religious Good and the Ethical Good respectively : the synthesis we seek can only be brought about by way of an ethical religion.

The essence of religion is dependence upon a Transcendent Unity that is the ground of all the different aspects of experience. The self-discovery of this Unity is the Religious Good *par excellence*. Now it is this Unity that can alone reconcile a conflict which inevitably breaks out within the conception of the Good itself, a conflict by which our age is particularly troubled. This is the conflict between the Scientific Good and the Ethical Good, between the Truth as to Nature and the Ideal for action.

It was the work of Kant above all others to disclose this fundamental cleavage. On the one hand, the pursuit of science leads us to the conception of a world governed by natural law in which there appears to be no room for ethical action. The latter implies freedom; but how is freedom

possible in a reign of natural law where everything is determined? Yet we seek the Scientific Good by trying to find law in everything; while we pursue the Ethical Good by acting freely in obedience to the moral law. We pass perpetually and easily from one of these attitudes to the other. do we realize what this passing implies? It means that, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, we believe at bottom in a common ground alike of Nature and of our freedom. We imply that neither of these great aspects of the Good, scientific truth or the ethical ideal, is complete in itself but that both only exist in subordination to the control of that Transcendent Unity of which religion makes us immediately aware. The world of natural law can only be one with the world of free action if Nature and freedom have a common root. Religion as the feeling of absolute dependence reveals to us that common root: it is That on which the whole universe depends as well as ourselves. It follows that scientific truth, valuable as it is, is not all we need to apprehend in regard to the Universe we have to add to a satisfying conception of physical nature the notion of the Spiritual Ground that makes freedom possible even within the network of natural law. We are led to the conclusion that while all general laws are principles of determination, the particular can still hold the seeds of spontaneity within itself.

This view enables us to make the necessary transition from science to ethics by way of the natural goods which are the starting point for scientific research and which can be the ends of ethical action. For what are the common things of daily life but each of them a *nexus* of particular qualities existing upon the basis of natural law, much as the varied patterns of an embroidery exist upon the underlying canvas that sustains them? These common goods, then, also have their root in the Transcendent Unity of the Ground of all existence, along with our own freedom which chooses and develops them, and with the Fellowship in which we not only work together for a common end beyond it, but also often find an end sufficient in itself.

We must observe, however, that the unity of experience established by religion exists only for feeling. It is not as yet articulated into an harmonious whole in which we can actually see and understand the inter-relation and inter-working of every part. But it is probable that our experience of beauty is a presentiment of the final harmony of all experience towards which, guided by religion, we strive in all our ethical action. have not the time to develop this thought further on the present occasion important though it is. Those who are interested in it will find some further discussion in my book, *The Metaphysical Justification of Religion*.

Here we are immediately concerned with the place of religion in the synthesis of the Good. What religion does is to make us at home in the Universe, to give us confidence in the unity of the world, so that in all our detailed analysis we need never despair of a synthesis. Directed by the spirit of religion, we envisage a synthesis in which natural goods and social action, scientific truth and the ethical ideal are all completely unified in a Whole compact of Beauty. Just as we call the Transcendent Unity of which religion makes us aware by the great name of God, so the synthesis of which we speak will best be called the Kingdom of God. It will clearly be an harmonious whole in which the Unity of the Transcendent Ground will be reflected for our consciousness in every part.

Religion provides us with the starting point of the great synthesis of Goods which is the supreme good. That starting point is the acknowledgment of the Transcendent Unity which we call God. The movement of the synthesis proceeds in obedience to the Ethical Ideal, in so far as the test to be applied in the interweaving of the different elements of the Good

into the pattern of the whole must lie in the capacity of other concerns to combine with ethical action. Ethical action is action that is guided by the law of reason. We are so to act that our life may be an harmonious unity in itself and form an element in a larger harmony; in the first place, of human society, and, finally, of the Universe. This notion of unity has power over our consciences: it constitutes the moral law.

If religion gives us the Ground of the Kingdom of God, ethics exhibits the mode of its development. Nothing but what can form a part of an ethical whole can enter into the Kingdom. The selfish pursuit of natural goods and of Beauty, and even a selfish absorption in religion, are all alien from the Kingdom. In it the love of God must go hand-in-hand with the love of one's neighbour.

These things being so, we have found the answer to the question earlier proposed, " Why the ethical element in the Good is so important ". But we have found that the religious element is fundamental also.

IV.

Christianity and the Highest Good.

It has been said that there is no peculiarly " Christian " Good, that indeed the Highest Good is precisely the same for Christians and for others. But Christianity reveals the principles of its synthesis, both in the abstract form of doctrine and in the concrete example of Jesus Christ.

As regards doctrine, Christianity is a *monotheistic* religion. It firmly acknowledges the One Transcendent Ground of the Universe as the object of reverence and worship. But Christianity is equally an *ethical* religion. It is just as firm in its assertion that no acknowledgment of God can organize His Kingdom except upon ethical lines. He that loves God must love His brother also: " He that doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother ".

But Christianity adds to these doctrines the Person of Jesus Christ—or rather they only come to have their full Christian meaning as they are exemplified in Him. In Him the spirit of ethical religion was so incarnated as to become a social power. The Christian religion is capable of combining itself with different scientific conceptions of the Universe, so long as the Unity of the Transcendent Ground is recognized and an ethical trend towards the Supreme Good is observed. Jesus Himself thought in terms of Jewish apocalyptic. The Greek Fathers re-expressed Christianity in terms of Platonism. The great Medieval Schoolmen turned from Plato to Aristotle and admitted an independent science of nature. Our task is to combine Christianity with modern physics, biology, and historical science. So long as we do not lose the Transcendent Unity or the ethical trend, we are still on the Christian path, and may still count ourselves disciples of Jesus of Nazareth.

When we speak of God as our Father, as Jesus Himself did, that is of course a figure. But let us note that it is a figure taken from a simple ethical form, the family. God is the Ground of the Unity of His Kingdom, as the father is the basis of the unity of the family. We trust and obey God in seeking the Kingdom and His righteousness. Even as we keep the Kingdom before us as our end and aim, we acknowledged God's guidance and support. We are engaged in no vain quest:—"We look for a city that hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God ".

In so doing we follow the example of Jesus Christ. If we are in doubt as to what the love of God and man means, we look at Him. But He is to us more than a " mere example ". His example is an inspiration and an

encouragement. His Spirit lives in the world as a social principle, and organizes the fellowship we call the Church.

In this fellowship the actual synthesis of the different elements of experience is always realized in some measure. The theological and ethical system which the Church at any moment possesses is one of its most important assets. It contains a plan of the Kingdom of God as it has been realized up to date. The building is not all of one time. It is a mansion where some is old and some is new, and where in places there is need of re-construction. If the complete meaning of the Kingdom of God as the synthesis of all goods in the Highest Good has been understood, there will be no surprise at the necessity of re-construction. Material civilization advances, science develops, new economic conditions arise; and as a consequence the old ethical formulæ become inadequate and outworn. The Beautiful is perhaps the form of experience which least knows change; yet even Art is affected by the movement of thought and life. The pictures of Paul Cézanne with their interest in the geometrical figures of nature just as surely reflect the scientific temper of our age as the medieval cathedral evidences the predominantly religious mood of its time.

We all know that we are living in an age of flux. Perhaps we do not always realize how much there is that stands fast amid all change. Certainly, our problems are very great. Novelty has come crowding in upon us. Science exhibits a series of bewildering changes. It is with the modern scientist as it was with the servants of Job—while he is yet speaking, another comes with the tale of a fresh development that is almost as disorganizing to our settlement of mind as were those ancient messages of disaster to the established state of the Patriarch. Yet, like Job, but with more reason, since Christ is come, we hold on to God, and refuse to admit defeat. Our very presence here in this Conference is an evidence that we have not despaired of His Kingdom, even though the course of history has shaken some of the existing building and has brought us strange and unfamiliar materials with which to repair the ruin. We still hope to be able to unify "experience not only within itself but with a satisfying intellectual conception of the physical world and its spiritual background". We expect to build the theory of relativity and the quantum theory and the new astronomical knowledge into a modern theology as firmly as St. Thomas Aquinas built the Aristotelian physics into his *Summa Theologica*. It is still Jesus Christ that gives us this confidence. For Him the world was God's world. If that is our spirit, we shall believe that all further knowledge of Nature is further knowledge of God.

Many of us here are no doubt even more distressed by the ethical confusion of our time than by its annihilating novelties in physics. We feel that the most urgent problem before the Christian Church is the social problem. Never before was the world so conscious of the glaring inequalities of our modern social system—yet the state of present-day politics in this country shows how far we are from apprehending either their proper causes or their proper remedies.

Others in this Conference are deputed to deal with this and other practical problems. I will only repeat now what is already printed above my name in the Conference Handbook:

> The Christian motives tend perpetually to embody themselves in an ethical system; but this system is a continually changing one. What is wanted in the present conflict between economics and ethics is a deeper intellectual analysis and more goodwill.

The same is true of other problems, those of marriage and divorce, of internationalism and war. "A deep intellectual analysis and more goodwill" is wanted in these matters also.

V.

The Christian answer to Humanism.

So far as Humanism teaches that the older theology and ethics of Christianity are no longer adequate to our present-day situation, it is perfectly right. So far as it maintains that experience must furnish the materials for our conception of the Good, it is also right.

But Humanism is wrong, if it thinks to dispense altogether with belief in God. What guarantee is there of our finding eventually an harmonious combination of the conflicting elements of our experience, if we lose faith in God? Our very effort after a synthesis implies a belief in the Unity of the Transcendent Ground.

If we lose belief in a Unity that sustains our ethical endeavour, we shall presently lose faith in its utility. The only possible philosophy will be that of *carpe diem.* The effort after any greater consummation will be unmeaning.

Lippmann in his interesting, and in many ways, fine book, *A Preface to Morals,* admits that *disinterestedness* is the doctrine of all the " high " religions; but, somehow or other, he is convinced that Christianity is a " low " religion, of harps and crowns and other tangible rewards. He will not admit that the religion of Jesus is independent of its primitive apocalyptic form. The author of the Fourth Gospel and St. Augustine are not allowed to know anything about real Christianity, any more than Dean Inge or the Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick. The appeal is to " the man in the street ", and to his conception of the Gospel.

But, surely, the essence of Christianity is not apocalyptic, but the faith in God of which apocalyptic is one expression. To attempt to build a disinterested ethic out of experience without a faith in God is to build a sand-castle for the waves to destroy. To be disinterested, as Lippmann wants us to be, we must have a hold upon something that can take us out of ourselves, an Absolute, a Divine Being, God. Humanity as *L'être suprême* is not enough. Without loyalty to God, it tends to fall apart into its constituent elements and realize Herr Teufelsdröckh's vision of asps in a basket, every one trying to get its head above its neighbour's.

I have said in the syllabus that Humanism cannot secure happiness, because it is based on scepticism. For the same reason, it cannot be an adequate inspiration to effort. We do not always realize how much of our latent happiness and power to act ethically come from a radical faith in God. Scepticism inevitably begets pessimism, and pessimism in its turn begets apathy.

The answer to Lippmann's Humanism is to deny his premise that Christianity is a " low " religion, inseparable from the popular imagination of a geocentric universe and a literal heaven and hell; and to assert that it is that high religion of faith in the Transcendent God and in His Kingdom exemplified and vitalized in Jesus Christ, which makes true disinterestedness a permanent possibility for men.

THE CHRISTIAN GOOD: HOW ATTAINED.

By Prof. C. Anderson Scott, D.D.

I greatly regret that it was not possible for me to hear Mr. Cunningham's paper yesterday on "The Content of the Christian Good", and can only hope that any discrepancy between my conception of that Content and his may not be serious. I may as well begin by warning you that after

five and forty years study of the *New Testament* and five and twenty years teaching of it I remain what some good men would call (and do call) a very old-fashioned person—at least on one fundamental point. I agree with Peter that "there is no other name", *i.e.*, no other person, "whereby we must be saved" but the Person of the Son of God crucified and risen and living for evermore.

Personally, I believe that these words were spoken by Peter, and formed part of the Aramaic source of which Luke made considerable use in the early chapters of *Acts*. If that be so, if they were uttered a few weeks after the Crucifixion, one cannot but marvel at the audacity of confidence in the risen Christ which they express. But it would matter little to me, even if they were shown to have been put into the mouth of Peter by Luke some forty years later. For in that case they would express confidence which had been tested by experience and had stood the test. On the other hand, I think that we have been led by the Holy Spirit to put a wider and fuller meaning on these words than was commonly put by our fathers. In the first place, the salvation which God has led us to desire and seek for is no longer a merely individual salvation, the saving of our own souls. It is a social salvation, more akin to the salvation promised in the *Old Testament,* an experience of corporate deliverance which covers the nation or the race. There is no other name by which *we* must be saved.

In the second place, we are putting on the word "salvation" a connotation which again is more akin to the *Old Testament* point of view—it is national deliverance from national sin. In that we are to see deliverance from servitude to greed and self-centredness, lust and shamelessness, from servitude to the devil.

We yearn over our people as Hosea yearned over Israel—as Hosea felt that Jehovah yearned over Israel. And we have the humbling sense of being *priests* to God on their behalf—not because we wear priestly vestments and offer sacrifices but because we bear the common sin of the people upon our hearts, priests by the imposition of the hand of Him Who was called Jesus, because He should save *His people* from their sin *His* people, our people.

And there *is* no other name under heaven whereby we must be saved. Who is there, apart from those who speak in the name of Christ, that even tries to do this service for the world? The philosophers, with very few exceptions, wash their hands of any responsibility for ethical deductions, and when one of them does break through the convention, the others turn and rend him. The psychologists would discourage us from thinking it possible that a bad man can either become good or be made good. "As the tree falls, so let it lie". And the scientists are, of course, debarred in principle from dealing with anything so recalcitrant to experiment as goodness. Some of the educationists perhaps come nearer than others to recognizing the need, and accepting the task, of moral education. But how many of them get beyond the standard so acutely diagnosed by Archbishop Temple: "Enjoy yourself to the full, *provided* you do not interfere with the enjoyment of others *in your set*"?

Men talk scornfully of the failure of the Church to make men good. But the Church, taking the word in its widest sense, is the only institution in the country that ever tries to do it. We, followers of Christ, are the only people who even think they know how it is to be done. And we cannot remind ourselves too often of the fact that even God Himself cannot make a good world, a world good for men (not to speak of heroes) to live in, *except* by making men and women good.

Neither does it seem to me that there is any reason to suppose that the Christian standard has changed. Differing in character from the Jewish standards, the law of Commandments contained in ordinances, the Christian standard is set by the ambition to please God. Not that the Commandments, positive and negative, have ceased to be authoritative, but they have ceased to be relevant, except for those who stray far from the ways to Zion. They are like sign-posts for the motorist who knows the way. Jesus reiterated some of them—"Thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not commit adultery". But it never enters our heads to do these things—literally. And even when we have accepted the wide and legitimate expansion which our Reformation fathers gave to these commandments, the adequately Christian conscience shrinks instinctively from such action, not because it is forbidden, but because it is inconsistent with its fellowship with God.

Finally, so far as these general and introductory remarks are concerned, I see no reason to suggest any novelties in the means whereby this goodness is to be attained. Some put their trust in ritual, others in mysticism, that false mysticism which is a *method* and one which can only be practised by an *élite*. And we Nonconformists have something to learn from each of these types. The priest, whatever else we may say about him, is at least an early riser, and follows an ordered life of devotion, which issues in a certain spiritual poise. The mystic, however we may deprecate his mechanical method, is a perpetual reminder to us of the value of self-discipline and ordered meditation. But these and other more familiar means of cultivating goodness are best regarded as ancillary to what is central to them all. And that is that as surely as God repeats morning by morning the miracle of light, so surely we should allow Him to repeat the yet greater miracle, and shine in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the Person of Jesus Christ. And by the time when Paul wrote these words, the great change had taken place in the meaning of "glory", the glory of God. It has no longer the *quasi*-material splendour of the Schechinah, but the glory of goodness—full of grace and truth.

I have spoken hitherto of the goodness to be attained and the way in which it is to be attained by those who have committed themselves to God in Christ. But we are at least equally concerned about the others, and it is in connexion with them that the problem arises to which I chiefly desire to draw attention. Much misunderstanding arises from thinking, speaking, or writing about a Christian ethic apart from the Christian religious experience. The Christian ethic is the natural self-expression of the life that is hid with Christ in God. It is the harvest of the Spirit, the natural result of that possession of the Spirit of Christ, which characterizes the relation to God in Christ mediated by grace, realized by faith, and made active in love. This gives us our direct line of approach to the practical solution of our problem. The means of attaining Christian goodness is the acceptance of that Gospel which is "a divine force unto salvation".

Nevertheless, though the "Christian ethic" is futile apart from the Christian experience, it is neither isolated as to its content, nor lacking in sanction from ancillary sources. It is not isolated as to its content, far from it. Apart from the Commandment "Thou shalt love" (the one real Commandment given by Jesus, valid for all persons, at all times, and in all circumstances) and inferences drawn from the application of that Commandment to particular ethical problems, there is little indeed in the Christian ethical system to which parallels cannot be found in other

systems, earlier or contemporary. Such parallels, *e.g.*, between Paul and Seneca, which are sometimes adduced in criticism of Christianity, as proving its want of originality, do really provide additional sanctions for its ethical demands. No one who studies Paul as a whole and Seneca as a whole will doubt that when they arrived at similar results they reached them by quite different routes. What is original in Christianity is Christ, and the dynamic of the Cross. Similar ethical teaching from outside does nothing to weaken the originality of these, but, on the other hand, does confirm the Christian claim that the things enjoined by Christ and His Spirit belong to the highest good of men.

And confirmation comes, also, from another source, from conscience. The full importance of this can only be felt, of course, when we have freed ourselves from the fallacy that a man's conscience is something static, something whose witness should not be expected to change, whereas there is no part of a man which ought to be more consistently the subject of growth or education than his conscience; and the witness borne by it will vary accordingly. It follows that, though the confirmation of conscience may be lacking when some particular ethical precept is first presented to it, the judgment should be regarded as provisional. Thus we get an almost infinite gradation of judgments of conscience on details of the Christian ethic. Some details are by some consciences promptly confirmed. A man says, when he hears the words of Jesus, "Yes, I know that that is right". And henceforward it is his conscience, not any external authority, by which he is guided, and the Christian precept has been confirmed by the inward voice. And even in the innumerable cases where the conscience of the individual fails to produce such confirmation, its original verdict is by no means final. For a Christian the normal experience is, or ought to be, that he accepts what is as yet unconfirmed by his conscience on the authority of Jesus Christ, and employing it as a working hypothesis puts it to the test of experiment. "He that willeth to do, shall know concerning the teaching". Ultimately the verdict is given in favour of the external authority, but it is thenceforward the verdict of conscience.

But there is one part of the field where the kind of confirmation of which I have been speaking is wholly or almost wholly lacking. I refer, of course, to the ethical treatment of sex. This was not less conspicuously true at the beginning than it is now. The way in which Christian moralists have habitually expanded the Seventh Commandment to cover all kinds of sexual immorality obscures for us the fact that the prohibition of adultery did not in the first instance and for many generations after Moses embody a comprehensive ideal of sexual purity, but was rather designed to protect a man's property in his wife. For the judgment of pre-Christian Judaism on the wider questions of sexual morality we have to look for evidence in connexion with *πορνεία*, harlotry or prostitution. And that evidence is very scanty and rather perplexing. On the one hand, there are indications not a few that the harlot was a well-known public character, almost a recognized feature of society. I need not recall the instances. Some of them are rather startling. Even the prohibition in *Deuteronomy* against offering the hire of a harlot in the temple seem to regulate abuse of the practice rather than to condemn the practice itself. On the other hand, we have the use which the prophets make of the vocabulary of whoredom as a figure for Israel's unfaithfulness to Jehovah, which at least indirectly suggests a severe moral judgment on such practices. In or after the Exile we discover through the *Book of Proverbs* much wise and impressive counsel on the subject.

But the sanctions which are there appealed to are wholly prudential. The consequences attached to lax conduct are physical. There is no suggestion that πορνεία is a heinous sin. It is not till we come to the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* (probably *circa* B.C. 100) that we begin to find evidence of a real moral conscience on the subject. It is probably to the Essenes that the credit belongs of setting up a higher standard than had been enforced or observed before them as to polygamy and as to πορνεία. But the earliest official injunction against it appears to be that implied in the decrees of the Council at Jerusalem (*Acts* 15), and it was a new note in morals which was struck by our Lord when he included πορνεία with μοιχεία in the list of things which "defile" a man, *i.e.*, disqualify him for fellowship with God, a note which was caught by Paul and by him struck with great firmness when he wrote, "flee from fornication". "Condemnation of fornication was", as Mr. Bertrand Russell says "a novelty in the Christian religion".

When we turn to the heathen world contemporary with the rise of Christianity we find a society in which sexual vice flourished unchecked by either conscience or public opinion. It is hard to find a passage in Pre-Christian Greek literature in which loose intercourse is looked upon as in itself a moral offence. Sexual indulgence stood upon exactly the same moral level as eating and drinking. Philosophy made no attempt to alter this moral attitude. Even the Stoics, with their relatively ascetic morality, made no effort to combat the sensuality of the time.

I have ventured to recall these historical facts for two reasons. First, I doubt whether we have given full credit to the Gospel for the very remarkable, though partial, victory which, in the first century of the Church's existence, it achieved in this field. I say "partial" because the victory was won within the area of society which became definitely Christian. But within that area the sex-impulse was definitely brought under control. A new standard of purity in morals was set up, and accepted by Christian men and women. And the success of the early Church in this extraordinarily difficult task ought to be both an example and an encouragement for ourselves. For, secondly, the situation which faces us corresponds very closely with that of the first century. Any confirmation of the Christian ideal which may have been once supplied by extra-Christian convention has suddenly fallen away. And the confirmation which comes from experience, the experience, *e.g.*, of a pure and happy marriage, which is far commoner than many of our modern writers will allow, that confirmation is something so imponderable that it appeals only to those who have already the insight of sympathy. The lack of that insight is one of the most serious handicaps under which some of our would-be instructors labour. They seem never to have known a good woman, or a happy home.

We are therefore confronted with a situation closely corresponding to that in A.D. 30-130. Some would say it is worse to-day, more hopeless. They might point to the cinema, the theatre, and the a-moral press inserting itself daily into nearly every home in the country. But the Christians of the first century had to meet a shamelessness which we have not yet reached—the *palæstra*, the gymnasium, the phallic cults, and the public *lupanaria*. What they had not to face was this violent, almost fanatical, attack on Christian morals by educated men who certainly catch the ear of the public. And there must be few of you engaged in the regular ministry who are not painfully aware that the moral standard and the moral ideal have lost their hold on the post-war generation.

I wish very much, therefore, that we could use this opportunity to discuss fully and frankly the lines of argument, if there are any, along which we may find support for the Christian appeal. Of course, we must first of all be quite sure in our own minds that continence is demanded of the Christian, and that it is possible. Unfortunately, there is a section of people who would not wish to be described as non-Christian who would like to think that it is not required of Christians because they are convinced that continence is not possible.

One finds a strong disposition to regard sexual vice very much as war is regarded in the same quarters. It is something of which you will never get rid—what some people even describe as a safety-valve.

Now, I want to come down to bed-rock, by asking the question. Suppose a young man were to come to any one of us and ask, "Why should I not go away with a girl for the week-end?", what can we, what ought we, to say to him?. If he is a Christian, with some real understanding of what it means, the answer is comparatively easy. One would point out to him the hopeless inconsistency, intellectual and moral, which would be involved in such action. One would point out to him the tremendous significance of the choice between time and eternity, the flesh and the Spirit, between his appetite and God. And inasmuch as his previous acknowledgement of Christ would give the colour of defiance to such action, it would be difficult to see how he would leave for himself any "room for repentance ".

There is more that we might say to him, though that more should not be necessary. But if it were a non-Christian or hesitating Christian who put the question, it is only by such further argument that we can appeal to him. In the first place I suppose we should appeal to his honour. It is a mean thing, a shabby thing, that you propose to do. Say what you like, your respect for a girl would go down, if she yielded to you under such conditions. He might pooh-pooh such a suggestion as either untrue or irrelevant, and say that he had been reading Lippmann, or Havelock Ellis or Bertrand Russell, and had learnt from them that all that was antiquated convention. To which I should reply : "You should read Bertrand Russell more carefully. Then you would find him saying, 'To use another person in so intimate a manner is to be lacking in that respect for the human being as such, out of which all morality springs' ". Has not this been said before? "The second is like unto it, Thou shalt love (that is, care for, and that implies respect) thy neighbour as thyself".

Then I should suggest to him that he would be exposing the girl to a very great risk, while he himself would run no risk worth speaking about. "Oh, that's all right", he might reply ; "We know all about it, have read plenty of books on birth-control". "Take care, my friend", I should say, "You are suffering from the will to believe. If you will not listen to Christian moralists like Bishop Gore, who tell you that no method is 'safe', in the meaning you give to the word, listen to your friend Bertrand Russell again : ' In America uninvited pregnancies are not infrequent. And they are often dealt with by abortion'. Think what that means of shame and pain and danger, and say whether you think it is 'plucky' of a man to expose a girl to such a risk".

My third point would be, that by such premature indulgence he would be snatching at the shadow and losing the substance. What you get by waiting for a true, full and permanent union is worth any amount of self-control now. And again I would call his attention to Bertrand Russell, whose ideal of sexual union is still "a dignified, rational and wholehearted

ctivity in which the complete personality co-operates''—a description to vhich we have only to add the word ''permanent'' to get an acceptable lefinition of Christian marriage.

My last point would be of a different character. I should ask him if ie had duly weighed Russell's striking statement—''Prostitution is open o three great objections, first, the danger to the health of the community, second, the psychological damage to women, and third the psychological damage to men''.

I feel inclined to say with the defending counsel when his opponent at down, ''That is my case, my lord''. Only if Mr. Russell had been vriting with the accuracy which we have a right to expect in a scientist, ie would have put the first sentence differently, and if he had not been swayed by prejudice he would have explained wherein the psychological damage consists. What he refers to as ''a danger to the health of the community'' is a *danger* to each individual, but it is a present and active mischief in the community. Few of us do not know of cases within the circle of our acquaintance where the innocent suffer hideously through the sin of another. And there is the ''psychological'' damage. Any man who cared at all for those whom he is instructing would have explained that the damage is *progressive,* that a process of deterioration is set up, and that a long course of indulgence leads to the condition of a ''moral degenerate'' wherein the victim is as much the slave of lust as others are the slave of drink.

And as any unthinking reader might well imagine that mere psychological damage was of little importance compared with physical, it seems to me that a biologist ought to have made it clear that under that adjective are included the powers and qualities which distinguish men from animals. Psychological damage is therefore something much more serious than physical. In fact, Mr. Russell's statement makes one inclined to infer that we should be rather obliged to God for trying to dissuade men from what causes so much mischief.

Finally, I should like to take Mr. Russell (and his pupils) where he would be very unwilling to go, namely, to St. Paul. He has that contempt for the Apostle which is the badge of all his tribe. But that does not excuse him for his ignorance or wilful mis-statement on the subject of Paul's teaching about marriage. The most elementary sense of scholarly responsibility should have kept him from deducing that teaching from a single passage. And no estimate of that teaching can be correct which fails to do justice to the fact that Paul finds in human marriage an illustration of the union between Christ and the Church.

But besides that, Paul, if I am not mistaken, shows a quite remarkable insight into the psychological basis of marriage, which may excuse him for having been, as Mr. Russell would have it, more unbiological than the Catholic Church. The passage in which he shows this insight is rendered obscure for the English reader by the curious use he makes of the word 'body'' (1 *Cor.* $6^{13\text{-}20}$). He says, *e.g.,* that every other sin which a man commits is external to his body; but in fornication he sins against his body. And most of the commentators either jump on him or say they do not know what he means. But it has been pointed out by Johannes Weiss, followed by Paul Feine, that neither the Jew nor the Greek had any word corresponding to our word ''person'' or ''personality'', and that in consequence the writers of the *N.T.* had to employ various rough equivalents. These were, ''name'', ''face'', ''soul'', and ''body''. And Weiss boldly interprets the word ''body'' in the sentence I have quoted as ''the personality which uses the body as its organ''. So in a previous verse Paul

means that the sexual union results in the creation of a unified personality. It never is or can be merely physical, and the breaking off of the union, still more the repeated breaking off, results in psychological disintegration. Which is, I take it, what Mr. Russell would say if he was asked to explain "the psychological damage". It is really rather odd that St. Paul pointed it out before him.

But the Apostle goes on to clinch his argument by quoting the text from *Genesis* which had been already quoted by our Lord, "the two shall be one flesh". I am strongly inclined to think (following up a hint I got from Lietzmann) that in spite of the use of the word "flesh" in the famous text, the thought which underlies it is the same. "Male and female created He them". The *rationale* and the character of marriage lie in the physical constitution of men and women. Our thinking on the subject is apt to be confused by the emphasis we naturally put on marriage as a social institution, as set up by an ecclesiastical ceremony. The Biblical doctrine seems to rest on something behind and below either of these—on a God-given capacity and a God-given responsibility. It is the concurrent acceptance of both gifts which constitutes marriage as intended by God. Quite lately I found what I have long wondered whether I should find, in Dr. C. G. Montefiore's last book, the statement that "among the Rabbis cohabitation was held to constitute marriage". The considerations which I have suggested as together precluding irregular unions for any self-respecting man seem to come to a focus in the same conclusion.

If the history of evolution, physical, psychological, and moral, is to cause in us any emotional re-action, it is surely one of awed wonder at the process and awed respect for the results. One thinks of the incalculable sacrifices made in an incalculable number of experiments through all the millenia of human history, at the end of which "civilized" man arrived at certain moral principles and conceived certain moral ideals. One thinks of the Supreme Sacrifice by which these principles were at once confirmed and made practicable.

One recalls Walter Smith's lines:

> All through life I see a cross
> Where sons of men yield up their breath;
> There is no gain except by loss,
> No life except by death.

And one cannot help feeling that those who reject these principles and pour contempt on these ideals, and encourage younger people to do the same, are not only defiers of God but traitors to the human race.

THE CHRISTIAN ETHIC: ITS EXPRESSION IN SOCIAL LIFE.

By The Rev. B. C. Plowright, B.A., B.D.

It is clear that in this paper we come to an issue which is equally critical for the thought of Humanism and for the spread of Christianity. The issue is crucial for Humanistic thought because it is here that its greatest test will come in practice, since, unless the atomistic and individualistic ethic which is characteristic of Humanism can transmute itself into terms of social relationships, it cannot hope to commend itself to a modern world which finds its greatest puzzles precisely in that sphere. Humanism might,

ıdeed, persist for a while, drawing for the time being on the deeper social ıought and moral ideals of the past generation, but sooner or later one uestion will inevitably force itself into prominence and demand an nswer: "Here am I, an individual; what is my fundamental relationship ith these other multitudes of individuals who with me are bound up in the undle of life?". Unless, when that question is put, Humanism can point) an ethical relationship which is ontological and essential, of the very tuff of things, it can have little to say to commend it to those who are ıost deeply concerned with the realities of life as they are lived out in mill nd factory and office and shop, for the simple reason that whilst in the thics of personal discipline the "ought" implies the "can", in the ethics f social relationships the "ought" implies not only the "can" but the is". Men will not in the long run consent to treat other men as brothers, nd so seek that kingdom of fellowship and peace which we Christians call ıe Kingdom of God, unless they are fully persuaded that in some deep, ndeniable, and, in the long run, indefeasible sense, men are their brothers ı fact.

The issue is equally critical for Christianity. I do not want to labour ıe point, but those of us who know a little of what the ordinary decent rtisan is thinking know that we are living in a peculiarly illusory fools' aradise if we imagine that any presentation of Christian faith issuing only ı an ethic of personal discipline can hope to win once more the suffrages f the lapsed masses of our people. Few things in modern life are more ragic than the fact that the Church has developed almost exclusively one de of the Christian ethic, that of personal discipline, and has left almost ntouched, to be developed by those outside the Church, the other side, the hic of social relationships. So far as the life of to-day is concerned, both umanism and Christianity stand or fall by their message here. The nviction of this paper is that Humanism is so inherently individualistic,) wholly cut off from any interpretation of the meaning of life as a whole, at it must inevitably break down at this point, whilst in Christianity there , both implicit and explicit, precisely that ethic of fundamental human lationships on which alone a stable world of peace and human co-eration and fellowship can be based.

there a Christian Social Ethic?

What, then, is the Christian social ethic? Such a question clearly akes an assumption which, in view of some recent discussions, cannot mmarily be accepted without further argument. Humanism is clearly bottom individualistic, and hardly attempts to give any answer to any ıical question save this, " How can I best handle this nature of mine and expression in life?". But the denial of any suggestion of a specific cial ethic has come of late years from not a few inside the Church, and ch criticism is summed up in the recent work of Dean Inge, who has ındly asserted that the ethical teaching of Christ is wholly individualistic. that be so, then indeed the whole of our question falls to the ground, d the Christian can do no more than advise those who look to him for idance that the whole of the Christian ethic, so far as social relationships e concerned, is to be just and kind to those individuals whose pathways life intersect his own. But is it so? There are not wanting, indeed, ose who urge that in the very nature of the case it must be so. They nt out, and rightly, that every man lives in a series of concentric circles ıis own individual life at the centre, then in successive order within the nily, and after that within the local community, the Church, the State, d finally the world-wide community—and that with every enlargement of

the circle or group his control and his power to affect the action of his group diminishes almost to vanishing point. Yet it is not a hard matter to find a reply to those who assert, either from consideration of the words of Jesus, or by reason of the exigencies of life, that the Christian ethic is and must be purely individual. To take the former point first: Even if the original teaching of Jesus were as purely individualistic as it is claimed to be, there clearly lie at the back of the detailed teaching certain fundamental principles of which His own teaching were but particular and local expressions, principles which are in themselves universal and demand expression in the whole of life, social relationships included. For man cannot live his life with an ethical dualism. He cannot keep the ethical ideals of Christianity for his own private or semi-private relationships of life and leave the rest of his life ethically uncriticized. That way lies a hopeless division of the self and the definite ruling out of that achievement of ethical unity which is the ideal of Christian character. When we urge that there is a real Christian social ethic we are simply applying His fundamental principles at the point where the shoe pinches most hardly in our own day.

But we are inclined to deny categorically the round assertion of Dean Inge that the ethical teaching of Jesus is wholly individualistic. Consider, for example, such an incident as that recorded in the Gospels where "some of them that stood by told Him of those whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices". Do you remember His answer :"Except ye repent ye shall in like manner all perish"? Is there any possibility of mistaking what is implied in the answer, that it is a criticism of the political relationship between Jew and Roman, and an emphatic reminder that that way lies disaster. I need hardly remind you of the work of the Rev. Stephen Liberty and Prof. Simkhovitch along these lines, and, to a somewhat smaller extent, of Prof. Troeltsch. These three students working independently have pointed out clear indications in our Gospels that our Lord was much more concerned with the political situation as a whole than we have been accustomed to think. And whilst I am not enough of a *N.T.* scholar to speak with even the least grain of authority on the matter, I would venture to suggest that a study of "Q" leads in the same direction. I confess that I have a strong impression as I read it that here we have what might almost be called a Manual of Instruction for the New Israel, the Church. We forget, perhaps a little more than we ought to do, that the early Church served itself heir to all the ancient promises of Israel, and I suggest that it may well be that what the Law was to the old Israel, "Q" was to the New. I must leave it for much more competent minds than mine to say what value—or want of it—there may be in such a conception of the document: I can only say that for myself it does seem to bear very much that stamp. If that be so then clearly phrases like "Love your enemies" and "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God" are much more than individual counsels of perfection, they enshrine definite policies for a community, the first in the political, the second in the economic, sphere of corporate life. The first says bluntly that not only is there no room left for hate in the new society, but calls for positive goodwill; the second, that true and lasting economic progress depends on the right adaptation of both economic methods and system to the fundamental spiritual structure of life. But more than all other arguments, I would plead that to-day the stringency and urgency of our situation forces upon us the necessity of shaping and formulating some kind of Christian social ethic, even if there were no actual warrant for it in the actual words of Jesus, for we find ourselves in a world in which, as a matter of fact, certain ethical working hypotheses of social

life *do* obtain and are the creative factors in modern social life, and we cannot escape the necessity of passing a Christian judgment as to how far these are in fact Christian, how far they are sub-Christian, how far they jump with the temper of Christianity, or where we must part company with them. And all this factual necessity implies a positive Christian point of view, a definite Christian social ethic.

I do not deny, of course, that in one sense the ethic of Christianity must always be individual; any action I may take will be my action, and no one else's, and for its ethical quality I shall be in the main responsible. But that does not do away with the fact that in my action I shall be expressing the mind of a community, and ultimately the mind of Christ. It is my action, but it is the action of the community expressing itself through me as well. Now it is with what I have called above the "working hypotheses" of social life that the Christian social ethic has in the main to do, and ultimately our question as to what the Christian social ethic is, narrows down to the question, "What are the Christian working hypotheses for social life?". At the moment of writing this paper I am in complete ignorance of what the preceding speakers will have said, and therefore may I say that the point of view of this paper is that the Christian ethic depends at every point upon two things, upon the Christian experience of God and the Christian interpretation of life as a whole, and the Christian verdict as to the meaning and nature of human life in particular. It depends upon the soul's experience of God; for that experience is the discovery of that which gives what I can only call crucial and final satisfaction. There is, as it were, a kind of intuitive "click" in the mind which is the sign to the soul that it has found that for which it was made. And that satisfaction, which involves unification as well, issues inevitably in the release of moral energy otherwise dissipated in reconciling the discordant elements in it. And secondly, the Christian ethic is rooted and rests eternally in our Christian persuasion concerning the Fatherhood of God, and on our conviction that the world has a spiritual structure as definite and, in the long run, as inviolable as the physical structure of the world: it rests, in a word, on the conviction that the world was made by the Eternal Love and that only the activities of fellowship and love can bring out all its deep, hidden, and lovely meanings. We are persuaded that any and all forms of social life and organization which are based upon anything less and lower than that, "kick against the pricks", that, by the very nature of the spiritual world, they are self-doomed to decay and destruction.

And in the Gospels certain principles which bring the general principle one step nearer the concrete actualities of life leap out at one from the authentic words and practice of Jesus. They are four in number and we may perhaps call them "ethical considerations". From the story in *Mk.* 3^{1-6}, the story of the healing in the Synagogue on the Sabbath day of the man with the withered hand, we cannot avoid drawing the inference that in the mind of Jesus the specifically human interests are paramount above all others, a principle to which He gave explicit expression in His own phrase, "The Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath". If that applies to the holiest ordinance of the Jew, it applies, *a fortiori,* to such more "secular" organizations of life as industry and politics. Secondly, whilst Jesus undoubtedly believed that man's sonship to God was perfected and completed in his awakening to moral sonship, He does seem to have believed at the same time in what may be called an ontological sonship, in which the moral sonship was implicit: from that we derive a second principle which bids us at all times treat men as sons of God, and forbids us at any time to treat them as mere means to an end.

Thirdly, the story of the parable of the Two Debtors in *Matt.* 18[24ff] expresses, on the face of it, the principle that the only right human relationship is that in which a man treats his fellows as God has treated Him. Fourthly, the whole passage concerning authority in *Lk.* 22[25ff] asserts that in a truly Christian community there is and can be no such thing as arbitrary authority. "It shall not be so among you."

In point of fact, then, the Christian Church is in possession of four great principles which go a long way to providing it with the outline of a Christian philosophy and ethic of the social life—the principle of the supremacy of human values and interests, the principle of recapitulation in human relationships of the Divine-human relationship, the principle of potential equality, the principle of the denial of arbitrary authority. We envisage a world whose organizations are designed for the highest welfare of men, which functions through love and in fellowship, which refuses to subordinate man either to machines or profits or any such de-humanized thing, and whose method is the co-operation of potential equals. I am tempted to digress for a moment to point out that what we are witnessing to-day is the break-down of our social life, particularly in industry and politics, precisely because their working assumptions counter these at most points, but I refrain—and that for two reasons. First, merely negative criticism is profitless, for no system is fool-proof or knave-proof, but more because the way of denunciation of evil is that of the *O.T.*, while the way of the *New* is that of the enunciation of the positive good. We shall do our work far more effectively if we can give to our Christian business men and politicians a sense of the positive ideals which are inherent in Christianity and point out the direction in which they are expected to be working as Christian men, than if we merely exasperate them by the cheap and easy method of pointing out what is wrong. Our main task is to indicate the goal, to make them realize that whatever economic and political practice may be in fact, at all events as Christian men they are pledged to its transformation into terms of fellowship, co-operation, and the service of men. It is no easy row that the modern industrialist and politician are hoeing and I do not wonder if sometimes they are inclined to resent, even to the point of bitterness, the somewhat facile denunciations with which some of the unwiser amongst us parsons gain a little cheap publicity and pseudo-popularity, but, if I may speak out of my own experience, I have never found that they resented the statement of positive ideals and principles, and I affirm my own conviction that more of them to-day are willing to listen to such positive idealism than at any previous time in history. We cannot prescribe the economic methods or the political machinery by which such an issue is to be brought about, but we cannot escape insisting that a point of honour is involved for Christians in setting themselves honestly and squarely to make industry and politics an expression of those ethical principles I have named. And here, perhaps, I may add one word to stress the importance both of individual action and of the corporate judgment of the Church. Any advance in economic and industrial practice has almost invariably been made by individual Christian men; what the new spirit in industry owes to men like Joseph Rowntree, George Cadbury, and our own Angus Watson it is impossible to estimate, and it is difficult not to think that the political world is waiting for individuals who will give political life a new lead in a way similar to that which those I have named have given in the industrial realm. But apart from the witness and work of the individual, we must attach supreme importance to the judgment of the Church itself, for, in modern life, the new idea "gets across" largely through the work and testimony of a small but intensely convinced group.

We need have no manner of doubt that a Church which could make up its mind concerning the nature and character of its own working hypotheses for society, and could give clear and definite expression to them, would speak to the best mind of our age with a convincingness which would have the power to convert it, and which would greatly strengthen the hands of its representatives in business and politics when they made their experiments in that direction. Our root trouble is that we have failed most signally to provide our industrialists and our politicians with such working hypotheses, with the result that every man does that which is right in his own eyes, and the end and issue thereof is perilously like moral anarchy in social life. Men do in fact, for the most part, simply accept the working assumptions they find already in the field, and submit to what looks like economic and political determinism. And not the least important thing we have to tell our people is that there is no such thing as either economic or political law independent of the ethical assumptions on which these are based; that economic methods and political machinery take on their particular form according to the ethical assumptions which are made, and that as disciples of Jesus they are committed to bringing to industry His commands and His demands on men. What those ethical assumptions are I have tried to indicate above. We turn now to illustrate their action in two spheres, the economic and the political.

Christian Ethics in Industry.

We turn first to industry. And I may be allowed to repeat what I said a moment ago, that we have first of all to persuade our people of what can be demonstrated to be a fact, that there is no such thing as a fixed and unvarying economic law after the fashion of mathematical law, but that all economic law involves an ethical assumption, and that the form the economic law takes will vary with the precise ethical standard assumed. We have to deliver our folk from economic determinism and the sterility of moral effort which determinism of every kind implies. That first, and basically. Next, we have to outline the conditions to which a truly Christian industry must conform. Clearly our first and third principles combined give us this important condition, that industry exists for man and not man for industry, and that its one legitimate end is the service of the community. I am sure that no small part of our task is to help our business men to think nobly of the work to which they have set their hands, to persuade them that, rightly regarded, industry is the supreme social sacrament, the means whereby a man helps to make available for his fellows all the rich provision by the Divine love for man in the illimitable supplies of raw materials. We have to make it perfectly plain that when men are making boots or weaving wool or cotton, they are truly fellow-workers with God, and that at their benches or their looms they are helping the Divine intention for these things to realize itself, and that they will never make industry all that it ought to be until they see it so.

Next, we have to say, I think, that the relation between the partners in industrial activity can never rightly be that of master and man, the controllers and the controlled, but only that of the co-operation of equals in a common task. I am not sure but that here we do touch the point at which the struggle for a really Christian industry will be found to be the hardest, yet it is clear that the world is being driven to face the question as to whether the Christian conviction will not ultimately prove to be the only workable one. For the loss to industry by strikes and lock-outs and day-to-day friction between employers and employed is not to be computed, and the same may be said of the economic wastage due to economic

nepotism. Until we get to the point where we recognize that no man is born into the economic purple, but that the right to lead in it truly goes only by capacity and not by birth, it is clear that we shall have to be content to allow a vast reservoir of economic capacity to go unused and untapped. And just as the basic law of life as fellowship bids us hold that industry can only properly fulfil its function by the frank co-operation of the partners within it, so it forbids us to believe that it can ever flourish stably and enduringly so long as it is conceived as a struggle for individual profits between rival industrial organizations. Competition I believe there must be, and I can conceive a kind of competition which would be a wholly healthy sublimation of the pugnacious instincts in man, but such competition would rather be emulation in the service of the common good—not an internecine struggle for personal and individual advantage, a competition which is in fact, not a sublimation of the pugnacious instinct, but a feeder of the war spirit. If, or rather when, the mind of Christ expresses itself in industry, then it will be an industry viewed supremely as the great social service which a man can render to his fellows, it will function through the *condominium* of all who partake in it, it will express the spirit of emulation in the service of the community between the different units in industry, and at all times it will set and rank the human interests of industry beyond all others. And, lest I be charged with putting too great a strain on human nature and demanding too much of it, and with drawing a futurist, roseate picture of it, I would remind you that the kind of industrial organization I have sketched is what the rising school of economists is telling us is the inevitable form that industry must take if it is to function truly. In the new conception of "organic economics" as expounded by Wiener Sombart and Othmar Spann we have the definite disavowal of the old-time economic determinism and the equally definite insistence that the sole right of any industry to exist is the service it renders to the community. And, I ask you, what does that mean but that our economists have discovered the staid and sober truth that lies behind the phrase of our Lord, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you"? The only industrial system that will work in a world made by Love for fellowship is an industry that, in every method and every one of its functions, expresses the spirit of fellowship.

Christian Ethics in Politics.

As in industry, so in politics; the specific function of the Church is to state clearly the creative and generative ideas which shall give direction and definiteness of aim to the Christian politician. Two points stand out of first-class importance—the question as to the nature and function of the State, and the question of the form of government through which the State expresses the common will. Using as our clue the principles we have already applied to bring our conception of a Christian industry into a little sharper focus and definition, how should we conceive of the Christian State? What would be its essential nature, and through what form of government would it most naturally function? Well, since human interests over-ride all others, I suggest to you that we must hold steadily to the conviction that the State exists for man, not man for the State, and since we regard men as being, potentially at all events, sons of God, the State is the association of free men, potential equals, by which the goodwill of each is made available for all. It is not the result, as Hobbes and those who still think with him would have us believe, of a prudential contract between the citizens whereby they ensure that they shall tread on one another's toes as

little as possible, but is the expression and embodiment of the pooled positive goodwill of all the members. And does not that same line of thinking lead us to the persuasion that the Christian spirit manifests itself most naturally in democracy as the form of government best fitted to express its characteristic genius? I do not mean to suggest that there is any guarantee that democracy as such can always be trusted to act wisely or even with justice—we cannot forget that two of the greatest political crimes of history lie at the doors of the Athenian democracy on the one hand, and the French on the other—but it is difficult to see how in any other form of government there could be either potential equality or the maximum pooling of goodwill. Besides, the alternative to democracy is some form of authoritarian government, and surely that is ruled out by the express word of Jesus. Such a conception of the Christian ideal for the State and for government is one of our sorest needs, for it would do away steadily with that pre-occupation on the part of the State in modern life with economic issues, and it would tend to render impossible the struggle of competing groups for domination in the State. I venture to suggest that what we are witnessing now is not only the definite proof of the unworkableness in the long run of the working hypotheses we have brought to industry, but that also the growing political instability of the world is proof positive that our working political hypotheses are out of line and out of tune with what I have called the fundamental spiritual structure of the Universe.

You will expect one word at least about international politics and inter-racial relationships. It is by now, I hope, abundantly clear from the illustrations already given of the working of the central Christian principles in industry and intra-national politics, that what the Christian asks of industry and politics he must press for in this realm also. From the Christian conception of international and inter-racial relationships all thought of the domination of one group by another must be expelled, and instead of it the positive conceptions of active goodwill must control his thought of other nationals and other races. There may be room for real tutelage of the backward races of the world by the more advanced, but exploitation or brutal domination of one race by another is abhorrent to the Christian conscience.

Our vision of the spirit of Jesus in social life, therefore, is a vision of a world which, in its successively enlarging areas of life, is a world whose organizations express the sense of the primacy of human needs and are designed to meet them, a world in which man's capacity for his Divine sonship gets a chance to express itself, and a world which throughout its length and breadth functions through fellowship. We believe that since the world was made as it is and by Whom it was, only such an organization of the social and corporate life and activities of men has the seeds of stability and satisfaction in it.

Will you suffer me two further words? One concerns the practical issues for actual life, the other goes, I believe, to the root of the matter. What are we to say to men when they come and say to us, "Yes, we agree that these are the ideals of Jesus, but how are they to be realized?". Now I do not believe that we are called upon to tell the industrialist or the politician exactly how he is to act; indeed, I do not disguise my conviction that our thought upon these matters is so immature and undeveloped that we cannot even make a pretence of doing so. And the business man and the politician have to work in areas of life which are already organized around certain ethical principles and possess their own moral standards. What are we to say to men who come to us and ask how the passage from the real to the ideal is to be made? In some cases, where the object of

the industry, when achieved, definitely degrades human life I think our answer is clear—a man must get out of it at whatever cost. But what of those cases where a real social need is being met, yet has in it practices and an ethic that are sub-Christian? Suppose, for instance, that a man was persuaded in his heart that competition was wrong, what should we say to him? Clearly industry must go on, and the same is true of the political life of the community as well. You see the point to which I am coming. Do we not need a Christian doctrine of the place and limits of compromise, or as I prefer to put it, of toleration? Have we not to tell men who feel called to industry and politics, yet are uneasy by reason of the conditions they find already in existence, that literally they are called to bear the sin of the community, and that their main business is to limit indeed the profit they themselves derive from their pursuit, but more, always to watch and wait for the opportunity of taking the next step which will bring business or politics a little nearer to their hearts' desire? Our task is to give them a sense of the direction along which Christians ought to work, and the end for which they ought to strive, to remind them that every "secular" vocation has it in it to be a true sacrament of God.

My last word is this: one thing more we can do. For three years it was my priceless privilege to be honoured with the friendship of that great headmaster, Sanderson of Oundle. On occasion he would utter *obiter dicta* that were as priceless pearls. Speaking of his ideals for his own school he said, "I want to make my school a miniature of all that I should like life to be". Is not that a great motto for us in the churches? The Church ought to be the miniature of all that we should like life to be. Will you let me leave it at that, with the one single comment that nothing could more readily persuade the world that we do not speak cunningly devised fables when we speak of our Christian ideals for social life, than a Church which is itself the living embodiment of fellowship, equality, love, and service? And what is that but saying once more that it is our business to be the Body of which He is the glorious Head?

THE CHRISTIAN GOOD: ITS EXPRESSION IN THE LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

By Prof. J. G. McKenzie, M.A., B.D.

It is often said that "what is right is the easiest thing in the world to know and the most difficult thing to do". The previous lectures have shown that the epigram is an over-statement; and the opening prayer for guidance acknowledges that the foundations of our concept of the Christian Good are questioned, our ideals discarded, and that one great and influential school of ethical thinkers at least seeks no supernatural foundations or sanctions for its way of life.

Nevertheless, it is well to remember that if the Humanist and Romanticist are doubtful about the validity of our Christian Good, they are emphatic in their insistance that A Good must be found and that that Good must be authoritative over the individual soul. No writers, to my knowledge, have so forcibly disclosed the moral chaos that has resulted from the undermining of our Christian standards. Our emancipated moderns, free from external restraints, have not achieved disciplined individuality, and only upon that basis can a secure and stable society be built.

"The task before us", as Laurence Hyde says: "is that of persuading a race of beings who are to an exceptional degree free from external restraints, to impose some sort of voluntary restraint upon themselves. Everybody is able to-day to 'do as he likes', but what he likes to do is only too frequently something ugly, crude, banal, or positively subversive. The finer values of civilization are slowly but surely being destroyed. A great wave of vulgarization is sweeping over the world. Everything tends to be dragged down to the level on which it is comprehensible or emotionally satisfying to the man who has neither purified his perceptions, disciplined his will, nor cultivated his mind. From one point of view at least the fruit of Liberalism is libertinism". "Whirl is King having driven out Zeus".

No one, I think, will deny the indictment. But not all realize the part that modernism in the Church has played to bring this about. As Hocking has finely said, we have discarded many of the old ethical doctrines but forgotten to conserve their power. We have taken away the doctrine of Hell but in doing so have undermined the fact that life involves an infinite risk.

Be that as it may, it is because these writers realize how true the indictment is that they insist on the need for moral standards which will not merely be restraints on the unfettered freedom of our modern world but an inner dynamic attitude to life.

In virtue of the fact, however, that " the acids of modernity are dissolving the usages and sanctions to which men once habitually conformed " the preacher cannot command although he may persuade. But he will only be successful if " the course of conduct he advocates is not an arbitrary pattern to which vitality must submit, but that which vitality itself would choose if it clearly understood ". To a very large extent these writers believe, with Lippmann, that our Christian Good " reduces itself to the wholly arbitrary proposition that the best life for man would be some other kind of life than that which satisfies his nature ".

Hence the attack on the conception of the Christian Good is based upon a psychology of human nature. There is a demand for standards which will liberate our energies and not suppress or repress them; a demand for virtues that will be pleasant. " The Humanists ", as Mr. Babbitt puts it, " would not go beyond disciplining the ' lusts ' of the natural man to the law of measure ". Mr. Bertrand Russell would not go as far. In any case there can be no doubt that the challenge of a pagan ethic to our Christian morality from McDougall's doubts regarding the possibility of a universal ethic to Mr. Russell's sex promiscuity is grounded on what is believed to be a psychology of human nature. It is thought, apparently, that an ethic based upon psychology will give us a morality without tears, a character without conflict, behaviour that is not followed by fear, and a personality without effort.

Psychology and the Christian Good.

Professor Laird has argued that ethics deals with " the justification of imperatives ". The older rational ethics was content to deduce the Good from an analysis of the notion of good; but an ethic based upon metaphysics will remain out of touch with the actual moral life in much the same way as a theology based upon metaphysics has had little or no relation to actual religious experience. In any case the demand upon Christian thought to-day is a demand to justify our imperatives; and that can only be done if our imperatives do not contradict a sane psychology of human nature.

There can be no doubt that much that has passed for the content of the Christian Good was based, sometimes upon an erroneous view of

human nature, and sometimes upon a false view of what human nature could become. This has led to forms of asceticism which have not seldom resulted in gross perversions, and oftener in harmful repressions which defeated the very ends of asceticism. Human nature, in the sense of its instinctive tendencies, cannot be eradicated. These tendencies may be repressed, controlled, or sublimated, but never eradicated without dehumanizing the individual. Hence the ethic that demands the eradication or repression of innate tendencies can never be justified; and it must create divisions within the soul which will not merely defeat the Christian imperatives but have disastrous effects upon personality.

Meaning of Repression and Control.

A word may be said here about the meaning of repression. There is probably no term so misunderstood. Even Dean Inge, who is more careful than most writers, seems to think that repression connotes a refusal to do something. But this is wholly a mistake. " Repression ", as Dr. D. Yellowlees has accurately pointed out, " is not a refusal to do something, but to see something ". It is a failure to *see* the nature of the tendencies behind our feelings, thoughts, action, or judgments.

Repression, then, is a self-defence reaction of the conscious mind to some thought, feeling, or desire to which is attached fear, guilt, or some painful emotion. We see but do not perceive; we hear but do not understand. We bring something else to the focus of attention—a rationalization, or a neurotic symptom—and these disturb the normal processes of the mind or character. Control, on the other hand, consciously sees the threat to our moral integrity, or social prestige, or to the health of the organism, and deals with it on the conscious plane.

Now nothing makes for severe repression like a wrong attitude to these instinctive tendencies, or wrong beliefs as to what is right and wrong for a Christian. When repression takes place in a Christian the joy and peace of believing disappears. These wrong attitudes or beliefs are incorporated into our conscience, which is the controlling agency so far as morals are concerned, and the conscience tends to repress what it cannot incorporate, whether it be a feeling, a cognition, or a volition. It was Butler, you remember, who said: " Had conscience strength as it has right, power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely *govern* the world." But to-day it is not its strength we doubt but its right, not its power but its authority. For a time it may be defeated and repressed, but its reactions are terrible in their intensity.

Naturally, I can but touch lightly on the psychology of conscience and show its relation to the expression of the Christian Good. It is that organ of the soul through which our moral values are organized into a unity and through which they are brought to bear upon our moral actions. I cannot agree with Prof. A. E. Taylor that it is " just the aggregate of the individual's judgments and convictions as to what from time to time in varying circumstances he ought to do". It is much more than that. It is the volitional side of that innate sense of *ought* from which the moral life as well as all ethics starts. It is dynamic in its nature. Before anyone can act contrary to its standards and judgments he must undermine its authority by a rationalization, or overcome its strength by repression; he must find some good reason for his act; he must make it a " good ".

On the ethical side, conscience may be considered as the aggregate of our moral judgments, convictions, and standards organized into a unity, and functioning as a unity. These judgments, convictions, and standards are always acquired, first, through suggestibility—from parents, and

raditions and teachers, and finally through reflexion. *The authority of onscience lies not in the rightness of its judgments or convictions but in irtue of the fact that it legislates for the moral personality as a whole.* Once the conscience has accepted a judgment, a conviction, or a standard, t then spontaneously exerts its strength, power, and authority to bring ur feelings, thoughts, desires, and actions into harmony with these; it efuses to incorporate into our organized moral self whatever is not in armony with its content.

It is because of this power and authority of conscience that the psychol- gist insists that the moral judgments we teach our children, the con- ictions we try to induce in our young people and the standards we hold p should be in accord with human nature, a coherent view of life, and a ational view of God. To think a thing wrong has the same psychological ffect as if it were wrong. Suppose a banker were to think it wrong to find imself wishing that he had some of the money in his desk to help his invalid ife to health; it might easily break him down and incapacitate him from uch work. Suppose a doctor were conscious of sex feeling when examin- ig an attractive woman and were to think that wrong and repressed it, : might easily throw him into an anxiety neurosis. Suppose a minister vere to think it wrong to enjoy or even to look for some appreciation of is sermon, it might easily set up a false conflict between love of self and ove of Christ. But think what must happen in those who have been aught that anything sexual is wrong, or that intercourse must have for :s end procreation, or that pleasure for pleasure's sake is a sign of an nregenerate soul! Suppose that to the sexual you have attached a social nd religious taboo, with its undefined threat to prestige and the soul, and an you wonder if repression with all its consequences sets in? In the ld days this threat was defined as hell, and this was much healthier; at ast the anxiety was linked with its real cause. It is this undefined reat, or rather the emotion attached to it, that becomes detached from ie repressed tendencies and then displaced upon all sorts of things nd may become so intense as to end in a tragic act. False judgments, nvictions, or standards mean that our Christian expression must be one f restraints, not one of joyous realization of the power of Christ, or joy i believing, and the peace of the assurance that in spite of every evil ndency He will keep that which we have committed unto Him against iat day—be it the day of judgment or temptation. It is this attempt on ie part of many to make human nature what it can never become that mpels them to take their " joys sadly ", or justifies the gibe of the umanist that we love the virtues in proportion to their unpleasantness, - that our Christian Good reduces itself to the proposition that the best e is some other kind of life than that which satisfies man. I am per- ctly certain from clinical experience and studies that not only is there great deal of unnecessary disabling repression among Christians, but iat owing to this wrong view of things there is more control of some ndencies than need be.

You will not misunderstand me. Any kind of moral life worth the ime will demand control, sacrifice, and renunciation. Some perfectly gitimate desires will have to be renounced; some values refused as in- mpatible with our ideal ends. But no repression or harmful effects eed result. Renunciation is conscious and, once made, brings a unity to the soul that spells peace; control brings a sense of independence alized through dependence upon Christ that is a healthy inflation of the ul. The uncontrolled expression of desire is no less harmful than re- ression; both lead to a failure to achieve an harmonious personality and us leave the soul unsatisfied.

From what I have said it should be plain that from the psychologic point of view—and I believe with Taylor, from the ethical point of view— an absolute standard for practice is out of the question. Metaphysics ma demand—and rightly—an absolute standard, but practice demands com promise. Indeed we must remember that our moral concepts (and th includes our Christian concepts), are still in evolution; and much more that the case with the moral life itself. The Christian preacher who de mands the application of an absolute standard demands what is neith possible nor desirable.

It seems to me, from the psychological point of view, at least, that thi enhances our Christian Good both theoretically and practically. Chris lays down no rules either for religion or ethics. A learned Mohammeda has made this lack of particular ethical direction a reproach of the Gospels He thinks that it is a great defect not to have anything like a code of law as in the Koran or the *O.T.* But surely this is the glory of the Gospels It was the inwardness of religion that Christ revealed, not its dogmati form; He differs from every other ethical teacher by insisting not on outwar obedience, but on the spirituality of the springs of action. Man rises, no primarily by doing the will of God, but by laying it upon his mind an conscience to discern the will of God and then to do it. Christ lays dow no regulations as to how God shall be worshipped, but, whatever form we choose, we must worship Him in spirit and in truth; He imposes n imperative as to how we shall fulfil our duty to our neighbour, but some thing far more profound: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" Christ never shows us the ethical end; He shows us the " way ".

Much of the difficulty in expressing the Christian Good in social affair and in the individual life arises from the attempt to make the applicatio of the absolute standard to particular situations. Was it not this tha underlay the fallacy of the proposal to withdraw the chaplains from th Army, and underlies a good deal of the pacifist's application of th absolute standard of non-resistance? Like asceticism it may be justifie as a protest, but apply the standard absolutely and it is found to b unworkable.

I am not unaware of the fact that differences of opinion are allowabl in regard to the application of the ideal to war; it can always be retorte that if we refused to take arms God would see to it that His imperativ would be justified. Here no proof can be offered; we must walk by faith When we come, however, to the sphere of sexual morals and their relatio to the Christian Good we are not without definite data on which to bas a judgment. The difficulty here arises without doubt from the applicatio of an absolute standard to situations which differ fundamentally, and th standard itself is based on a wrong view of human nature.

Sexual ethics is a large and difficult subject in itself, but there can b no doubt that the popularity of the criticism of the Christian Good, and th welcome which is given this criticism is due to the attack here. And i may be granted at once that the tendency of the Early Church, strengthene by the experience of Augustine, did much to reduce the sexual act to some thing shameful, or " the unfortunate necessity of married life ". M own conviction is that the paucity of women creative artists was due t the unnatural repression of the creative side of their nature owing to thi wrong view.

The sexual act should be a love act, a loving embrace. It is no because the sexual act is a sign of man's animality that the Christia moralist condemns Bertrand Russell's sexual ethics, or Lindsey's com panionate marriage, but because it is the sacred, holy sacrament of love

t is for the same reason that we condemn as false the idea that the marital mbrace should never be exercised except for procreation purposes. Such a iew reduces the whole thing to a crude biological and sensual level.

From the purely psychological point of view all these views are based n a false estimate of human nature. Bertrand Russell's psychology is psychology of the male, whose sex tendency is much more promiscuous nan that of the woman because it is not allied with the parental tendency. he latter is acquired in the male. He forgets also that indiscriminate exual intercourse before marriage may lead to regression after marriage wing to the natural tendency of sex energy to seek old channels. The iew that the sex act should only take place when procreation is desired oses sight of the fact that the instinct does not die in woman when the eriod of child-bearing comes to an end, and in the male it may be very trong even until very old age. Such a view almost invariably demands epression or such a control as to use up all the available energy that the ndividual possesses, and results in lack of concentration, irritability, ositive dissatisfaction with life. The deeper the love of husband and wife ne more likely is the tendency to the marital embrace to be stimulated, or it is the sacred expression of their oneness. The natural concomitant f the whole embrace is intense pleasure on the sensual side, and the eneration of the tender emotion on the spiritual side, which deepens their ffection and binds them together. Because there is intense sensual leasure it does not follow that it is the motive, any more than the pleasure e gain from eating is the motive for taking our lunch. On the other and, when the embrace is refused or repressed almost invariably the ntimate affection declines; and more tragic still, the tendency may with-raw itself from the loved object and seek promiscuous channels, which n a Christian man is likely to be repressed and neurotic symptoms result.

Certainly it is quite true the embrace may be renounced; and there is lenty of evidence to support the idea that continence is possible and robable without any nervous disturbance. But I am inclined to agree ith Hadfield that the tendency can never be renounced if thought wrong n itself but only repressed. In any case renunciation must be mutual lse tragedy begins.

The true Christian expression here, and one quite in accordance with ne psychology of human nature, is to lift these intimate and sacred elations to the love level, to strip them from any sense of shame, and ndow them with Christian joy. To reduce them to something which nould be done in the dark, or to make them an " unfortunate necessity f married life", is to leave one of the most intimate marital relations in n unredeemed state of sheer animalism. Such an attitude militates gainst the free joyous expression of the Christian Good in the individual. low many men and women suffer untold agonies of remorse after such elations and thus incline to repression because of this unsanctified view f the marital act! The true happiness of Christian marriage lies in the ict that the sex object and the love object are one; and the whole act lifted from the level of sensuality to the emotional-spiritual level.

From what I have said the position in regard to the Christian attitude o divorce can be easily defined. To compel a woman to live with a usband who demands conjugal rights when she has lost all respect for im and all love for him is to compel her to suffer untold agonies. A oman is very different from a man here psychologically. Sexual intimacy ith one for whom she cannot even simulate love rouses the deepest feelings f revulsion and hate. Certainly the Church allows separation in these ases; but what is forgotten is that the woman's maternal tendency may

be strong as ever it was, though it could not be aroused by her husband; and if no divorce is possible, she must remain incomplete.

As we Nonconformists allow a much greater latitude in regard to divorce than either the Roman or Anglican Church I can leave the matter and give my time to the difficult problem of birth-control. In so far as this is condemned on the ground that the marital embrace should only be indulged for procreative purposes I have already given reasons which should clear that ground from the point of view of the psychology of human nature. But there are other reasons from this point of view which we should carefully consider. In the first place birth-control has a long history. Even the most rigid, I suppose, have tried to be "careful"; and that simply means birth-control was practised without mechanical protective. Weighty reasons can be given from the economic and national points of view for control of the number of children, and all of them ought to receive full weight from those whose task it is to lead others to the highest reaches of ethical and spiritual life. Such views ought to have weight in the formation of our ethical judgments. If it is politically and economically wrong to have average families of five, it is difficult to see how it can be ethically right. The truth here must apply to every sphere if the *N.T.* doctrine that we are members of one another holds good. Some may prefer to be as Paul and remain celibate. But Paul is not a safe guide here; for marriage to him seemed to have its justification in the fact that it prevented fornication. I am sure anyone marrying for that reason to-day would be ethically condemned.

Again you have to take into account the fact of spacing the children. What is to be done with the instinctive tendencies in the interim? The great danger will be repression unless we allow the view I have upheld that the marital embrace is raised above procreative purposes, although here one has to remember that a new interest has come into the life with the child and in the mother's case that will spontaneously sublimate for the time being.

From the psychological point of view birth-control which has the conscience behind it can be amply justified. Where there is a shirking of responsibility, and the exercise of conjugal rights with no wish to have children because of selfish reasons, real spiritual life becomes an impossibility, and we have a great deal of evidence to the effect that the woman will be bound to suffer. The act becomes motivated by pleasure and not love. The real urge behind the woman is not the sexual pleasure but motherhood, and the repression of this tendency can bring very untoward results in the way of emotional disturbance. Indeed, where there are one or two children the mother is likely to have a difficult time between the ages of 35 and 40, which is the age when the urge is strongest in woman whether she has children or not. It is relevant to mark here that the difficult time through which many women pass at the period of the climacteric and before is often due to the fact that repression has been exercised all along, but the tendency was not strong enough to exhaust her energy. With the strengthening of the urge more repression will be needed if it is to be kept out of consciousness, and disturbance is almost inevitable. It is more for this reason than any other that all shame be lifted from the act, for then repression would not be needed; mutual love would continue to deepen.

I have said enough to show that the application of an absolute standard to these intimate relations of married life will result either in the Christian Good being refused altogether or in a neurotic type of Christian.

All this is closely bound up with the sense of sin. There is no joyous hristian life that is not the outcome of filial relationship with God and ellowship with Christ. It is the fact that it is through Christ that for-iveness is mediated that has given Him His high place in Christian xperience. Sin from the psychological point of view has little or nothing o do with broken laws; always the sense of sin means an experience of lienation. Sin, whether against God or man, results in the disturbance f spiritual relationships; interest is withdrawn from the loved object if ne sin is unrepented; the separation is felt as a burden when the tendency s still there but unrepented. Repentance and sorrow for sin are two ifferent things and must not be confused. Mere sorrow for sin will arry us but a very little distance towards the Christian Good; it is re-entance that is fundamental here. Sorrow for sin gives no new birth.

From the theological point of view all sin is against God. From the sychological it is not so much a sin against God, it may be against man; ut in so far as it is unrepented we are not merely separated from those gainst whom we have sinned but from God. If the sinful tendency is epressed instead of being acknowledged and repented the alienation is elt in an extreme form. And here the work of the pastor and psychologist ust converge before improvement is likely to occur. It is this new birth, ne creation of new attitudes of a psychical nature that is the real starting oint of the Christian life in the true sense of the term. The new umanists admit that a new birth is necessary; but they have no promise f a new birth nor an inkling how such a thing is to occur outside of eligion. Lippmann tells us in glowing colours what the man who is re-enerated, mature, and disinterested will be like; he will have the religion f the spirit; but unfortunately he has forgotten that the real difficulty to get the new birth—a religion which is not simply the expression of ne spirit of man at his best, but of the spirit of God.

Granted, then, the new birth, and how is the Christian Good expressed? s it not in the man who emulates Christ rather than in the man who ttempts to imitate Him? Imitation of another, even of Christ, is a sychological as well as an ethical impossiblity, for the simple reason that sychologically individuality creates those differences which separate each om the other by a great gulf in ability, outlook, and talents. Ethically ur responsibilities give us our duties; and Christ's responsibility no man an take. But we may have the mind of Christ, the single mind, the ure heart, the sanctifying of ourselves for others' sake, the mind that eeks first the Kingdom of God, seeks the things that gain by being hared. We may seek to emulate His fellowship with God though we can ever have His as it is He that mediates ours. Christ is not the proto-ype of all Christians; indeed He was not a Christian at all in the true sense f the term! it is He that creates the Christian. That is the psychology f it, whatever the theology of it may be.

That is why the Christian psychologist would lay emphasis upon the neaning of the Holy Spirit, or the indwelling Christ. This is the most mportant doctrine from the psychologist's point of view. "How am I", ays a poor soul, when the repressed tendencies are brought to consciousness again, "to control them? Will there not be a danger of their over-oming me and repression setting in again?" Certainly there will be; and nat is why the doctrine of the Spirit's power to sanctify wholly should e as widely known and as widely incorporated into the Christian attitude s any doctrine we have. Just as the indwelling Christ possesses a man, o that extent the Christian sentiments become the controlling tendencies n his life, and as all the virtues are qualities of sentiments they grow

spontaneously into the character and expression of the life that is hid wit Christ in God. Christ becomes " the objective conscience ", to use phrase of Denney's, and consequently every relationship is brought to th bar of His judgment, and thus may be controlled or renounced, neve repressed.

But that indwelling Christ cannot be kept without effort. The poss bility of freedom from repression comes from the freedom with whic Christ can reveal our evil tendencies or those not yet brought under th sway of a conscience of which He is the content. When fear reveals ou tendencies they are repressed; when Christ reveals them they are brough within His control; when fear lays bare our sin, there is repression; whe Christ does so there is healing, forgiveness, and a creative relationshi established.

Above all things, it is only as Christ comes as indwelling power tha sanctification begins. Sanctification from the psychological point of view means that all our tendencies are swept into the power of our Christia sentiments. There is no dissociation of any tendency from the conscious Christian life and its expression. What a joy it is when a man because o his fellowship with Christ becomes conscious that tendencies that were continually a source of temptation are now part of the very strength with which he is realizing his Christian life. Christ has become his will, the content of and the power of it. Will is not something that stands over against our instincts and desires. Will is just as strong as it is able to sweep into its moral purpose the strength of our instinctive tendencies. The will is that which canalizes their energy along the line of moral purpose. To say that a man's will is weak is simply to say that his tendencies are unorganized. To say that he has a strong will is simply to say that his inner life is organized on a moral basis. When the organizing object is Christ Himself the very tendencies which gave us sorrow and led to sin, are themselves our strength. Such sanctificaton sometimes comes suddenly, sometimes it is of slow growth; all depends on the degree we have left self-love and surrendered to God.

Pyschologically this is realized when we know that the sources of our life are not within but without, to use Grensted's argument. Our minds become fixed, not on our knowledge of God but on His knowledge of us. He knows where we dwell, knows the temptations that beset us, the divisions in our soul. We find our assurance not in our love to God; that is too inconstant, but on God's love to us. It is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; striving always for our sanctification, and forbearing with our sin, Finally, it is God's faith in us that holds us. He has such faith in us that He has forgiven us, borne with us, given us our very task in life. And we simply dare not let Him down; for that would be to crucify Christ afresh. Our own faith lies in appropriating these; experiencing these rather than intellectually conceptualizing them. And with such an experience how can our lives be other than that joyous, victorious expression of a " more than conqueror "? How can we fail to grow in grace if within and without there hold us

> that one Face
> Which far from vanish rather grows,
> And decomposes but to re-compose,
> Becomes my universe that feels and knows.